

GERMANY SINCE 1710

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# GERMANY SINCE 1740

BY

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TO  
MY SISTER  
R. P. I.



## PREFACE

The rise of modern Germany has long attracted the interest of American readers, but interest has often been baffled by the complexities of German state and national life and by the mass of detail which historians have included in their accounts of Germany. Many Americans desire, I believe, an introduction to German history. I have attempted to meet this desire by choosing the most interesting period — from the accessions of Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great in 1740 down to recent times — and presenting only the most important events of this period.

Both for facts and for ideas I am indebted to German as well as English printed sources and to numerous Princeton friends and colleagues. More particular gratitude has been richly merited by Professor Sidney B. Fay of Smith College, who read the manuscript of the whole book with exceeding care and offered many acute observations and suggestions. To John Haughton Coney I can no longer voice acknowledgment of the stimulus which his counsel always gave, for he is gone, and Princeton and American historical science have lost one of their noblest spirits.

GEORGE M. PRIEST

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## A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS IN GERMAN HISTORY SINCE 1740

1740. Germany, or the Holy Roman Empire, composed of 318 states, is a federation of great age, but it is approaching disintegration because it lacks a strongly centralized government and unifying leadership.
- 1740-1748. Charles VI, Archduke of Austria and head of the Holy Roman Empire, dies in 1740 without a male heir, leaving the succession of his daughter Maria Theresa in doubt. Frederick II (the Great), who has just (1740) become the king of Prussia, disputes Maria Theresa's succession to lands in Silesia and wins almost all of Silesia by conquest, 1740-1742 and 1744-1745. Bavaria, Saxony, France, and other states also contest the succession of Maria Theresa — in the War of the Austrian Succession, 1741-1748 — but gain no territory permanently. The elector of Bavaria becomes the head of the Holy Roman Empire in 1742 as Charles VII, but dies in 1745, and the husband of Maria Theresa succeeds him as Francis I. The War of the Austrian Succession ends with the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which secures to Maria Theresa the possession of all her father's realms except Silesia.
- 1756-1763. Frederick hears that Austria, France, and Russia, resentful of his success, are plotting to seize and dismember Prussia; he therefore tries to checkmate his enemies by forcing hostilities. The Seven Years' War follows, leaving, by the Peace of Hubertusburg, the boundaries of each contestant's domains just as they were before.
1765. Francis I is succeeded by his son Joseph II (1765-1790) in Austria and the Holy Roman Empire, but Maria Theresa retains control until her death in 1780.
- 1772, 1793, 1795. Poland is partitioned among Russia, Prussia, and Austria.
1786. Frederick the Great dies after a reign of enlightened despotism, leaving Prussia thoroughly organized, equipped with a large standing army, and recognized as a power of the first class.
1789. The French Revolution and its overthrow of absolutism lead to the intermeddling of Austria and Prussia in French affairs (1792), to the downfall of the French monarchy, and to the campaign of the First Coalition against France (1793).

1795. Prussia, in the demoralizing reign of Frederick William II (1786–1797), deserts its allies by signing the Peace of Basel with France.
1801. Austria, under Leopold II (1790–1792) and Francis II (1792–1835), continues the struggle against France, but is forced, in its own name and in that of the Holy Roman Empire, to the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797) and, after the defeat of the Second Coalition by Napoleon Bonaparte, to the Treaty of Lunéville (1801), which cedes to France the whole of the west bank of the Rhine. The Treaty of Lunéville also causes, by a process of consolidation, a great reduction in the number of states in the Holy Roman Empire.
1805. The war of the Third Coalition ends in the Treaty of Pressburg and in the formation (1806) of the Confederation of the Rhine through the union of Baden, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and thirteen lesser German states under the protectorate of Napoleon.
1806. The Holy Roman Empire is formally dissolved by the abdication of Francis; henceforth he is known as Francis I, Emperor of Austria.
- 1806–1807. Napoleon completes his domination of Germany by warring against Prussia, which is now under the timid Frederick William III (1797–1840) and is feebly supported in the so-called Fourth Coalition. Napoleon forces Prussia, in the Peace of Tilsit, to cede half its territory.
1809. Austria rises against Napoleon for the fourth time, but is again defeated.
1812. Napoleon conducts a disastrous campaign against Russia, losing nearly half a million men.
1813. Prussia, regenerated by internal reforms and encouraged by Napoleon's calamities in 1812, leads the way, in the War of Liberation, to a national uprising against Napoleon. Prussia, Austria, states of the Rhine Confederation, and Russia—the Fifth Coalition—defeat Napoleon decisively in the Battle of Leipsic.
1815. England and Germany overthrow Napoleon finally in the Battle of Waterloo. The Congress of Vienna reconstructs the map of Europe and constitutes the German Confederation out of thirty-eight loosely federated German states with Austria as permanent president.
- 1815–1848. The German Confederation does not fulfil the popular desire for national unity, and the rulers of individual states fail to establish a permanent form of representative constitutional government. Many rulers, prompted by Metternich, the prime minister of Austria, revert to practices of eighteenth-century absolutism, in order to crush the political aspirations of their people. The

accession of Ferdinand I (1835-1848) in Austria and of Frederick William IV (1840-1857) in Prussia does not alter the situation.

↓1834. The Zollverein, established by Prussia, binds many German states together in commercial opportunities and, by thus nationalizing German life, is the first step toward national German unity.

1848-1851. The Revolution in France, overthrowing the monarchy and establishing a republic, starts insurrections all over Germany, whereby the people secure many concessions from their rulers. A national parliament, elected by popular suffrage, assembles in Frankfort-on-the-Main and offers the title of "Emperor of Germany" to Frederick William IV, but he refuses to accept a crown from the people. Monarchists regain the control of Austria—where Francis Joseph succeeded in 1848—insurrections in other states are checked, almost all the concessions to the people are withdrawn, and the German Confederation lasts on as before. The one conspicuous gain of all the insurrections is the constitution granted to the people of Prussia.

1850. The rivalry of Austria and Prussia for preëminence in Germany advances into the foreground, when Prussia tries to gather all the German states except Austria into a union which shall accept Prussia as its leader. Austrian influence breaks up the Prussian union before it becomes formidable.

1850-1860. The relations between Austria and Prussia grow more and more tense. Austria loses its possessions in Italy (1859), but it strengthens its position in Germany by establishing constitutional government in its remaining provinces. Meanwhile William I succeeds (1857) in Prussia and begins a thorough reorganization of the army although the Prussian Legislature refuses appropriations.

↓1862. Bismarck is appointed Prime Minister of Prussia. Bismarck desires national unity, not, however, as a consummation of the will of the people, but as the achievement and gift of the king of Prussia. He also believes that in order to compass German unity all connection between Austria and other German states must be broken.

1864. Contrary to the will of the German people, Bismarck forces a war upon Denmark, which results in the cession of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia and Austria.

1866. Bismarck irritates Austria; Austria retaliates by breaking a convention with Prussia concerning Schleswig and Holstein and thereby gives Bismarck a *casus belli*. Though supported by only a few of the other German states, Prussia enters upon the Austro-Prussian

War, and, with its reorganized army, defeats Austria and its many German allies in less than seven weeks. By the Peace of Prague, Austria is excluded from all political union with Germany. Prussia forms under its presidency the North German Federation, consisting of the twenty-two states north of the Main. Thus German unity is established, and modern Germany is made, though it is not yet complete. The South German states enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia.

✓ 1870-1871. France sees its commanding position on the Continent threatened by a new rival; Bismarck expects war on this account, and he desires war as a means of welding the South German states together with those of the north. When France assumes an unreasonable attitude toward Prussia, Bismarck forces France to stand its ground, and the Franco-German War ensues. By the Peace of Frankfort (May 1871), France gives up Alsace and a large part of Lorraine. Meanwhile the South German states have joined the Federation, and the German Empire has been proclaimed (January 1871), with the king of Prussia as hereditary German Emperor.

✓ 1879. A Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria is formed, which is expanded into the Triple Alliance by the inclusion of Italy in 1882, and formally published in 1888.

1880-1890. Germany acquires colonies in the South Seas and in Africa. William I dies (1888) and is succeeded by his son Frederick III, who reigns only ninety-nine days. Frederick is succeeded in June 1888 by his son William II. Bismarck is dismissed from the chancellorship in March 1890.

1890-1914. Germany enters upon a period which is marked by vast industrial expansion and increase of material prosperity, by the enlargement of the standing army, by the creation of a navy, by the growth of political consciousness among the people and of demands on their part for a larger share in their own government. At the same time Germany seeks more and more vigorously an outlet for its energy; England fears Germany's commercial competition as well as its aggressive tendencies; France remembers the loss of Alsace and Lorraine and fears its eclipse as a power of the first class; Russia nurtures Pan-Slavism and seeks to close the door to Germany's expansion toward the Near East. On the one hand the Triple Alliance has long been standing; on the other rises the Triple Entente of Russia, France, and England. Trouble in the Balkans at last relieves the tension by plunging Europe into war in August 1914.





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**ABBREVIATIONS**

- |                       |                      |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Abp.....Archbishopric | K.....Kingdom        |
| Bp.....Bishopric      | Ldg.....Landgraviate |
| C.....County          | Mg.....Margraviate   |
| D.....Duchy           | Pr.....Principality  |
| El.....Electorate     |                      |



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2 B 4 C 6 D 8 E 10 F 12

G 11 from H 16 J 18 Green K 20 L 22 M 24 N 26



**GERMANY  
IN 1740**



- Boundary of Germany
- Territories of Brandenburg
- Line of Hohenzollern
- Territories of Austrian Hapsburgs
- Ecclesiastical Territories
- Chief Imperial Free Cities

Many minor states, ecclesiastical and lay, and free towns are necessarily omitted.

G 11 H 16 J 18 K 20 L 22 M



# GERMANY SINCE 1740

## CHAPTER I

### GERMANY AS IT WAS IN 1740

The German Empire of 1740 was established on Christmas Day 800 when the Pope placed the imperial crown on the head of Charlemagne in Rome. From that time until far down the Middle Ages the Empire stood forth as the great power in western Europe. Conjointly with the Papacy it was the acknowledged head of Christendom. But the Empire comprised many different racial elements which could not be coalesced. A political unit in name, the Empire was never one in spirit. In the centuries which followed Charlemagne various emperors tried to mold the imperial provinces into an organic whole—Otto the Great (936–973) succeeded in part—but all were ultimately defeated either by intrigues of powerful nobles or by divergence of material interests. Luther created a feeling of national unity by means of his *Translation of the Bible* (1534), as Germans realized in it the possession of a mother-tongue common to them all. But the religious differences of the Reformation ranged German states against each other in bitter partisanship, and the ravages of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), the culmination of this hostility, added unparalleled want and misery to spiritual discord that could not be reconciled. The Treaty of Westphalia,

1. Antecedent history of the German Empire of 1740

which concluded the Thirty Years' War, left the states of Germany as disunited as they ever were. Provisions of this treaty were still regulating affairs of the German Empire in 1740.

**2. The title, area, and population of the Empire**

For many years Germany had borne the official title of "The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation"; "Holy" in order to mark the secular state as divinely appointed and as a counterpart to "the Holy Catholic Church"; "Roman" because the German Empire was conceived as a continuation of the ancient Roman Empire; "of the German Nation" because the head of the Holy Roman Empire was the chosen leader of the German peoples. In the following pages, until the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, the terms "Germany," "the German Empire," and "the Holy Roman Empire" will be used, in accordance with the custom of the eighteenth century, as synonyms of each other. In 1740 Germany included Austria as well and thus embraced a territory which nearly doubled the area occupied by the German Empire of recent decades. In round terms, Germany included four hundred and fifty thousand square miles of land, or equaled that portion of the United States which lies east of the Mississippi River and north of Tennessee and North Carolina. The exact number of people in this great territory is not known, but it was probably between twenty-five and thirty millions.

**3. The political conditions of the Empire**

The Holy Roman Empire consisted in 1740 of three hundred and eighteen states. Each of these states enjoyed full territorial sovereignty and the right to form alliances with any other states or with foreign powers on condition that such alliances should not be injurious to the emperor or to the Empire. Each state might have an army of its own, coin its own money, and regulate its own tolls and

customs-houses. Thus, as the heads of the large majority of the states were absolute monarchs by hereditary right, each ruling prince in 1740 exercised absolute sovereignty in his own dominions and felt himself attached to the Empire chiefly by tradition and sentiment. The Imperial Diet might make laws for the Empire and declare war and conclude treaties in the name of Germany. But the decisions of the Diet were dependent upon a unanimity that could rarely be attained, and the Diet had no efficient means of enforcing decrees which it might pass. The practical difficulties of this situation blocked progressive legislation hopelessly. The sessions of the Diet had therefore degenerated into long and solemn discussions of very frivolous matters; for example, which of two duchies should vote first, and whether the envoys of princes should sit on chairs of red or green cloth. In the seventies of the eighteenth century the Imperial Court of Law at Wetzlar faced a docket of sixty thousand undecided lawsuits. Thus, through the impotence of the central government and through the guaranteed petty sovereignty of the states, the Holy Roman Empire of the eighteenth century failed completely to give its subjects a sense of national unity and a large national life. As it was then constituted, it was hastening inevitably toward final disintegration. Thoughtful people realized this failure even then and foresaw the coming collapse. Goethe in his young manhood was only expressing the sentiment of the age when he put into the mouth of a student in *Faust*: "The poor old Holy Roman realm, how does it hold together?"

The states of the Empire varied greatly in extent and in the character of their government. The hereditary lands of the archduke of Austria composed about half of the Empire; a few of the remaining three hundred and

4. The size of the states of the Empire and the character of their government



seventeen states barely surpassed the burgraviate of Reineck, which, it seems, could boast of only one castle and twelve subjects. Nevertheless a state might enjoy the rank of a kingdom or a duchy or a county; it might be a free imperial city; it might be ruled over by an archbishop or an abbot or a prior. The actual government ranged from the unblushing tyranny of sundry princes to the semi-republicanism of free cities; in many free cities the government was determined by limited suffrage and popular representation in legislative assemblies. Little monarchies were very prone to copy the court of Louis XIV; regardless of the inordinate taxation which it entailed, they vied with each other in setting up weak and foolish imitations of the court of Versailles. The heads of other states were meanwhile striving to bind up the wounds of the Thirty Years' War and thus to provide a reasonable amount of comfort and prosperity for their subjects; for many years after 1648 the restoration of conditions before the war marked the acme of any ruler's hopes, but few achieved even this by 1740. Even state loyalty and state patriotism found little nourishment for growth when the memory of recent disasters was still vivid and the knowledge of a distant and more glorious past had been obliterated by the intervening years. One reads but little of open strife between the states from 1648 to 1740, but boundary disputes, jealousy, and suspicion perpetuated the apartness of one state from another. Individual states were frankly determined not to sacrifice their own interests for those of all the states combined, thus giving a final emphasis to the lack of cohesion throughout the Holy Roman Empire.

5. The election of the emperor

The supreme head of all these three hundred and eighteen states was chosen by the majority of certain leading princes of the Empire. Originally there were



seven of these princely electors, but by 1740 the number had been increased to nine. Three were the German archbishops of the Roman Catholic Church at Mainz, Trier, and Cologne; six were the secular rulers of Bohemia, Saxony, Prussia, the Palatinate of the Rhine, Bavaria, and Hanover. Theoretically these electors met after the death of each emperor and chose without fear or favor the new head of the Empire. As a matter of fact their choice was predetermined, as each emperor before his death secured the promise of the various electors to vote for a successor who had already been selected by the emperor himself. In every case for three hundred years preceding 1740, the emperor, and the electoral college after him, had chosen a member of the reigning emperor's own family as his successor.

For three centuries the ruling house of Austria, the Hapsburg family, had furnished the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. As the possessions of the archduchy of Austria equaled all the rest of the Empire put together, the leadership and the predominating influence of Austria were well founded. But the Austrian possessions were widely scattered; many of them lay entirely outside of the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire; and they were very heterogeneous in character. Besides the German-speaking inhabitants of Austria proper, the Hapsburg family ruled over the Czechs of Bohemia and the Magyars of Hungary, over the Rumanians in Transylvania, over the Italians of provinces scattered all the way from Milan to Naples, and over the Flemings of Belgium; in 1740 Belgium was known as the Austrian Netherlands. Austria proved its claim to rank among the first powers of Europe, if in no other way, by holding together these variegated possessions; but in order to

6. Austria  
the leading  
state of the  
Empire

achieve this, the Hapsburgs sacrificed their opportunities and their obligations as heads of the Holy Roman Empire. Pursuing the selfish dynastic policy of their family, they devoted all their attention to their own hereditary possessions and gave the Holy Roman Empire not a single emperor who labored earnestly for the unification and progress of the Empire.

7. Other  
important  
states

Through age as well as through honorable achievements many states besides Austria were widely known throughout Germany and Europe and figured conspicuously in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Among these were Bavaria, just west of Austria proper in South Germany, and the electorate of Saxony in central Germany, directly north of the Austrian possession of Bohemia. In 1740 the duke of Bavaria hoped at the death of the archduke of Austria to succeed to the Austrian dominions by inheritance through an elder female branch of the Hapsburgs. The duke, or as he was more generally called, the elector of Saxony cherished similar hopes and for the same reason. His position in Germany was further strengthened by the fact that he had been elected by the Polish diet as head of its kingdom. The duchy of Würtemberg, west of Bavaria, and the margraviate of Baden, west of Würtemberg, were also important states. In North Germany the duchy, or electorate, of Hanover loomed large, in great part because its head was also king of England from 1714 to 1837. For many years Hanover aspired to play among the states of North Germany the leading rôle which Austria played in the south. These aspirations were destined, however, to be blighted by Hanover's next-door neighbor to the east, the kingdom of Prussia.

The growth of Prussia under the Hohenzollern family forms one of the most important chapters in modern

European history. The original home of the Hohenzollerns lay in the former South German duchy of Swabia, but as early as the twelfth century a scion of the family went to Nuremberg and there secured for himself and his descendants the position of burgrave, or "count of the city." In 1415, however, in return for financial assistance of three years before, the reigning emperor conferred the Mark of Brandenburg together with its electoral vote upon the burgrave Frederick of Hohenzollern. Originally one of the border provinces of the Empire — hence its name, "Mark," or "march" — the Mark of Brandenburg lay in northern Germany; in 1415 it embraced about ten thousand square miles, approximately equal to Massachusetts and Rhode Island combined, with Berlin near the center. In the hands of Frederick and his heirs, the electorate of Brandenburg became one of the most flourishing of all the North German principalities. At the time of the Reformation, Albert, a member of a subordinate branch of the Hohenzollern family, was the chosen Grand Master of the Knights of the Teutonic Order. He became a Protestant, dissolved the Order in 1525, and received in fief of the king of Poland a part of the old territories of the Order, namely, the duchy of East Prussia; this is now the extreme northeastern province of the kingdom of Prussia. In 1618 the duchy fell by inheritance to the elector of Brandenburg, and in 1657 its permanent independence of Poland was secured.

Frederick William (reigned 1640–1688), "the Great Elector" of Brandenburg, laid the foundations of the modern house of Hohenzollern. He built up a strongly centralized government; he developed agriculture and trade so that his people became comparatively wealthy; and he created a strong standing army. In the reign of

8. Origins of the Hohenzollerns and of Prussia

9. The founders of the kingdom of Prussia

his son and successor Frederick (1688–1713), the electorate of Brandenburg was merged, by imperial sanction, into the Kingdom of Prussia ; with the title of Frederick I the new king assumed the royal crown amid great splendor on January 18, 1701 in the city of Königsberg. The royal treasure which Frederick depleted in order to acquire and embellish his new dignity was restored and enlarged by his frugal son Frederick William I (1713–1740). The army grew to a host of 80,000 thoroughly drilled soldiers, and the centralized government of the Great Elector was converted into an absolute monarchy. These bequests of Frederick William I to his son paved the way for a series of startling events which began in 1740.

The life of the German people embodied the unhappy effects of existing political conditions, and at the same time it contained the germs of a new being. The Thirty Years' War took from the German people all initiative and enterprise for many years ; it gave them a craving for continued peace, for law and order at any price. Men found it comparatively easy therefore in the absence of war to realize a measurable degree of happiness. They paid the bills of extravagant courts without much grumbling, and were satisfied with the large or small crumbs of good government which fell from their rulers' tables. The peasants suffered most. Burdened by taxation and required to perform fixed services for their landlords, they were bound to the soil and passed from one owner of an estate to another along with plows and other farming implements. Traces of medieval conditions also clung to many towns. Few were lighted at night ; few boasted any paved streets ; many were still enclosed by old walls and ramparts ; communication between them still depended upon more or less infrequent and unreliable stagecoaches.

For a century and more German life had contained no impulse to the creation of an honorable literature. In 1740 Germans read chiefly the literature of other nations, France and England particularly; weak imitations of Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* and the *Spectator* of Addison and Steele were read with especial delight. German architecture and sculpture had produced memorable works, for example, the Zwinger at Dresden, but these works without exception also show the deep influence of foreign models. Only music had maintained independence and originality. Like the German hymn, the one great achievement of German literature in two hundred years, music had sprung directly from the high spiritual fervor of the Reformation and the heart-rending tribulations of the Thirty Years' War; it had found immortal form in the works of Bach and Händel. Thus, purely intellectual vitality was at a low ebb in 1740; but two great forces had begun to leaven German life and thought. The "pietistic movement" was turning men away from blind adherence to dogmatic doctrines which had been set up by the Church; it was teaching men that true Christianity sprang only from a close prayerful relation to a personal God; pietism was thus reviving ardent feeling and it was spurring imagination. Rationalism likewise protested against adherence to traditional dogma. It differed from pietism in subjecting all theories and all phenomena of life to the test of reason. Both forces made for independence; rationalism made for intellectual vigor and liberty as well. The history of German literature in the eighteenth century presents not a single author of great repute whose early life was void of pietistic influences. German philosophy and German science of the nineteenth century could hardly have come into being without rationalism as a forbear.

## CHAPTER II

### THE WARS OF MARIA THERESA AND FREDERICK THE GREAT

1740-1763

12. The  
death of  
Charles VI  
and its effect

Charles VI, head of the Holy Roman Empire and archduke of Austria, died in October 1740. Throughout many years Charles had feared that at his death his lack of male issue would induce various rulers to seize a part of the Hapsburg possessions. He had therefore spared no efforts to secure the promises of the most important European nations and German states that they would permit his daughter Maria Theresa (born 1717) to inherit her father's dominions unimpaired. Many nations and states had given their promise ; but, in view of the treacherous course which international politics of the eighteenth century often followed, no one was sure that any of these promises would be kept. The news of the death of Charles VI sounded in the ears of Europe like the curtain bell of a long-awaited drama. Every one knew that the stage was set ; whether for tragedy or serio-comedy no one could foretell. All doubt soon vanished. Bavaria at once reasserted its claims to all the Austrian possessions and to the succession as head of the Empire ; Saxony followed suit ; France manifested its desire for the Austrian Netherlands. But Maria Theresa's most fateful enemy came from the kingdom of Prussia. With speed and energy he came and struck before any other claimant mobilized his army.



Prussia's claim to Austrian territory went back to the year 1537. By a treaty made at that time the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg and a ducal house of Silesia agreed that on failure of issue on either side the other should inherit the lands of the decedent. Such treaties were frequently made; but the emperor of that time, who was also king of Bohemia, refused to acknowledge this one because the Silesian house had become the voluntary vassal of the Bohemian Crown two centuries before. When the ducal house did fail of issue in 1675, the emperor seized the Silesian lands. At the same time, however, he gave the Hohenzollerns a compensation in the form of other land and thus lent a semblance of legality to the Hohenzollern claim. This compensatory land which Austria had given to the Great Elector, Austria next took back from the Great Elector's son Frederick I. From that time on the Hohenzollern claim, though never renounced, lay dormant until the death of Charles VI, five months after Frederick II (born 1712) had become king of Prussia. Frederick saw in Charles's death an opportunity to reassert and to secure the Hohenzollern claim; he proceeded at once to realize it. This determination on the part of Frederick cannot be wholly condemned, as custom and usage were on the side of the Hohenzollerns when the original treaty was made; this custom and usage furnished the basis on which Frederick defended his act in a later writing. But in Frederick's own time public opinion was already giving more weight to the dependent relation between the Silesian ducal house and Bohemia. In the eighteenth century and ever since, Frederick's act has more and more appeared like an attempt to impose sixteenth-century conceptions of law and of the right of might on an age of higher standards. Few people outside of

13. Prussia's  
claim to  
Silesia

Prussia have ever believed that Frederick's course was thoroughly justified or that he was actuated solely by a desire for justice. Indeed, Frederick himself gives authority to this view. In his *Memoirs* he says with convincing audacity that he seized the opportunity of 1740 as "a means of acquiring reputation and of increasing the power of the state."

14. The First  
Silesian War  
and the War  
of the Aus-  
trian Suc-  
cession

In November 1740 Frederick offered to assist Maria Theresa to the undisputed possession of her father's throne and dominions if she would give him a part of Silesia, but she refused the offer. In December Frederick invaded Silesia with an army of 22,000 men. With the exception of three fortresses the whole province surrendered to him before February 1741. A decisive Prussian victory over Austrian veterans in April paved the way to an alliance two months later between Prussia and France. In November Frederick joined the general coalition of Bavaria, Saxony, many lesser German states, Sweden, France, Spain, and Sardinia against Austria and its allies: England, Holland, and Russia. Frederick's fight for Silesia thus became a part of the War of the Austrian Succession. An army of Bavarians and French marched victoriously through a part of Austria and after uniting with Saxon forces took Prague. Here the elector of Bavaria was crowned king of Bohemia; a month later, January 1742, he was chosen emperor of the Holy Roman Empire under the title of Charles VII. Another victory of the Prussians over the Austrians determined Austria to dispose of the enemy at its flank by making peace with him. The resulting Treaty of Breslau (June 1742) gave Frederick Silesia; but he deserted his allies to achieve it. As Maria Theresa could now turn with far greater effect against her remaining enemies, she succeeded in wrenching Bohemia from



them before the end of the year, and in May 1743 she was crowned queen of Bohemia. In June the energetic coöperation of English, Hanoverian, and Austrian troops resulted in a brilliant victory over the combined French and Bavarian armies. Saxony and Sardinia went over to the side of Austria a few months later. Austria's star was in the ascendant.

As Austria gathered strength, Frederick doubted more and more the permanence of his hold on Silesia. In June 1744, therefore, he made a new alliance with France; in August, under the pretense of assisting the emperor, Charles VII, he opened the Second Silesian War. He captured Prague in September, but the French left him in the lurch, and he was forced to retire into Silesia for the winter. Partly through indolence, partly through insufficient money and men, the new emperor had never been able to help himself, much less Frederick. From the Prussian point of view it was an irony of fate when Charles VII died in January 1745. The ground of Frederick's contention was cut from under his feet. In the very same month Austria, Saxony, England, and Holland formed the Quadruple Alliance for the purpose of dividing Prussia among themselves. After concluding a peace with the new elector of Bavaria, Maria Theresa sent (May 1745) an army of Austrians and Saxons over the Riesengebirge into Silesia to crush Frederick. Lured on by his seeming torpor, they penetrated into the heart of Silesia. At Hohenfriedberg, on a June morning soon after dawn, Frederick fell upon them with bewildering fury and success. A single regiment of 1500 cavalymen brought in 2500 prisoners and 66 standards; the Austrians and Saxons lost more than four times as many men as the Prussians. Frederick hoped for peace, but Maria Theresa was by no means defeated in spirit. In September

15. The  
Second  
Silesian War

her confidence increased when her husband, formerly duke of Lorraine and now grand duke of Tuscany, was elected emperor of the Holy Roman Empire as Francis I. A plan was soon evolved for the invasion of Prussia by three Austrian and Saxon armies. But as they were advancing certain of success, Frederick charged and routed them (November 1745). Three weeks later a victory of one of his generals opened the way for Frederick to the capital of Saxony. In Dresden, on Christmas Day, a peace was signed whereby, in return for the confirmation of his possession of Silesia, Frederick acknowledged Francis I as emperor.

16. The end  
of the War of  
the Austrian  
Succession

With the Peace of Dresden tranquillity returned to the German Empire. But Austria was forced to continue its struggle with France and Spain in order to maintain possession of its provinces lying without the Empire. In 1746 the chief engagements were in Italy, in 1747 in the Austrian Netherlands; both campaigns went against Austria, though it was assisted in the one by Sardinia and in the other by England. At last, in 1748, Austria entered into an alliance with Russia, and England hired a Russian army. When this fresh force crossed Germany in the summer of 1748 on its way to the chief scene of conflict, along the Rhine, France decided to conclude peace. The articles which now closed the War of the Austrian Succession were signed in October 1748 at Aix-la-Chapelle. By this peace Austria again confirmed Frederick's possession of Silesia and it also relinquished three Italian provinces, but it regained the Netherlands, which France had seized during the war. Austria thus lost heavily, but the chief principle for which it had contended, the succession of Maria Theresa in Austria and the Holy Roman Empire, was permanently established.

When Frederick returned home from the Silesian Wars, he was already greeted by his exultant subjects as Frederick "the Great." To the heritage from the Great Elector and Frederick William I — a full treasury, a large army, and a well-centralized government — Frederick had added surpassing strategic ability in war and the magic inspiration of a born leader of men. By these means he had acquired a province of a million and a quarter inhabitants and sixteen thousand square miles, that is, in area more than Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts combined; he had won the devotion of his people; and he had made a name for himself throughout Europe in two brief campaigns. But the very brilliance of his triumph and his unholy consummation of it through repeated desertion of sworn allies left him exposed to the sore jealousy of Austria and the distrust of all Europe. On the other hand, Austria's prestige as the leading and most powerful state of the Empire had been openly questioned by Bavaria, Saxony, and Prussia. Though Bavaria and Saxony had failed of their purpose, a large Austrian province had passed into the hands of Prussia. On this account Austrian jealousy of Prussia now struck its roots deep. From this jealousy and from the obvious rivalry which thus began between Austria and Prussia sprang many events in the history of Germany far down into the nineteenth century.

In years of peace Frederick devoted himself to the development of his state with a zeal that has rarely been surpassed, but in the decade after the close of the Second Silesian War he was quickened more and more in his activity by an increasing sense of the dangers which threatened him from abroad. Knowing that in case of war he would have to depend mainly upon the resources of his

17. Results  
of the wars  
of 1740-1748

18. The rise  
of a coalition  
against  
Frederick

own country, he gave to trade and agriculture every incentive at his command, replenished his treasury, and nearly doubled his standing army, now a body of 150,000 men. Maria Theresa meanwhile instituted reforms in her army, but she sought strength chiefly through alliances with foreign powers. She was by no means reconciled to the loss of Silesia — it is told of her that she could not see a Silesian without tears — and time and resentment were bringing her powerful friends. The ancient hostility between Austria and France was bridged over; Frederick's biting epigrams against the mistress of Louis XV, Madame de Pompadour, clinched the Austrian-French alliance. The empress of Russia, Elizabeth, whose notorious life had been sharply ridiculed by Frederick, likewise shared Maria Theresa's hatred of the "upstart" rival. Sweden was ready to enter an alliance against Prussia, as it desired to regain the Baltic port Stettin and thus secure a foothold on the Continent. Lastly, almost every state of the German Empire eventually took active part against Prussia either through jealousy of its successes or on account of the traditional prestige of Austria as head of the Empire. Speaking in round numbers, the allies commanded full 500,000 troops; Frederick mustered about 200,000.

George II of England, who was also elector of Hanover, feared that Frederick would seize his Hanoverian possessions west of Prussia. But war broke out just then between France and England in America, the French and Indian War. If France transferred the scene of conflict to Europe, it would naturally, with the aid of the Austrian Netherlands as a base of operations, attack Hanover. George's fear of this drove him to an alliance with Frederick. For several years England gave Prussia an annual subsidy of £150,000; its troops also assisted Frederick indirectly

19. Frederick  
assisted by  
England

at certain crises by keeping the French occupied in and west of Hanover; but Frederick fought his own battles without any aid from English troops, and he sent many of his soldiers to assist England in driving and keeping the French out of Hanover. In 1756 Frederick received proof of the existence of a coalition consisting of Austria, Rùssia, and France, whose purpose was the dismemberment of Prussia. When Maria Theresa evaded and then repulsed his inquiries about the reasons for her increasing armament, he resolved to anticipate his enemies and to strike first and hard.

In August 1756 Frederick led 70,000 men into Saxony and thus began the Seven Years' War. Saxony was captured in a few weeks and converted into winter quarters for the Prussian troops. In the following spring Frederick entered Bohemia and fought the first big fight of the war near Prague in May 1757. Here Frederick's troops crossed a broad stretch of marshy meadows under the fire of the Austrian guns on the heights above, stormed the fortifications, and drove the Austrians into Prague. Frederick and his men reaped the moral benefit of a great victory, but they lost nearly a fifth, 12,000, of their comrades. A month later Frederick was badly beaten by the advancing Austrian reënforcements, and the siege of Prague had to be abandoned. During the summer of 1757 the Russians overran East Prussia, the Swedes landed in Pomerania, and France seized Hanover. The triumph of the coalition seemed certain. In October Frederick heard that the hostile states of the Empire had formed a large army, and that this army was marching north to join the French. Fearing that their juncture would mean the loss of his capital, Berlin, Frederick headed for Leipsic at full speed to prevent the union.

20. The beginning of the Seven Years' War, 1756

The Battle of Rossbach, November 1757

All Europe looked upon him as ruined. But early in November 1757, at Rossbach, Frederick achieved one of those sudden, utterly unexpected victories which made him the wonder of his age. He failed to avert the union of the French troops and the army of the Empire, but when the allies were marching in a long thin line with the purpose of surrounding the Prussians, Frederick threw his troops upon them like a thunderbolt. In an hour and a half, against odds of more than two to one, he put the whole army of the allies to flight. He lost less than 600 men; his opponents lost nearly 8000. The armies of the allies scattered all over Germany.

21. The  
Battle of  
Leuthen,  
December  
1757

The Austrians now engaged Frederick's still more serious attention. They had captured Breslau, the capital of Silesia, and Frederick had to dislodge them or yield his most treasured possession. In twelve days he led his troops one hundred and seventy miles through difficult country. On the fifth of December 1757, just a month after Rossbach, Frederick with an army of 33,000 men met the Austrian army of 82,000 at Leuthen in Silesia. Here he used his famous "oblique" attack; that is, he marched his troops obliquely to the enemy's left so that his right wing might half encircle the Austrian left and drive it back upon the center and right. The Austrian ranks crumpled up under the terrific charge, first the left, and then the center; the town of Leuthen was seized by the Prussians, and a cavalry charge decided the battle. The Austrians left 10,000 men on the field; 21,000 of them were taken prisoners. The Prussians lost 5500. Napoleon called the Battle of Leuthen "a masterpiece" and said that it alone would have been sufficient to make Frederick immortal. Within a month, under different conditions both in the character of the country and in



the style of attack, with desperate odds against him in both cases, Frederick had crushed both the French and Austrian armies, two of the most renowned armies of the time. He had cleared the country south of Berlin of the enemy, and he had again made good his claim to Silesia.

In the campaign of 1758 Frederick's ally, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, drove the French out of Hanover and across the Rhine, and Frederick defeated the Russians who had ventured too near Berlin. He was beaten by the Austrians, but he prevented them from gaining any benefits from their victory. Unluckily for Frederick, combined action on the part of his enemies, hitherto not realized, was accomplished in 1759. The Russians and Austrians joined forces, about 90,000 in all, at Kunersdorf, fifty miles east of Berlin, in August 1759, and Frederick tempted fortune by attacking them with 50,000 men. The night closed down, after six hours of fighting, on the greatest calamity Frederick had ever experienced. He left nearly half his army on the battlefield. For a time Frederick himself gave up all hope. But the allies failed to press their advantage, partly through sluggishness, partly through petty jealousy of each other. Silesia was lost to Frederick, and 1759 ended with only the one ray of hope which came from a substantial victory over the French by the duke of Brunswick aided by English troops. In 1760, however, Frederick regained Silesia after a victory against odds of more than two to one. In the autumn of the same year he heard that the Austrians were establishing winter quarters at Torgau in Saxony. Unwilling to leave them ensconced so near his own frontier, he resolved in early November to attack the Austrians and drive them out of Saxony. The Battle of Torgau, fought partly in the dark

22. The campaigns of 1758-1760

The Battle of Kunersdorf, August 1759

The Battle of Torgau, November 1760

of evening, was a frightful hand-to-hand slaughter, the bloodiest of the whole war. With his 44,000 men Frederick drove 65,000 Austrians out of Torgau and Saxony, but he lost nearly a third of his army. Both he and his enemy were paralyzed by the struggle.

23. The tides  
of fortune in  
the last years  
of the war

From this time on Frederick's resources were so far exhausted that he could do little but rest on the defensive. England had discontinued its subsidy, and his own sources of revenue were drying up. He had left a large majority of his original army on the battlefields of the preceding years, and though he still managed to keep an army together, the want of military training for many of his men greatly diminished the average efficiency. In 1761 Austria recaptured Saxony; Russia took half of Pomerania; the two together seized half of Silesia. Frederick was cut off from home and lay encamped in southern Silesia. But by a rare combination of favoring circumstances the tide suddenly turned. Early in January 1762 Elizabeth of Russia died and her successor, Peter III, from of old an ardent admirer of the Prussian king, at once offered Frederick peace, giving back all the Prussian territory which Russia had conquered. The withdrawal of Russia soon led to the withdrawal of Sweden, leaving Austria and other states of the Empire and France in arms against Prussia. France, however, was prostrate from its war with England; it remembered, moreover, its ill-starred campaigns in North Germany and did not fight Prussian troops again. Toward the end of 1762 the Prussians defeated the Austrians and an army of the Empire, afterwards making raids into South Germany, levying contributions, and implanting in the southern states a great desire for peace. Bavaria, the Palatinate, and other southern states declared their neutrality in



December and in January 1763; the dissolution of the army of the Empire followed at once.

On February 15, 1763 Austria, Saxony, and Prussia signed the Peace of Hubertusburg, and the Seven Years' War was ended. The Peace confirmed the treaties of the First and Second Silesian Wars, thus ceding Silesia permanently to Prussia. Frederick promised in return to cast his electoral vote in favor of Joseph, son of Maria Theresa and Francis I, when Francis died. The war wrought no political changes. Austria remained at the head of the German Empire; Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, and all the other German principalities remained secondary states of the Empire. Further, not a boundary stone of any province was shifted. Nor, in spite of great loss of life and material welfare, had any state of the Empire, not even Prussia, suffered disastrously from the war. Before many years had passed, every physical trace of the war had been obliterated.

The lasting significance of the Seven Years' War lies in its profound effect on German national consciousness, on the German sense of unity. Before the war the disintegrating character of the Empire had loosened all but officially any close relations between different states. For many years no strong leader had appeared in Austria or elsewhere; men felt themselves not German, but Bavarian, or Saxon, or Prussian, as the case might be. But Frederick's victories were not only Prussian; they were also German. He had beaten soundly France and Russia as well as Austria. He had established the claim of an ignored German province to rank with great powers. The full fighting force of all his enemies was never concentrated against Frederick, but with a population of 5,000,000 and but little aid from abroad he had maintained all of his possessions against attacks of states and nations whose total

24. The end of the Seven Years' War, 1763

25. The significance of the Seven Years' War in German life

population approximated 90,000,000. The people of different states might be jealous of this brilliant success and rise of Prussia, but they were enthusiastic admirers of Frederick. He was a German national hero. Pride in his achievements united countless Germans in spirit and gave new impulse to a sense of German national life. It also created desire and resolution to emulate Frederick's triumphs in war in other fields of activity. For example, the classical period of German literature is sometimes dated as beginning in the year of Frederick's accession, in 1740; sometimes the date is given as 1748; but very nearly all of the great products of classical German literature appeared after the Seven Years' War, some of them under its immediate spell.

## CHAPTER III

### FREDERICK AND GERMANY IN TIME OF PEACE

1763-1786

As soon as the Peace of Hubertusburg was signed, Frederick plunged again, as if refreshed from a long holiday, into the work for the internal development of Prussia which the war had nullified or held in check. In the decade of peace before the Seven Years' War Frederick had begun to drain outlying swampy districts and bring them closer to the heart of his kingdom by arteries of canals; this work he now continued, and to these fertile districts, which were no longer too remote, he attracted many thousand new settlers. Besides remitting the taxes for a time in some of his provinces, he distributed cavalry horses and large quantities of seed among the peasants, thus restoring and advancing agriculture. New industries were established and, together with those already existing, were developed with great rapidity; the cloth mills in Silesia, silk factories, glassworks, foundries, and other industries engaged a considerable portion of Frederick's thought and care for many years. The prohibitive duty which Frederick put on foreign imports protected and fostered home industries and caused a rapid improvement in home products, though the system which he employed in collecting taxes galled his people by its unnecessary vigilance. Through miserly frugality in government as in his private life — he spent only one sixth of his income — Frederick was able

26. Frederick's most important acts of government in time of peace

to give large sums to needy communities, to increase his standing army to 186,000 men, and to leave a well-filled treasury at his death. Morally and intellectually the most bracing reforms of Frederick's reign were his revised administration of justice and his proclamations of religious tolerance and freedom of speech. At his behest the courts no longer regarded class distinctions but rendered decisions to noble and peasant alike ; Frederick thus strengthened immeasurably his people's faith in the rewards of honest, upright living. "Every man," he said in his picturesque idiom, "is to go to heaven in his own way," and "newspapers, if they are to be interesting, must not be interfered with." By unshackling spiritual and intellectual life Frederick gave play to forces which ultimately established the moral and intellectual standards of Prussia and Germany. During Frederick's reign the population of Prussia increased from three and a half to five and a half millions, and the area by more than two thirds, so that in 1786 Prussia comprised nearly sixty-five thousand square miles, about the area of New England. By applying his methods of administration and his reforms with but few alterations to all his provinces Frederick welded Prussia into a unified and fairly homogeneous realm.

Frederick believed and personified both his maxims : "The king is the first servant of the state" and "The people are not there for the sake of the rulers but the rulers for the sake of the people." With astounding attention to detail he watched the course of his administration in every province of his kingdom every year. He worked hard from eight to ten hours every day ; in a single period of six years he made twelve thousand royal decisions. Frederick thus displayed a sense of duty which his people could not fail to see and could not forget. True to

27. Frederick's attitude toward government and toward his people : its weakness and its effect

Hohenzollern tradition he distrusted the intelligence and the reliability of the common people. He therefore deliberately trained his subjects to expect everything governmental to be done for them, nothing by them ; he rejected their political coöperation and postponed indefinitely their training and education in state affairs. Frederick regarded the nobles as the strongest pillar of the state, but from them too he sought and desired little governmental aid. Even the chief ministers were hardly more than secretaries to Frederick, and the crown prince himself was not associated with the king in the government. In short, throughout Frederick's reign, in matters of common polity Frederick was Prussia. The state depended upon him alone, upon his life and health. When he died, the Prussian world seemed to stand still ; men knew not what might come. But through his achievements in war and peace Prussia had crystallized into a compact German state and represented to Germans at large a lofty ideal. Here was to be found the orderly unified life which other German states, not to speak of the Holy Roman Empire, had failed to establish.

Although Frederick's edict granting Prussia freedom of speech gave a mighty impulse to the development of German intellectual life, and although his brilliant deeds in war and his commanding personality brought down a new fire to German poetry, the great king himself was always skeptical of any notable achievement of German intellect or German imagination. Frederick considered his mother-tongue a language of boors ; he is said to have spoken it badly, and he certainly wrote it abominably. His schemes for the education of his people were the most rudimentary and the least effective of all his reforms. He gave encouragement to not a single German author

28. Frederick's indifference toward German thought and German literature

and was not averse from chilling the enthusiasm of more than one. Nor did he take part in his people's speculative thinking or share in their religious faith. He was an agnostic and aided the Church only because he considered its influence morally elevating. Frederick's indifference to all these phases of the life of his people is explained by the fact that his intellectual and literary bent became fixed in his youth and young manhood, when German thinkers were few and German letters offered no satisfaction to a refined taste for literature. In those early years Frederick became imbued with the culture of France and adopted permanently French standards of thought and literary art. He read and spoke the foreign language habitually; his many works in prose and verse are all in French. When he reorganized the Berlin Academy of Sciences, he called chiefly French scholars and literary men to Berlin, among others Voltaire. Under their influence Frederick's own intellectual life touched a wide range of subjects and interests; this appeared especially in the table talk in the palace Sans Souci at Potsdam, where he used to gather congenial spirits about him in the evening. But it remains a pity that Frederick had so few German intimates and that he did not share in and further the German thought and German literature which added so much luster to his age.

The emperor Francis I died in 1765 and was succeeded both in Austria and as head of the Holy Roman Empire by his son Joseph II (1765-1790). The change of ruler caused hardly more than a ripple anywhere, for Maria Theresa was still enjoying the advantage of her beauty and her personality, and until her death in 1780 she continued to have the last word in Austrian politics. Joseph II moreover shared the controlling ambition of his mother's life, to unify the widely divergent nationalities subject to the

29. Austria  
in peace  
under Maria  
Theresa and  
Joseph II

rule of the Hapsburgs. Each hoped that after thus restoring and enhancing Austria's prestige they might reunify the Holy Roman Empire, but their labors began and ended in their own hereditary possessions. Maria Theresa believed with all her heart in the theory of absolute monarchy; she therefore granted political and social reforms — in education, trade, religious toleration, and the condition of the peasants — only in so far as they might not weaken the authority of the central government. Cautious even to the point of appearing semi-medieval in an age of enlightenment, she was yet spurred on by a profound sense of duty to the welfare of her people. This conflict within herself, between ambition and caution, hampered Maria Theresa throughout her reign and robbed her of much of the achievement and the glory which nature, it seems, had put within her reach. Joseph II inherited his mother's ambition for Austria and he was eager to rival the example of Frederick of Prussia, whom he admired greatly. But he was afflicted by a hasty judgment and by feverish energy, "generally taking the second step before he had taken the first." He was consequently checkmated again and again in his dealings with other German states and with foreign powers. In his own realm he alienated many of his people and expended much of his energy in attempting to retrieve past mistakes. When he abolished serfdom in his dominions and secured civil rights and freedom of worship to all Austrian Protestants, he set up the two greatest memorials of his reign.

In Bavaria, Würtemberg, and other states of Germany phases of incompetent or wicked government still lingered. Whether the burdens were imposed by priests or by luxurious, tyrannical rulers, a large part of the common people remained impoverished, bound in serfdom, illiterate. Men

30. Con-  
ditions in  
other German  
states



were hired out as mercenary soldiers to fight the battles of other nations, as the Hessians and Würtembergers in America, merely in order that their hereditary lords might live in greater affluence ; men were thrust into prison without trial on charges which only despots prefer. Many families left Bavaria and other states to find homes in Hungary and Russia and even crossed the sea to America. Nevertheless the enlightenment of the age found political application in many parts of Germany. Reforms were instituted, analogous to those of Prussia, in the duchies of Brunswick and Saxe-Weimar, in the electorate of Saxony, in the ecclesiastical electorates of Mainz and Trier, and elsewhere. Progress was slow in all these states, as none of their rulers found the broad and deep foundations awaiting them such as the ancestors of Frederick the Great had laid in Prussia. But in numerous states the administration of justice was improved ; class distinctions were mitigated ; the burdens of the peasantry were lightened ; institutions of learning were built up. The duke of Brunswick gathered together some of the best intellects of Germany ; Carl August of Saxe-Weimar made his little capital Weimar " the Athens of Germany " by providing a congenial residence there for leading German men of letters. The people of such states as these responded joyously to the liberal ideas and to the enlightened practices of their rulers. A large measure of contentment and of state pride entered into the lives of the common people. Indeed the prosperity and the growing local patriotism of individual states threatened the complete dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire as a political unit. This threat was stayed by the unifying influence of various phases of German intellectual and spiritual life no less than by the memory of recent achievements in German history.



The pietistic movement touched many parts of Germany and served as a bond between people of widely separated states. Starting in opposition to the creed-bound self-righteous theology of the seventeenth-century Protestant Church, pietism made religion a close personal relation between the individual and his God; it established permanently the sanctity of individual religious belief. Through pietism the heart with its feeling supplanted the intellect in matters of Christian faith. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the tender devout meditation of the early pietists had developed into a highly emotional egoism, and pietism had therewith lost its power to gain new apostles; it lingered on thenceforth as a controlling factor chiefly in the lives of the older generation. The individualism of the pietists was paralleled and superseded in the lives of the younger generation by the individualistic spirit of rationalism. Men turned now to a personal investigation of all the phenomena of life according to the dictates and powers of the individual reason; men set out to believe only those things which reason could prove to be true. Rationalism in theory and in application absorbed for years many of the best minds all over Germany; in popularized versions it also found a reception in the middle classes and even among peasants. German rationalists continued to believe in God, free will, and immortality; they did not deny even divine revelation. Thus they were cautious, but they were also fearless, and they inculcated a spirit of unafraid investigation which gave modern Germany its intellectual freedom. As rationalism approached its climax as a philosophical theory, the emotional side of pietism reappeared in the form of sentimentalism. People wept at parting and meeting, however brief the separation; they wept copiously over the heroes and

31. Religious and philosophical life of the time

heroines of fiction and over scenes in nature. It was the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) to check sentimentalism, to correct the extravagant claims of rationalism, and to construct for German life a foundation of rational morality. Kant showed that there are ideas which men believe and yet cannot prove, for example, the soul, the world, and God; Kant thus revealed limits beyond which human knowledge and human reason cannot go. Man must use free will, he said further, not in the service of capricious individualism, but as a means with which he satisfies a sense of personal responsibility. The principle of doing good to others that others may do good to us Kant put aside as base and unworthy; he bade men obey, without asking unanswerable questions, the unconditional command of duty, the categorical imperative. Do good because it is right to do good. In the noble idealism of this rational morality lies the ultimate source of the most strengthening German thought and German poetry since Kant's own day.

32. The rise  
of classical  
German  
literature

The classical era of German literature began about 1750. Its first great product, the melodious poetry of Klopstock (1724-1803), gave final expression to the glowing devotion of German pietists, to their rapturous contemplation of the works of the Almighty, and to their sweeping flights of imagination. Klopstock, first of all German poets, dared to cast aside the rules and regulations of poetic technique and to give free rein to his heart and to his imagination. Lessing (1729-1781) created modern German drama by writing its first great exemplar, but he furthered German letters far more by his literary criticisms and theories. A scholar in many fields, Lessing spurred German intelligence along many lines; his rationalistic observations on religion and religious tolerance, reënforced by illustration

of his views in literary form, clarified German thought and ennobled German life. Herder (1744-1803), likewise a philosophical critic of literature and life, first interpreted history as a continuous organic growth; in each nation's own history and tradition he saw the foundation on which it should build its modern culture. By exalting the native and national, and also by extolling personal feeling as the wellspring of great literature, Herder became the father of German Romanticism. Thus he influenced German letters well down into the nineteenth century, but before he was thirty years old, he had kindled the genius of Germany's greatest poet, Goethe (1749-1832). Rooted in German tradition, imaginative, restlessly inquiring, Goethe experienced within himself the impulses and forces of the age and gave them, in poetry and in the novel, consummate literary form. At the age of twenty-five he stood in the forefront of German literature; there he has remained ever since. Schiller (1759-1805), even more than Goethe a product of the eighteenth century, summed up the lessons and the needs of his age, and in his dramas and poetry showed his countrymen a way to spiritual regeneration. No other German poet has laid a more immediate, stronger hold on the imagination of his people than Schiller; no other has inspired them in times of political dejection with such lofty idealism. Through the thought and the work of these philosophers and poets and their less famous comrades, the intellectual life of Germany in the eighteenth century was rich and fruitful beyond the most ambitious dreams of former years. After centuries of feeble endeavor German literature burst forth into full flower within a single generation.

A short time after the close of the Seven Years' War the growing influence of Russia in Poland led Frederick

33. The  
(First) Parti-  
tion of  
Poland, 1772

the Great to suspect that Russia intended to seize the Polish kingdom. Poland at that time was in a constant state of anarchy. The king, Stanislaus Poniatowski, whom the Polish nobles had elected to his office at Russia's bidding in the place of the hereditary elector of Saxony, was a phantom ruler. The Polish constitution vested the power of the realm in the Diet, which was made up of nobles exclusively. But the veto of a single noble could block legislation in the Diet, and out of the conflicting interests of various nobles arose factions which made bitter feuds on each other in and out of the Diet. The three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, now stepped in, alleging that the anarchic condition of Poland was demoralizing their people in adjacent territories. In 1772 they agreed upon the terms of the (First) Partition of Poland and divided among themselves nearly one third of the kingdom. Russia acquired half the booty, and Prussia only one sixth, but Prussia's acquisition of sixteen thousand square miles filled up a dangerous gap in Frederick's dominions between Brandenburg and East Prussia. It is true that many of the Poles now under new rulers, especially those in Prussian Poland under Frederick the Great, benefited greatly by the change. But one of the powers, Russia, had fomented the social discord in Poland with the deliberate intent of ultimate seizure, and all three aggrandized themselves at the expense of a friendly defenseless nation. Their seizure of Polish territory was nothing less than highway robbery.

34. The War  
of the  
Bavarian  
Succession,  
1778-1779

On the death of the childless elector of Bavaria in December 1777, Joseph II laid ill-founded claim to the inheritance, and proceeded to add Bavaria to Austria. Frederick the Great was much opposed to an increase in Austrian territory, and knowing that Saxony, which had

a claim to Bavaria, would assist him against Austria, he determined "to humble Austrian ambition once for all." When Frederick declared in favor of the next Bavarian heir, the head of a collateral branch of the Wittelsbach family, the War of the Bavarian Succession broke out. No memorable battle, no evidence of unusual military ability, marks the history of the war. Frederick himself presents an uninteresting figure; he shows no longer either his former amazing resourcefulness or his power to strike a swift decisive blow. The war consisted almost entirely of skirmishes and maneuvers in northern Bohemia to obtain provisions and to keep the enemy from obtaining them. Hence it is sometimes called "the Potato War." Peace was signed in May 1779. Bavaria passed to the next Bavarian heir with the proviso that at his death it should go unimpaired to his heir-presumptive; Saxony received a settlement of its claim in money; and Austria acquired a small stretch of country adjacent to its territory. Prussia had strengthened its position in Germany by giving its apparently disinterested aid to two German states in a struggle to maintain their rights against Austria. But as subsequent events revealed, in securing the guarantee of Russia and France to the peace the door was opened to foreign intrusion in German affairs.

In the last ten years of his reign Joseph II allowed his ambition for Austria to lead him more and more into projects for Austrian aggrandizement at the expense of other German states and into seeking the aid of Russia and France. The stability of the Holy Roman Empire was thus threatened on three sides. At this point Prussia became the leader of a group of German states for the first time in history. In July 1785 Frederick the Great formed with the electors of Saxony and Hanover the "League of

35. The  
Fürstenbund

German Princes," or Deutscher Fürstenbund. The league merely agreed to defend and preserve, in word and if necessary in deed, all the states of the Empire as they then existed. The league was thus intended not to reform but to safeguard conservatively the old existing order. Many German rulers in the north and the south, Catholic and Protestant, gladly joined the league. It soon forced Joseph to abandon his projects, it curbed the influence of Russia and France, and it assured the continued existence of the Holy Roman Empire.

36. A summary of Frederick the Great's life and achievements

The establishment of the Fürstenbund just a year before his death illustrates conveniently and aptly the great net result of Frederick's life and reign. It revealed Prussia as no longer a third-rate power but as the successful rival of Austria in German affairs and as the peer of any nation in Europe. The goal of Frederick's whole activity was reached. The path which led to it had been long and devious. In the aggrandizement of Prussia Frederick had repudiated ethical considerations with shocking easiness. He had ruled his people with benevolent but often stifling despotism. He had foregone the sunshine of declining years, the affection and sympathy of life-long friendships, and had become the lonely "hermit of Sans Souci." But he had forged a state which could survive the blows of even the nineteenth century. He had given to Prussians and Germans an ideal of statehood which afforded initial inspiration to the state and national life of the German Empire of the most recent decades.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE DECLINE OF GERMANY TO THE TREATY OF LUNÉVILLE

1786-1801

The two decades which followed the death of Frederick the Great form the most humiliating chapter in the history of Prussia. Rarely has a nation risen so high to fall so low, or passed so abruptly from the most brilliant to the weakest of its rulers. Within a score of years Prussia sank, as the weakness and blindness of its rulers deserved, to the rank of a third-rate power. Frederick's nephew and successor, Frederick William II (1786-1797), showed good impulses to wise government as well as insight into the needs of his country. He reduced customs duties; he encouraged education; he finished the codification of Prussian common law which Frederick the Great had started. But for the most part he gave a free rein throughout his life to his passions and fancies. His mistresses wielded a profound and vicious influence over him until his death, and religious fanatics made him one of their kind. In accordance with the superstitious custom of the age he spent much time in calling up the spirits of the dead; he made the grave mistake of attempting to force outlived church doctrines on the clergy. In his foreign diplomacy he blundered again and again; he did not grasp the great possibilities of the Fürstenbund and allowed the "league of princes" to fall to pieces only a few years after the

37. Frederick  
William II  
and his reign



death of its founder. To these faults Frederick William added that of such reckless extravagance in government that the savings of his predecessor were soon dissipated and large public debts were incurred. The morale of the army also began to decline, partly through the officers' pride in a distant past, partly through the humiliation of the soldiers with the whip and other antiquated methods of discipline. It was inevitable that the people at large should fall victims to the moral corrosion of the time; the sensuality at court was duplicated in the immorality of all classes of society. Prussian society from top to bottom has never been so depraved as during the first two decades after the death of Frederick the Great.

38. Frederick  
William in  
foreign  
affairs

In 1787 Frederick William sent troops into Holland to assist his brother-in-law, the stadtholder, in suppressing a civil rebellion. He refused, however, to accept any indemnity for the expenses of the campaign, thereby exhausting a large part of the treasure left by Frederick the Great. The success of the expedition, moreover, was so immediate that the Prussian troops returned home more convinced than ever of their invincibility. Frederick William attempted in 1789 and 1790 to intervene in the war of Russia and Austria against Turkey, hoping to acquire the Polish cities of Dantzic and Thorn in return for his labors, but Leopold II (1790-1792), the brother and successor of Joseph II, frustrated Frederick William's scheme by immediately consenting to peace on condition that the political situation be restored to its status before the war. Frederick William gained nothing. On the other hand, he spent large sums of money during the negotiations and, as if exemplifying the blundering character of his diplomacy, he gave the death-blow to the Fürstenbund by neglecting to force its recognition by Austria.



In 1792 Russian troops invaded Poland, and Prussia, again fearful lest Russia should seize the whole Polish kingdom, hastily occupied the western part of it. The two powers agreed readily enough, however, in 1793 upon a Second Partition of Poland. By this treaty Prussia obtained twenty-two thousand square miles of territory with over a million inhabitants, which included the province of Posen and the cities of Dantzic and Thorn ; Russia acquired four times as much territory as Prussia. In the very next year Kosciusko led one more Polish revolt, but Prussia restored order almost single-handed. Prussia, Russia, and Austria at length declared in January 1795 that the only way to keep the peace in Poland was for them to divide what was left. In this Third Partition Prussia received the old capital Warsaw and several districts along the Prussian eastern frontier, in all about twenty-one thousand square miles and a million inhabitants. Austria's share was approximately the same in size. Russia got about twice as much as either.

These two partitions of Poland were accomplished so easily because the nations of Europe had become absorbed in the course of the French Revolution. In 1789, when the extravagances of its kings and the mismanagement of its ministers had brought France to the verge of bankruptcy, the French king, Louis XVI, called the legislative body, the Estates-General, together to relieve the financial peril and to enact general reforms. The Estates-General, which was transformed after six weeks into the National Assembly, went, however, much further than Louis expected. The nobles and clergy were dispossessed of their estates and ancient privileges, and a constitutional monarchy was proclaimed which was founded on the doctrines of the political equality of all men and the right of self-government. The promulgation and adoption of these

39. The  
Second and  
Third Parti-  
tions of  
Poland

40. The  
French  
Revolution

doctrines were due in a measure to the influence of the American Revolution ; the constitution of the United States, which is wholly based on the principle of popular sovereignty, had gone into effect on March 4, 1789. As early as the summer of 1789 many French nobles left their homes and began in foreign countries to plan a restoration of the former absolute monarchy. Louis XVI and his wife Marie Antoinette, a sister of Leopold II of Austria, were soon suspected of intriguing with the runaway nobles and with foreign rulers. This suspicion and the opposition of the clergy and its adherents produced two bitterly hostile factions : the clerico-royalists who desired a revival of the old régime, and the constitutionalists who were rapidly going over to republicanism.

41. Its effect  
in Germany

The effect which the French agitation produced in the states of Germany varied greatly. Many leading spirits, Klopstock, Kant, and others, greeted the outbreak of the Revolution with great joy and hope, but their enthusiasm was quenched by the rising tide of opposition to the monarchy and by the bloody excesses of the Paris mob. Klopstock first lauded and then lamented the Revolution ; he is said to have dressed in mourning when Mirabeau, the champion of popular rights and of the French monarchy, died. In the better regulated German states, such as Austria and Prussia, the French Revolution made hardly any impression upon the common people. The events in France did stir the people of states which had suffered from oppressive taxes and from class legislation, and the loose bond which united these states with the Holy Roman Empire could not restrain the joy of the people over the triumph of the Rights of Man. Their rulers therefore became fearful for their thrones, and even Austria and Prussia grew anxious to preserve the French monarchy.

Austria felt an additional spur to intervention from the fact that a daughter of the Hapsburgs was the wife of the Bourbon king of France. In August 1791 Leopold and Frederick William formally declared the hope that other monarchs would soon unite with them to restore Louis XVI to all his rights and privileges; in the meantime Austria and Prussia would prepare for war. France replied to this intermeddling with the demand that the bands of intriguing French nobles in Germany be dispersed by March 1, 1792. As neither Leopold nor his son and successor, Francis II (1792-1835), observed the French ultimatum, France declared war on Austria in April. Thus began the long inevitable conflict between the new order of things in France and the old conservative order in the rest of Europe.

In spite of the turbulent conditions at home, France mustered an army of 750,000 men, and when the Prussian generalissimo, Duke Charles of Brunswick, threatened (July 1792) the utter destruction of Paris if King Louis suffered the least violence, French honor and French valor rallied superbly to the defense of the insulted nation. The Prussian army advanced within one hundred miles of the French capital, but there the French blocked them, and disease, hunger, and constant rains forced them to retreat; Goethe took part in this campaign and retreat with Duke Carl August of Saxe-Weimar and later wrote a vivid description of it under the title *The Campaign in France in 1792*. After the Prussians had withdrawn, the French turned against the Austrians in the Austrian Netherlands and defeated them decisively. Before the end of the year the French had carried the war into Germany and captured several cities along the Rhine, including Mainz, which gladly turned from its incompetent elector and opened its

42. The  
campaign in  
France in 1792

arms to the liberty-loving French. The campaign of 1792 was a colossal blunder. The allies made no lasting conquest, and the duke of Brunswick's manifesto only hastened the downfall of the French monarchy. In September 1792 the French Convention, which had taken the place of the National and Legislative Assemblies, declared France a republic.

The following January (1793) Louis XVI was condemned as a traitor to his country and beheaded. England gave the French minister his passports immediately, and on February 1 France declared war against England and Holland. During the year these powers were joined in the so-called First Coalition by Spain, Sardinia, and almost all the states of the Holy Roman Empire, including the allies of 1792, Austria and Prussia. Within a few months the Prussians recaptured Mainz and won three battles, and the Austrians regained their hold on the Netherlands. But the revolutionary enthusiasm of the French was rising higher and higher. They defeated the English and Austrians later in the year and again forced the Prussians to retreat. As the allies were further afflicted by dissension among themselves, the campaign of 1793 ended wholly to the advantage of the French.

In the spring of 1794 Austria achieved further successes in the Netherlands, but the French occupied Brussels in July, and soon after they held the whole province and a part of Holland. Francis II now resolved to abandon the Netherlands and look for compensation in a final partition of Poland. The Prussians fought successfully in the Rhine country, but Frederick William was very much more solicitous about his share of Poland than he was about the fate of the lesser states of Germany. He therefore withdrew across the Rhine, leaving nearly the whole west bank

43. The campaign of 1793, the First Coalition

44. The Peace of Basel, 1795

of the river to France, and began secret negotiations with the Republic. These negotiations were concluded in April 1795 by the Peace of Basel, in which Prussia ceded to France its possessions on the west bank of the Rhine on condition that Prussia should be compensated on the east bank when France should make peace with the Empire; meanwhile Prussia should remain neutral. Thus, for its own personal gain, Prussia broke faith with Austria and the Empire by making itself an inactive ally of their enemies. Excepting the friendship of a few minor states, Prussia had nothing to expect but bitter resentment from all its German kin. Two decades of disreputable isolation were in store for Prussia before it regained its national honor.

The French Republic sent three armies against Austria and the Empire in 1796. Two of these armies invaded Germany directly, expecting to be joined in Austria by the third, which was to enter the Empire by way of Italy. The two armies in Germany accomplished nothing. Archduke Charles, brother of Emperor Francis, first drove the more northern army back across the Rhine in the spring, and in the late summer he prevented the juncture of its remnants with two armies in southern Germany; he then put one of these into headlong flight across the Rhine and nullified the efforts of the other. The command of the French army in Italy was given to Napoleon Bonaparte, then twenty-seven years old. Napoleon had already distinguished himself in France by tactics and force which he had shown in assisting to preserve the stability of the Republic, but he was soon to be famous all over Europe. He entered Milan (May 1796) hardly a month after the campaign began, captured Verona, and laid siege to Mantua, which at last surrendered in January 1797, leaving him in

45. The campaign of 1796, in Germany and Italy

complete control of northern Italy. In the following spring Archduke Charles was sent against Napoleon, but he could not check the onward sweep of the French. Napoleon advanced to within eighty miles of Vienna. At this point the Austrian commander sued for a truce, which was followed in October 1797 by the Treaty of Campo Formio.

Austria gave up by this treaty a large part of its possessions in northern Italy and ceded its former holdings in the Netherlands to France. In the first draft of the agreement the integrity of the German Empire was guaranteed. At Campo Formio, however, Austria secretly agreed to France's occupation of the west bank of the Rhine, provided that Austria receive the Archbishopric of Salzburg and a part of Bavaria, and provided that Prussia obtain no new territory. The French thereupon occupied nearly all the west bank of the Rhine and organized their new possessions as integral parts of the Republic. The smaller states of Germany, terrified enough by the very name of France, offered of course no resistance. They could not dream of coping with France in their own might and they had been abandoned to their fate by the two powers from whom they might have expected to receive support. Prussia had sacrificed them in the Peace of Basel to its own interests, and for similar dynastic reasons Austria, the head of the Empire, delivered them into the hands of the national enemy in the Treaty of Campo Formio.

While Napoleon was invading Egypt in 1798 and winning new triumphs at the Battles of the Pyramids and at Cairo, the struggle against France was continued, or resumed, by the formation of the Second Coalition. This group of allies included England, Russia, Austria, Sicily, and Turkey. Prussia, which had now entered upon the long eventful reign of Frederick William III (1797-1840),

46. The Treaty of Campo Formio, 1797

47. The campaign of the Second Coalition, 1799-1800



the son of Frederick William II, remained true to the Peace of Basel. Austria defeated the French in South Germany in March 1799, and Russia and Austria together smothered the "daughter republics" which Napoleon had created in northern Italy, but discord and suspicion arose among the allies, and the Russian troops were recalled. In November 1799 Napoleon overthrew the existing government of France, the Directory, and forced his election as First Consul of the Republic; his power now was more dictatorial and absolute than that of any other ruler in Europe. When Austria and England rejected his hollow offers of peace, Napoleon prepared to reconquer northern Italy. He took Milan almost without a struggle, and at Marengo (June 1800), with the aid of reënforcements, he turned a defeat into victory. North Italy was again under French control. Austria, defeated at Marengo and defeated at Hohenlinden in Bavaria (December 1800) by another French army, could carry on the war no longer and agreed to peace in its own name and in that of the German Empire. The Treaty of Lunéville followed in February 1801.

While confirming in general the terms of the Treaty of Campo Formio, the Treaty of Lunéville declared further that the Rhine should form the boundary between France and Germany—France thus obtained twenty-eight thousand square miles of German territory and three and a half million German inhabitants—and that hereditary princes who lost territory on the west bank of the Rhine should receive an indemnity within the Empire, that is, to the east of the river. The only land "within the Empire," however, which did not belong to hereditary rulers, consisted of the free cities and the estates of the Church. This was the indemnity which a commission of German princes seized and distributed in 1803. In the scramble

48. The  
Treaty of  
Lunéville,  
1801

for inches of territory all the dispossessed princes turned to Paris for favor and aid; it is said that some caressed the poodle of Napoleon's prime minister Talleyrand, and others played "Drop the handkerchief" with Talleyrand's little niece, for the sake of an additional swamp or bit of woodland. Forty-five of the fifty-one free cities were robbed of their independence and incorporated in various states; all the ecclesiastical states except the electorate of Mainz were secularized, that is, turned over to lay rulers. One hundred and twelve sovereign and independent states were disposed of east of the Rhine, while nearly one hundred others had gone to France when the French seized the west bank of the river. Prussia received to the east of the Rhine nearly five times as much in area and population as it had lost on the west, but Napoleon was zealous in building up Bavaria, Würtemberg, and especially Baden as buffer states between France on the one side and Austria and Prussia on the other. The electoral dignity was conferred on Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse, but none of these states ever had a chance to vote for an emperor; Francis II was the last emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.

The lack of cohesion among the states of the Empire, the lack of pride and even of consciousness as a nation, simplified the process of reduction immeasurably. Each state was absorbed in its own affairs, in preserving its borders and in making new acquisitions an integral part of the state. The wholesale reduction in the former huge number of principalities and rulers in the German Empire smoothed the way to Napoleon's domination of Germany; this was of course the original impulse to the move. But the final effect of the diminished numbers transcends the limits of the Napoleonic era by many years. The vast importance of the closer consolidation of 1803 lies in the



fact that after still further reduction it was found possible in 1870 and 1871 to weld the new German Empire out of twenty-five independent states. No earthly power could have consummated this with the three hundred and eighteen independent German states of the eighteenth century.

The common people of the individual German states showed almost complete indifference to the epoch-making political changes. The eighteenth century had given the people a large measure of peace and contentment in their social life ; it had granted them liberty to develop spiritually and intellectually ; it had made them fairly satisfied with the existing order. Enlightenment and participation in political affairs, which the eighteenth century had not generally bestowed, the people did not sorely miss or greatly desire. Thus, neither the French Revolution nor the sweeping changes of 1803 caused more than a transitory stirring of popular interest. Philistine and philosopher each remained absorbed in his handicraft or in his science. Nor was his peace of mind disturbed by any literary agitation. The greatest authors, Goethe and Schiller, had been caught in a current of classicism or of idealistic philosophy which carried them away for a time from life and people about them. The Romantic School, which arose about 1800, deliberately denied contact with the immediate present and began a study of the German past which could bear fruit only after a lapse of time. Some of the greatest works of German literature, Schiller's master dramas, many of Goethe's poems, and the most famous writings of the Romantic School, were produced in the years of Germany's swiftest disintegration (1797-1806), but with few exceptions these works lack all direct connection with political events of the years in which they arose.

50. Popular  
indifference  
to political  
affairs

## CHAPTER V

### THE DEGRADATION OF GERMANY

1801-1808

51. French aggressions in Germany, and the recognition of Napoleon as emperor

Germany remained at peace with France from 1801 to 1805, but German resentment, which was already stirring against French influence in German affairs, was quickened more and more by French acts of aggression. In May 1803 a French army suddenly attacked and occupied Hanover because France was at war with England and the king of England was elector of Hanover. England could not come to the relief of Hanover, as its troops were needed at home to ward off the invasion which threatened the British Isles from France, and the German Empire offered no resistance to the foreigner, though Hanover as a state of the Empire was at peace with France. France therefore took possession, as if permanently, of one of the largest North German states, where it reaped a large revenue and occupied an important strategic position. In March 1804 a French troop invaded Baden, seized the Bourbon duke of Enghien on a charge of conspiracy against the French Republic, and took him to Vincennes, where he was shot in the castle ditch. Excitement and anger rose high in Germany at this violation of international comity, but again the Empire made no protest. Two months later, in May 1804, Napoleon was declared hereditary emperor of the French, and December 2 he crowned himself in the Cathedral of Nôtre-Dame in Paris.

Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and other states of Germany recognized the new dignity of Napoleon as individual political bodies, not as states of the German Empire. Indeed, the utter impotence of the Holy Roman Empire as a factor in European politics was long since obvious, and Francis II, who was the last of the more important German rulers to offer felicitations to Napoleon, had already (August 1804) half renounced the Empire by assuming the title of Emperor of Austria as Francis I.

The reluctance of Francis to acknowledge Napoleon's imperial dignity grew out of his dissatisfaction with provisions of the Treaty of Lunéville and with those of subsequent, less famous conventions. By 1805, when England and Russia were uniting against Napoleon, Francis was glad to join them in the Third Coalition. Alexander I of Russia went to Potsdam to win over Frederick William too; at the tomb of Frederick the Great the two monarchs pledged their friendship to each other; but Frederick William soon hesitated again and took no part in the war. The Austrian army of 50,000 men which entered Bavaria to check Würtemberg and Baden, friends and allies of the French, was outmaneuvered and surrounded by the French 200,000 strong and forced to surrender in October. The French now marched down the Danube to Vienna and northward from the capital to the village of Austerlitz. There the decisive "battle of the three emperors," Napoleon against Francis of Austria and Alexander of Russia, was fought December 2. The allies were routed; in the panic of flight many hundreds of the fugitives plunged to their death in the icy waters of a lake. Austria never forgot the humiliation of the treaty which followed at Pressburg (December 1805), for it thereby lost twenty-eight thousand square miles of territory, including Venice and Tyrol, and

52. The campaign of the Third Coalition, 1805

three million inhabitants. Francis was compelled to acknowledge the dukes of Bavaria and Würtemberg as kings. At Pressburg, or soon after, all Europe was forced to see and permit Napoleon's bestowal of a kingdom here and a duchy there upon one or another of his brothers or generals.

53. The Rhine Confederation

In minor articles of the Treaty of Pressburg Napoleon had favored various states of the Empire by raising them to new dignities and by granting them additional territory. A few months later the time was ripe for severing their connection with the Empire and uniting them under his protectorate in a new league; Napoleon purposed to counterbalance in this way the influence which the two most conspicuous German states, Austria and Prussia, continued to exert in German affairs. August 1, 1806, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and thirteen lesser states formally withdrew from the Empire on the ground that the Empire no longer afforded them any protection, and announced their union in a "Confederation of the Rhine." This new little Germany was afterwards enlarged by the admission of other German states. Completely under Napoleon's domination, this French Germany served him as a powerful instrument in clinching and maintaining his hold on the affairs of German people.

54. The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, 1806

An ancient institution received its death-blow when the original sixteen states of the Rhine Confederation withdrew from the Holy Roman Empire; it was a gratuitous fling on the part of Napoleon when he declared on the same day that he no longer recognized the Empire's existence. Less than a week (August 6, 1806) after the announcement of the Rhine Confederation, Francis II abdicated the imperial office. After a life of a thousand years, the Holy Roman Empire, the Empire founded by Charlemagne, died an unlamented death of inanition.

During all these events Prussia had observed a strict neutrality, chiefly because Frederick William III (born 1770, king 1797-1840) was not the man to take energetic action. Though beloved of his people for his simplicity of manner and for his goodness of heart, he was narrow-minded and shy and utterly incapable of making a decision. He never rose to a great emergency through his own strength. In calamity he was sustained by the indomitable courage of his wife Queen Louise, a princess of Mecklenburg; even to-day Queen Louise, the most attractive feminine figure in German history, is an idol of the German people. In spite of the wholesome example of family life in the royal palace, Berlin and the court circle were still permeated by the sensuality and extravagance of Frederick William II's reign. The reforms in finance and education which Frederick William III attempted to establish were checked by a lack of cohesion among different departments of state and by the lack of effective leadership. The army of 130,000 men was a splendid sight, but the soldiers had been cowed by brutal discipline and they were inexperienced in war. The leading officers were grandsires who in many cases had served in the Seven Years' War forty years before and who boasted now of victories in which they had played a very small part.

Frederick William had been very much irritated in 1805 by an unceremonious march of French troops through Prussian territory, and in accordance with his mental habit he had very nearly, but not quite, gone over to the allies. Directly after Austerlitz Napoleon offered Hanover to him as the reward of an alliance with France. The acceptance of Hanover, once a possession of the king of England, meant a break with England, but Frederick William did not have the courage to offend Napoleon. The gift was

55. Prussia  
in 1806

56. Napo-  
leon's isola-  
tion of  
Prussia

accepted. The isolation of Prussia from all its natural friends and allies, which had begun with the Peace of Basel, was now complete; in case of war Prussia could cherish no hope of securing any real assistance. Its submissive acceptance of Hanover had also won only the contempt of Napoleon. In the very next summer (1806) he seized scattered western possessions of Prussia and incorporated them in states of the Rhine Confederation. At the same time he began negotiations with England concerning a restitution of Hanover to its former ruler as if he had never mentioned Hanover to Frederick William. Napoleon's obvious purpose was to humiliate Prussia in the eyes of the world and to force it to declare war. The Prussian people were willing for war, many of the army were eager for it. Officers whetted their swords outside the French embassy in Berlin; soldiers went to performances of Schiller's *Wallenstein* and joined in the chorus, "Up, comrades, up! to horse, to horse!" No one realized Prussia's unfitness to offer serious resistance to Napoleon, but every one knew that the nation's wounded pride called for redress.

57. The  
Battle of  
Jena, October  
1806

Early in the autumn Frederick William demanded that Napoleon withdraw his troops from central and southern Germany where they had been recuperating since early spring. Napoleon quietly mobilized his forces, 200,000 strong, at Bamberg and marched northward, declaring war October 7. Prussia formed an alliance that is sometimes called the Fourth Coalition, but it consisted only of Prussia, Saxony, and Saxe-Weimar. Under Duke Charles of Brunswick, now seventy-one years old, 150,000 men gathered together; half encamped at Weimar and half on the high plateau back of Jena. On the misty morning of October 14, when the Prussians had no idea of the numbers facing them — Frederick William's sense of honor



would not permit him to sanction the use of spies — the French suddenly began an attack on two sides, and by four o'clock in the afternoon sent their enemy flying in wild confusion toward Weimar. On the same day a considerable part of the Prussian army was fighting a French corps at Auerstädt, twelve miles down the Saale River from Jena. With far superior numbers, the Prussians attacked slowly and at random; the duke of Brunswick fell mortally wounded; and General Blücher's gallant cavalry charge availed nothing. As at Jena the Prussians fled madly. In a single day the Prussian army was shattered. It was shattered because it was equipped with obsolete firearms, because it was poorly fed, and because it was wretchedly conducted. Again and again in the charges at Jena it was locally outnumbered, whereas good generalship could and would have presented a force far superior to that of Napoleon. The new order could not have triumphed more signally over the old than it did on the field of Jena.

While the Prussian troops scattered over the north, the French marched straight to Berlin. Napoleon entered the capital October 27 and sent the chariot of triumph from the Brandenburg Gate and Frederick the Great's sword to Paris as trophies. One by one the fortresses in Prussia continued to fall: Spandau without a shot, Stettin to only 800 French cavalymen, Cüstrin as readily, and Magdeburg with 24,000 men and an abundance of provisions and ammunition to a French army of 10,000 which had no siege artillery. Colberg and Graudenz achieved fame by holding out through countless hardships till peace was made; the commandant of Graudenz replied to the French assertion that there was no king of Prussia any longer, "Well, then, I am King of Graudenz." Blücher,

58. The collapse of Prussia

one of the last of all the Prussian officers to yield, was cornered near Lübeck, where he fought like a tiger; he wrung permission from the French to say in his surrender, "I capitulate because I have no bread and no ammunition left." Frederick William and Queen Louise fled to Königsberg, where they were destined to live in semi-exile until the end of 1809.

59. The  
Peace of  
Tilsit, 1807

Napoleon advanced during the winter to Warsaw and nearly to the Russian frontier. In the spring of 1807 Alexander visited Frederick William and swore that neither of them should fall alone, but the decisive French victory over the Russians and Prussians at Friedland (June 1807) changed his mind. Alexander formed an alliance with Napoleon and accepted a part of Prussian Poland, which Napoleon pressed upon him to make trouble between Alexander and Frederick William. Prussia signed the Peace of Tilsit with France July 9. In spite of the humiliating personal petition of Queen Louise, Prussia was forced to cede half its territory and half its population. All that lay west of the river Elbe, including Hanover, and all of Prussian Poland were given up. Napoleon declared that he left the remaining half of Prussia to Frederick William only "out of consideration for his ally the ruler of all the Russias," though his real purpose was to have a buffer state between Russia and France. A large part of Prussian Poland was transformed into the grand-duchy of Warsaw under the elector of Saxony, whom Napoleon made a king. The French soldiers did not evacuate Prussia until November 1808, and in the meantime they had extorted over \$100,000,000 from their helpless victim. Directly after the Peace of Tilsit Napoleon united the former western possessions of Prussia with Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick, whose rulers he had dispossessed, and called the whole



the kingdom of Westphalia ; Napoleon's brother Jerome was made king of this new realm with his residence at Cassel.

Napoleon was now in complete control of Germany. Austria and Prussia had been crushed and virtually all of the other states were members of the Rhine Confederation. It must be said that the conditions of life in many states of the Confederation were improved during the French protectorate. For example, the Code Napoleon with its superior adjustment of civil rights was introduced into various states, where it was used in a modified form for many years. Even to-day Germans in the Rhine country cherish the name of the Corsican, perhaps because he made their ancestors' duke a grand-duke, or because he manifested a particular interest in the affairs of their state. On the other hand, the pride of many Germans was galled by their subjection to one who had come from abroad as a friend and who stayed as a tyrant ; only one of many instances of petty tyranny was the execution of Palm, a Nuremberg bookdealer, for publishing and disseminating a pamphlet entitled *Germany in its Deep Abasement*. In November 1806 Napoleon had issued from Berlin a decree declaring the British Isles in a state of blockade and forbidding all commerce with them. The aim of this so-called "Continental System," to ruin English commerce by closing European ports to English merchant vessels, was not attained ; England found other markets for its wares. The Continental System did, however, deprive Germany and neighboring countries of many of the comforts and necessities of life, and it rapidly intensified feeling against Napoleon during the six years of its enforcement. In September and October 1808 Napoleon signalized his control over Germany by presiding with great pomp and

60. Napoleon in control of Germany

display over a congress of German princes at Erfurt. Here the two greatest men of the century met — Napoleon and Goethe. In October Napoleon led a train of German princes on a rabbit hunt over the battlefield of Jena. Though prompted to this act by fondness for startling display rather than by brutal malice, Napoleon could hardly have expressed with more stinging point his absolute domination of Germany.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE REGENERATION OF GERMANY

1808-1813

The regeneration of Germany began in Prussia, the state which had fallen lowest and suffered most. By a stroke of rare good fortune Frederick William could command the services of Baron Stein, the greatest German statesman of the time, and in October 1807 Frederick William put the reorganization of Prussia into Stein's hands. Through public economy and through the sale of royal domains Stein assisted in satisfying the extortionate demands of the French, a notable work in itself. A series of practical reforms, which he introduced, laid a new foundation for Prussian public life. Stein freed the peasant from hereditary subjection to a landlord and gave him the possibility of earning a piece of land of his own as well as the choice of his employment; Stein thus liquidated the last vestige of serfdom and of feudalism in Prussia. By releasing the cities from their former Government officials and permitting them, with a few restrictions, to govern themselves, Stein liberated urban life from the bureaucratic methods of the eighteenth century and began the education of the people in political affairs. Stein thus struck the most binding fetters of Prussian society and stirred the initiative and the development of the free self-conscious will of his countrymen. His ultimate goal was an intelligent harmonious coöperation of Government and people, and if he had

61. Stein's reforms in the Prussian state

established a legislative body representative of the whole kingdom, as he desired to do, he would have made Prussia even then a constitutional monarchy. But a letter from Stein in which he expressed the hope of a speedy uprising against France was intercepted by French agents; Napoleon pressed his dismissal, and in November 1808 Frederick William reluctantly let him go. Stein's immediate successor was soon followed by Hardenberg, who favored and advanced Stein's reforms.

62. Scharnhorst's reforms in the army

Stein's reorganization of the state was paralleled in the army by the work of Scharnhorst, who was appointed minister of war in 1807. Scharnhorst abolished flogging and other outlived forms of discipline, thus raising the soldiers' self-respect; he also provided the troops with modern fire-arms and drilled them for war instead of for parade. Napoleon had fixed the maximum number of the Prussian army at 42,000; but while the number remained the same, Scharnhorst changed the individuals from time to time and eventually secured a military force nearly four times as large as Napoleon's limit. Those who had been drilled constituted the *Landwehr*, or "national defense," and as they scattered among the whole population, they strengthened in private life the martial spirit of the people at large. Scharnhorst was ably assisted by his officers, especially by Blücher, Gneisenau, and Yorck. Gneisenau excelled in planning campaigns and battles; Yorck, a man of great natural reserve, was famous for his resoluteness and tenacity; Blücher was the man of action, the most picturesque figure of the time. Blücher had served in the Seven Years' War, still under twenty years of age, first in the Swedish army and later as a Prussian soldier. After the Battle of Jena he was stationed in Pomerania; it is said that he was seized at times by such fury at the insults to Prussia, he

would charge at the flies on the wall with his drawn sword, crying "Napoleon!" Uncouth in manners and speech, at times a slave to gambling, he was idolized by the soldiers who nicknamed him "Marshal Forward."

In the winter of 1807-1808 in the Berlin Academy, with French spies in his audience and the sound of French boots and drums outside on Unter den Linden, the philosopher Fichte delivered his *Addresses to the German Nation*. With far-reaching eloquence Fichte extolled love of country as the most powerful incentive to human life and progress. He denounced the plea that success was not endangered if one man did not participate; to the contrary, in the spirit of Kant, he preached a gospel of individual responsibility, stern self-discipline, and unwavering rational morality. The effect of Fichte's teachings was so immediate and so profound throughout Prussia that Napoleon said afterward that he was defeated by "German ideologists," Fichte and his kind; but at the time of the *Addresses* Napoleon did not fear "the professor" any more than he feared Scharnhorst's constant drilling. Fichte's lectures on patriotism were reënforced by performances of Schiller's *Maid of Orleans* and *William Tell*. As the soldiers were stirred to emulate the martial spirit of Wallenstein, the whole kingdom was awakened by the Maid and Tell to a new love of country and to a new sense of national honor. In 1809 the University of Berlin was established and in the following year was opened to over four hundred students; here in the Prussian capital young men of intellect and character gathered in order to learn at first hand the new spirit of the time. Also in Berlin the founder of gymnastic exercises in Germany, "Father" Jahn, gathered young men and boys about him to develop them physically for the coming struggle. The *Tugendbund*, or "league of

63. Other re-generating forces in Prussia

virtue," which was formed in Königsberg in 1808, purposed to develop German, and especially Prussian, intellectual and moral strength, but all its members knew that its ultimate aim was a triumph over Napoleon. Its life was brief, however, as the French exaggerated its influence, and at Napoleon's behest it was formally dissolved by Frederick William in 1810. In addition to all these forces in Prussian life there was also that of the fortunes of the royal family. Prussian love for Frederick William and Queen Louise was stung to the quick by Napoleon's ridicule of the royal pair and by their troubled residence in Königsberg. The death of the queen in 1810, after a long and painful illness, was like a call to arms. But it was not until three years later that memory of her played its part in the liberation of Prussia.

64. War between Austria and France, 1809

Soon after the Battle of Austerlitz Austria began to reorganize and enlarge its army, and by 1808 it could muster 500,000 well-trained soldiers. When the war in Spain was going against Napoleon in 1808, hope sprang up in Austria and all Germany that here too he might be defeated. But Napoleon regained the upper hand in the Spanish Peninsula, and Austria, which had gone too far to evade a conflict, found itself alone; Prussia would not enter a coalition without Russia, and the Rhine Confederation was faithful to its "Protector." Nevertheless, inspired by the patriotism of the people, the Austrian Government did not hesitate to declare war (April 1809); the thrilling orders to the army were perhaps written by the poet Friedrich Schlegel. The archduke Charles advanced into Bavaria, but he moved slowly and gave Napoleon time to return from Spain and gather fresh forces. In five days Napoleon won four engagements near Ratisbon — he referred to these actions later as the greatest achievements of his life — and entered

Vienna in less than a month after war was declared. Another Austrian army, however, approached from Italy and administered to Napoleon at Aspern, not far from Vienna, the first complete defeat he experienced. All Germany exulted over the victory, but not for long, as Napoleon evened the score at Wagram (July 1809). When Austria could still find no allies, it gave up and signed the Treaty of Vienna, whereby it sacrificed all its possessions on the Adriatic and all of Galicia. Austria had now been beaten by Napoleon for the fourth time. Its reforms had not availed in a crisis, and under the guidance of Metternich, a figure of tremendous importance in later years, Austria swung back into the ruts of conservatism. When Napoleon was married (April 1810) to Marie Louise, daughter of the emperor of Austria and grand-niece of Marie Antoinette, peace seemed to be guaranteed on the Continent indefinitely. Viewing the marriage in this light, the patriots of Germany saw their dream of freedom vanish overnight.

The courageous stand which the Tyrolese mountaineers made against the French in 1809 was a part of the war between Austria and France. Tyrol had been a possession of Austria for hundreds of years, but it had been ceded to Bavaria in 1805. Ever since that time the Tyrolese had been chafing under the forced allegiance to an unwelcome ruler, and under military conscription and other innovations which had come to them from France by way of Bavaria. All through the spring and summer of 1809, even after Austria had been forced to a truce, the Tyrolese fought on for the right to resume the old bonds with Austria. Andreas Hofer and his associates in command, former innkeepers, hunters, shepherds, and priests, led as plucky a fight as the world has ever seen. But finally, when Austria had signed the Treaty of Vienna, which left Tyrol to

**65. Insurrections against Napoleon in Tyrol and in North Germany**



Bavaria, Napoleon sent a host of 50,000 up into the mountains and overwhelmed Hofer's handful of men. Hofer was captured and shot, a prisoner of war, in the fortifications of Mantua in February 1810. Tyrol was at peace. In North Germany an insurrection was started in 1809 against the kingdom of Westphalia; Major Schill also marched out from Berlin with a few hundred men, expecting to stir up all North Germany against the French; another troop, not much larger than Schill's, fought desperately with French soldiers in the neighborhood of Brunswick. But all these enterprises were as futile as the struggle of the Tyrolese. Schill fell in a hand-to-hand fight in Stralsund, and the Brunswick troop was forced to flee from Germany.

Meanwhile discontent was brewing in the Rhine Confederation. Many members of the union complained bitterly of broken French promises or of petty French tyrannies. Bavaria under a generous king and an able prime minister had shaken off many of the evils of its past; reforms in the administration of justice and in the common law had been attended by a determined effort to subordinate the church to the state. But in the war against Austria, Bavaria had borne the brunt of the campaign and had not received a satisfying compensation. In Baden a wise and gentle absolutism had improved conditions in church and school, but it was constantly hampered by French interference. Württemberg had reverted to the unenlightened despotism from which it had suffered in the eighteenth century; its people feared their king as an enemy of the state. All these and other members of the Rhine Confederation complained of higher and higher taxes for French wars, of severer conscription, of rigid censorship, and, worst of all, of the Continental System. Napoleon was moreover

66. Discontent in the states of the Rhine Confederation



altering boundaries of countries with bewildering suddenness and frequency and converting into French possessions more and more of Germany, for example, Frankfort-on-the-Main and the duchy of Oldenburg. The years 1810 and 1811 were barren of open struggles against the French, but German people, and, foremost among them, those in Prussia, were advancing to a day of reckoning.

The waning of the friendship between France and Russia was to lead indirectly to the conflict. Alexander gradually saw that Napoleon would never consent to Russia's designs on Turkey; he resented the dethronement of his relative, the duke of Oldenburg; he was embittered by Napoleon's slighting of his sister in favor of Marie Louise; and, more intensely than anything else, he felt for his country the hardships and the obstacles of the Continental System. War between the two emperors was inevitable. The Confederation of the Rhine was of course with Napoleon; it did not dare to withhold its aid. And Metternich ranged Austria and 30,000 soldiers on the side of France. In Prussia the patriotic party hoped long for an alliance with Russia, but the Government yielded to Napoleon's demands; Prussia must furnish him 20,000 soldiers and support the French army on its march through Prussian territory.

Early in June 1812 Napoleon mustered his "Grand Army" of half a million men in East Prussia and crossed the boundary into Russia. For months the enemy could not be brought to a stand. They simply retreated and drew Napoleon farther and farther into their devastated country, where he lost tens of thousands through heat, starvation, and disease. It was September 7 before the Russians gave battle at Borodino. The French won, though at a cost of 28,000 men, and Napoleon entered Moscow a week later.

67. The approach of war between France and Russia

68. Napoleon's campaign in Russia, 1812

But he found a capital burning to ashes at the hands of its own citizens. When he had vainly waited a month for Alexander's reply to his proposals of peace, he was forced by the condition of his army, the scarcity of supplies, and the approach of winter to begin the most calamitous retreat ever known. Starving and harassed by the Russian army along the way, the hundred thousand able-bodied men who left Moscow dwindled in twenty-three days to 30,000; 20,000 of these were lost in crossing the river Beresina (November 26-29, 1812), partly through their own disorder and confusion, partly through the attacks of the Russian troops. It is said that of the Grand Army 125,000 men were lost in battle; 132,000 died on the march; and 190,000 were captured by the Russians. Only 1200 men entered Germany in military order. After the disaster at the Beresina, Napoleon deserted the remnant of his army and under an assumed name drove at full speed, via Warsaw and Dresden (December 13), back to Paris.

69. The  
"treason"  
of Yorck

During all these months the Prussian contingent under Yorck had taken very little part in the campaign, and Yorck was frequently urged by the Russians to desert Napoleon and join them. On the retreat from Russia Yorck allowed his men to be surrounded by the Russians. He then broke his allegiance to Napoleon and made a convention with the Russians (Tauroggen, December 30, 1812), whereby he and his men were to be neutral until the king should accept or reject the convention. Frederick William again yielded to French influence and formally dismissed Yorck for treason, but the Russians prevented the delivery of the official notification of dismissal. The treason of Yorck and his men remained an accomplished fact. German patriots everywhere heard the news of the bold deed with delight, for they knew that Yorck and his

men had struck a first blow for the liberation of Germany. The messenger who brought the notification of Yorck's dismissal continued to Petrograd on the second part of his mission, which was to offer Alexander an alliance with Prussia as soon as he should cross the Vistula.

Toward the end of December 1812 the news of the collapse of the Grand Army began to spread all over Germany. Napoleon was no longer invincible. Germany's opportunity had come. Frederick William still felt bound by his treaty with France, but even he could not check the tide of resolute patriotism that swept over Prussia. Baron Stein returned from his exile in Russia eager to hasten the certain uprising of the people and eager to give it a German character, a stamp of German nationality; for he saw that the independence not of Prussia alone but of all Germany might now be restored. In January 1813 Frederick William fled from the French pressure in Berlin and went to Breslau where he would be nearer Russia and Austria. Events of great import followed thick and fast. On February 3 there appeared, over Hardenberg's name but really from the king, a proclamation declaring the state in danger and calling for a volunteer corps of chasseurs. The former friendship and alliance between Alexander and Frederick William was renewed at Kalisz on February 28. Ten days later, on Queen Louise's birthday, Frederick William founded the Order of the Iron Cross as an incentive to acts of bravery. Prussia declared war on France March 16. And the very next day Frederick William issued his most famous proclamation: *To My People*. In this epoch-making document he called upon his subjects in all his provinces, the people of Brandenburg, Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania, to remember the heroism of the Tyrolese and to prepare for a last decisive struggle

70. Frederick William calls Prussia to arms, February 1813

for their existence, independence, and prosperity. Frederick William further gave permission for the formation of volunteer corps which might include non-Prussians. In a proclamation of March 25 the note was loudly sounded that the restoration of a constitution for all Germany, of free untrammelled life and spirit, was the issue; German princes who refused their support were to be crushed by public opinion and, if necessary, subjected by arms.

71. The response of the Prussian people

Frederick William did not appeal to his people in vain. Out of a population of five millions there came forth an army of 271,000, or one out of eighteen. Nine thousand volunteers were enrolled in Berlin in three days. Offices were deserted; universities closed their doors; as Arndt says, "Mere boys left their schools eager to bear arms and reciting hymns of Tyrtæus and verses from Klopstock's *Hermann's Battle*." From the rich and poor there poured forth a flood of contributions to the funds of war. Precious heirlooms were sold to raise money; women contributed their gold wedding rings; it was later considered a disgrace if a family still owned any silverware. To the people at large it was a holy war, a crusade, and in this spirit it was sung by poets of the time: by Theodor Körner, a member of Lützow's volunteer "free corps," who found his death (August 1813) on the battlefield at the age of twenty-two; by Arndt, a rugged fire-eater already well seasoned by a strenuous life; and by Schenkendorf, who fought through the war with only one arm. The volume, intensity, and thrilling power of the war-songs of this period in German history have never been surpassed by any nation.

72. The part of Prussia in the War of Liberation

Körner sang truly, "In the north breaks the dawn of freedom." Many young men like Körner himself went from other states of Germany to be enrolled in Prussian

volunteer corps; Stein too was not a Prussian by birth, nor was Scharnhorst or Blücher or Gneisenau or Fichte. Through the coöperation of thousands of individuals from other states the uprising assumed a national character, but hardly a German state except Prussia was ready to throw down the gauntlet to Napoleon. The rulers of other states were still bound to him in fear or in favor; some of them had to be dragged into the war; and the patient masses were willing to await a sign from their rulers or a sign from heaven in the shape of a Prussian victory. From Prussia came the initiative to the war and the enterprise; thence came the first German sinews of the war. The spirit and the tone of the actual conflict of 1813 were likewise Prussian to the core. Consciously or unconsciously these Germans were impelled by Kant's gospel of moral duty. Each of them owed it to his country and to himself to right the wrong of bondage to a foreigner. When toward the end of the war the states of the Rhine Confederation allied themselves with Prussia, the hour of Napoleon's overthrow had already struck. Prussia had already borne the chief strain and stress of the conflict. To Prussia therefore belongs of right the chief honor and glory of the German War of Liberation.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE WAR OF LIBERATION

1813-1815

73. The  
beginnings of  
the war

The German struggle for liberty began in March 1813 with a series of conflicts between Russians and French for the possession of Hamburg. The city was regained for Germany, though only for a few weeks, and during that time the allies made no attempt to break up the kingdom of Westphalia and, by pushing the war on to the Rhine, to intimidate and shatter the Rhine Confederation. Instead, they moved leisurely from Silesia into Saxony, taking the capital Dresden on April 22, for King Frederick Augustus of Saxony, like other princes of the Rhine Confederation, had remained true to Napoleon. In the meantime the French Senate had voted a new conscription of 350,000 men, and by the middle of April Napoleon was in the heart of Germany with a considerable part of these troops. On May 2 the allies, with 96,000 men, attacked him at Lützen, when he was leading 120,000 men to Leipsic. It was a stubborn, bloody fight on both sides, ending without a decisive result. But Alexander persuaded Frederick William not to resume the attack as planned but to retreat. The moral weight of a first victory was thus given to Napoleon; his renown, which entailed the continued loyalty of the Rhine Confederation, again seemed secure throughout Europe. Napoleon now proceeded to Dresden, which he took and made his headquarters without opposition



from the allies. On May 20 and 21, with a large advantage in numbers, he won a fierce battle at Bautzen from an army of Prussians and Russians. Napoleon's losses both at Lützen and at Bautzen had been very heavy, however, while the persistent valor of the allies, especially of the Prussians, had strengthened their prestige and their numbers.

Early in June Napoleon sought and gained a truce in order to have a chance to win new allies. His attempt with Russia failed. Austria was more favorably disposed. The patriotic enthusiasm of Austria in 1809 was dead, and Francis I, Napoleon's father-in-law and a genuine Hapsburg in his unchangeable loyalty to the theory of absolute monarchy, quailed before the power of the masses which had already been displayed in Prussia. Metternich desired, however, to use Austria's neutrality as a lever for the gain of his country. Austria, therefore, as a mediator, asked that Napoleon restore a large part of the conquests which he had made in Germany since 1806. Napoleon dared not show any weakness by making concessions, and repulsed the proposal. A later conference between Napoleon and Metternich proved just as fruitless, and two days after (August 12) Austria declared war on France. As long as the truce had continued, a great fear had oppressed the people of Germany lest too lenient terms be offered to Napoleon and his acceptance of them only half relax his grip on Germany. In the night of the tenth and eleventh of August the light of bonfires on the mountain tops blazed the good tidings over the Riesengebirge down to the soldiers in Silesia. Negotiations were past, Austria was won over, and war was to begin again. A great wave of relief and joy rolled through the allies' camps in that memorable night, and German patriots everywhere were thrilled with new confidence and resolution.

74. Napoleon  
tries to win  
allies

75. The Fifth Coalition and its plan of action

The Fifth Coalition consisted chiefly of Russia, Prussia, and Austria; the Swedish contingent and the part which it played in the war were relatively small, and the troops which England sent against the French fought almost exclusively in Spain under Wellington. The allies in Germany divided their forces into the Army of the North, 150,000 strong, under Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden; the Army of Silesia, 99,000, under Blücher; and the Army of Bohemia, 220,000, under the three monarchs with the Austrian Schwarzenberg as commander-in-chief. This armed host of 469,000 formed a great semicircle around Napoleon's 336,000 at Dresden. According to the original plan, the Army of Bohemia was to march on Dresden from the south and the other armies were to close in; if Napoleon, however, should make the first move against one or another of the armies, the other two were to attack his rear.

76. The Battle of Grossbeeren, August 23, 1813

Napoleon first sent a large force against the Army of the North with the purpose of capturing the Prussian capital. Bernadotte, as usual, was timid and dilatory, but Bülow and his Prussians, a part of Bernadotte's army, forced the issue and saved Berlin by defeating the French and turning them back at Grossbeeren, a Berlin suburb; in this fight the Landwehr, Scharnhorst's creation, first proved its sterling worth to the nation. A few days after Grossbeeren the Prussians were again victorious not far from Magdeburg. But the greatest glory of these early engagements was won by the Army of Silesia under "Marshal Forward" at the Battle on the Katzbach (August 26), between Dresden and Breslau. There, near the junction of two swollen streams, the Katzbach and the "raging Neisse," amid torrents of rain, Blücher and his Prussians and Russians threw themselves on the French with crushing force.

The Battle on the Katzbach, August 26, 1813



In a fierce hand-to-hand fight with swords, bayonets, and musket butts, the French were hurled back from a plateau down into the roaring streams. Many were drowned, many others were trampled to death in the mud, and no less than 18,000 prisoners were taken by the allies.

The very same day, however, the Army of Bohemia had attacked Dresden, and on the twenty-seventh it was pushed back into the mountains to the south with a loss of 30,000 men. The allies' confidence in themselves was shaken by this blow, but a French corps in pursuit of them was surrounded and wiped out through the bravery of General Kleist and his men, and a few days later (September 6) Bülow and the Landwehr again defeated the French, at Dennewitz, forty miles south of Berlin, with odds of three to two against them. Napoleon was losing command of the situation, and the record of his engagements threatened ruin to him. On the other hand, the allies' score of five victories and one defeat strengthened the morale of their armies immeasurably; it made the partisans of the allies still more eager for Napoleon's fall; and at the same time it was rapidly undermining the confidence and loyalty of Napoleon's supporters, especially of the Germans from the states of the Rhine Confederation. On October 7 Bavaria deserted him.

In the early days of October 1813 the allies began to close in around Dresden, and Napoleon saw the imminent danger of being cut off from France by a far larger force. He therefore retired toward Leipsic, where he hoped to meet and repulse once more the Army of Bohemia, though he knew that Bernadotte and Blücher were not far away. There gathered now about Leipsic a host never equalled before that time: on Napoleon's side French, Portuguese, Spaniards, Italians, and Germans from the Confederation

77. The effect of the allies' victories

78. The armies gather about Leipsic

of the Rhine, about 180,000 in all, against 300,000 Prussians, Austrians, other Germans, and Russians, besides Cossacks and Calmucks, Swedes and Magyars. The Germans call the battle the *Völkerschlacht*, or "Battle of the Nations."

79. The Battle of Leipsic, October 16-19, 1813. The first and second days

The conflict began October 16, a Saturday. With an advantage of 100,000 to 60,000 — other troops not having arrived or being held in reserve — Napoleon attacked the allies, Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, on the south of the city; but his enemy fought stubbornly, and as Napoleon's expected reënforcements failed him, the result was a draw. These reënforcements were held in check by Yorck, and by the end of the day they were vanquished. Thus the first day ended with one defeat and without any victory for Napoleon. The next day, Sunday, was quiet. The allies were bringing on more and more troops, and Blücher came close to Leipsic on the northeast, but there was no battle. Napoleon tried to draw Austria away from the allies, even offering to accept the conditions which he had rejected, but Francis would give the French ambassador no answer.

80. The third and fourth days

Early in the morning of the eighteenth, the thunder of cannon announced the resumption of the battle. Blücher and Bernadotte drew nearer and nearer to Leipsic from the north and east, and the allies' armies to the south and west gradually closed in. Village after village was taken near Probstheida, a village itself to the south of Leipsic and the buckle of the great belt of troops which Napoleon had thrown around the city. Now the Saxons and Würtembergers in the midst of the fight went over to the allies, some of them without their leaders. At length, when night had fallen, Napoleon gave up Probstheida and retired to Leipsic beaten. Before morning his troops had begun

their retreat in the moonlight along the road to Erfurt, which had been left open to them. Poles and Germans remained in Leipsic to cover their retreat. Soon after dawn of the nineteenth the allies drew in close about the city and began the final attack. Napoleon himself left about ten o'clock, and before noon the allies were pouring in through the city gates. Over 30,000 men were captured within the walls. On the "corpse-encumbered" field of Leipsic Napoleon lost in killed and wounded more than 50,000 men; the allies lost over 40,000. Napoleon fled toward France at full speed. A force of Bavarians and Austrians tried to check his flight at Hanau, but Napoleon cut his way through them and crossed the Rhine for the last time at Mainz on November 2.

During the following weeks and months the towns and fortresses occupied by the French fell one by one into the hands of the allies. The kingdom of Westphalia was broken up, the dukes of Oldenburg and Brunswick came home again, and, last of all, Hamburg was retaken in May 1814. The Confederation of the Rhine fell to pieces of itself. Soon after Leipsic the allies met in Frankfort-on-the-Main to discuss their next move. They offered peace to Napoleon's ambassador on condition that France be limited to its "natural boundaries," the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. But Napoleon insisted on having Holland and Italy too. At the urgency of Blücher and Stein, the allies decided to cross the Rhine and invade France, "not in order to persecute the French people and seize their country, but to overthrow Napoleon."

81. The French expelled from Germany

Proposals of peace

Blücher crossed the Rhine between Mainz and Coblenz on the eve of the new year, 1814, and advanced up the Moselle toward northern France. Schwarzenberg, with his Austrians and many soldiers from the states of the

82. The allies carry the war into France

Rhine Confederation, was marching to the south of Blücher, and Bernadotte on his north. The advance of the allies was at times careless and disorderly, so that Napoleon was able to win a series of brilliant victories, but he rejected offers of peace, and the allies regained the upper hand. Alexander and Frederick William entered Paris March 31, 1814, at the head of 36,000 soldiers. Napoleon was forced to surrender all claims to the French throne and to retire to the island of Elba, the sovereignty of which was guaranteed to him by the allies. Louis XVIII, the brother of Louis XVI, was established as hereditary king, in accordance with the (First) Peace of Paris, which was signed on May 30, 1814.

83. Napoleon  
returns from  
Elba

In September 1814 representatives of the allies met in the Congress of Vienna to discuss the state of European affairs and to redistribute European territory. After prolonged and often bitter debate, a tolerable adjustment of all differences was in sight when the startling news reached Vienna that Napoleon had landed on the French coast (March 1, 1815). For a time the discussions of the Congress were hushed and the powers allied themselves once more against "the enemy of the public peace," in spite of Napoleon's assertion that he merely wanted to rule over France as it was in 1792. The French army went over to Napoleon at once. After a twenty days' triumphal march Napoleon once more entered Paris and began his reign of a hundred days. Louis XVIII fled to the Netherlands. Within two months Napoleon collected an army of about 130,000 veterans, and, intending to reëstablish his old prestige by a speedy and glorious victory, he hastened northward toward the enemy. The duke of Wellington was encamped in the neighborhood of Brussels with an army of 160,000 men whom he had drawn from England, the Netherlands, Hanover, and Brunswick; Blücher

with 80,000 Prussians was at Ligny, between Napoleon and Wellington. On June 16 Napoleon attacked Blücher with an equal force and defeated him so decisively that Napoleon thought Blücher would retreat toward the Rhine. Wellington more than held his own that day at Quatre-Bras against a smaller French army.

By the evening of the following day, a Saturday, with large reserve forces not far away, Wellington and 67,000 troops stood ready for battle near the village of Waterloo; Napoleon with 72,000 was near a farm called Belle Alliance, from which the Germans name the battle. The French were far superior in cavalry and artillery, but Blücher had promised Wellington to have his beaten army ready for another battle on the second day after its defeat and to bring a fresh corps of Bülow's with him. Napoleon postponed the beginning of the battle until nearly noon of Sunday, June 18, in order to give the ground a chance to dry out and to ensure a better footing for his cavalry charges, but the delay also gave Blücher time to overcome tremendous difficulties in getting his men, horses, and cannon through mud that often rose to the hubs. At noon, amid the thunder of a furious cannonade, the French on foot and horse charged the English lines, but the close squares held tight. Another furious charge captured an outpost village and shook the English left wing. Wellington, with his watch in his hand, was heard to say, "Blücher — or night!" But just at this crucial moment — it was about half past four — the first of Blücher's men appeared at Napoleon's right flank and at once began an attack. In a desperate attempt to crush the English before all the Prussians arrived, Napoleon drew his troops together into a massive column, but the distracting Prussians on Napoleon's right gave Wellington a chance to consolidate his

84. The  
Battle of  
Waterloo,  
June 18, 1815

forces too, and the third charge shattered against the English. The Prussians, who had now arrived in force, seized the village on which the French had been resting, and soon after eight in the evening the French scattered in a panic. The Prussians pursued them far into the night.

The three days' campaign in Belgium cost more than 60,000 lives in all, but it ended Napoleon's power forever. Four days after Waterloo, Napoleon resigned the crown a second time in Paris, and when the allies entered the French capital July 7, he had already hurried on farther to the west of France. There Napoleon surrendered himself to the British Government and claimed its protection; like Themistocles, he said, he was seating himself at the hearth of a former enemy. But England could not treat with him alone. The allies together signed a convention on August 2 by which he was banished forever to the island of St. Helena. Here he lived from his arrival in October 1815 until his death in May 1821; his body was removed to Paris in 1840. The Second Peace of Paris, which was signed in November 1815, restored Louis XVIII to the throne and deprived France of its possessions in Italy and of several towns west of the Rhine, but left it Alsace and Lorraine in spite of the loud complaints of the Germans; Russia and England were not willing that Germany should include Alsace and Lorraine as it had until far down in the seventeenth century.

The German people owe a large debt of gratitude to the Napoleonic era, for it conferred and induced benefits which have been of enormous value to the states of Germany. West and east of the Rhine it secured many of the noblest purposes of the French Revolution, such as taxation according to means and the abolishment of class privileges. Above all, it brought to flower the idea of popular civil liberty which

85. Napoleon  
banished to  
St. Helena

The Second  
Peace of  
Paris,  
November  
1815

86. Benefits  
to Germany  
from the  
Napoleonic  
era

had gradually been taking form in the eighteenth century. Like the people of France, Germans paid the fearful exactions of Napoleon, because the firmness of his rule ensured to them the continuance of the heritage of the Revolution. But his petrifying tyranny threatened to rob them utterly of the most precious legacy of all, civil liberty and national independence. Confronted by this issue they turned against him and against the nation which had given them the supreme idea of the age. They turned in order to save the idea. In the act of rescue, in the War of Liberation, the German people first realized their power ; the war discovered them to themselves. Conscious of their strength and fitness, they now began the great struggle of the nineteenth century for constitutional representative government and for national union and independence.



## CHAPTER VIII

### THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION AND THE PERIOD OF REACTION

1815-1848

87. The chief  
results of  
the Congress  
of Vienna.  
The Final Act

As far as Germany is concerned, the chief results of the Congress of Vienna are embraced in two acts of prime constructive importance, the Federal Act, which created a semblance of German national life, and the Final Act, which reset the boundaries of the states of Europe. The two acts appeared on June 8 and 9, 1815, respectively, before the Battle of Waterloo. By the terms of the Final Act, Prussia surrendered former Polish possessions to Russia, retaining of these only the province of Posen, and in return for this sacrifice received about half of Saxony; Prussia also obtained former holdings in Westphalia and several small districts in the Rhine country and on the shore of the Baltic Sea. A kingdom of ten million inhabitants, Prussia now included one hundred and twenty-two thousand square miles, that is, a little more than the combined area of New England, New York, and New Jersey. Austria obtained Tyrol once more besides Lombardy and Venice. In compensation for Tyrol, Bavaria received a district on the west bank of the Rhine and the grand-duchy of Würzburg. Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Saxony retained the rank of kingdoms to which Napoleon had elevated them. Hanover was raised to the same rank and enlarged by the acquisition of various towns in North Germany and territory



which extended it to the North Sea, where it controlled the mouths of the Weser and Elbe rivers. Thus four new German kingdoms were formally established, which, together with several lesser grand-duchies and duchies, composed a group of so-called "middle" states. Each of these states had a lofty sense of its own importance, and during the following decades each of them fostered a spirit of exclusive devotion to state interests which was fatal in its effects on German unity. On the other hand, the "middle" states were still overshadowed by the "great" states, Austria and Prussia, both in territory and in the strength which Austria and Prussia had recently displayed. Austria, however, with its Italian provinces and its kingdom of Hungary, lay within Germany only to the extent of one third of its possessions. Austria continued therefore, as in years past, to appear more a European than a German power. Prussia was much smaller by the terms of the Final Act than it had been in 1806 and not even so large as in 1792. It lay open to Russia on the east, and it was separated from France on the west only by a low range of mountains; it was divided in two parts by jealous states such as Hanover. But Prussia was thoroughly German, and in the last decades its leaders had learned both the need of unifying the kingdom and the identity of Prussian and German interests.

The momentous beginning which the Treaty of Lunéville effected in the reduction of the number of German states was continued at Vienna. The territorial changes, which now were made, entailed the obliteration of sundry independent principalities, so that the number of German states was reduced in 1815 to thirty-eight. These formed the "German Confederation," with Austria as permanent president; they signed the new constitution, the Federal Act, on June 8, 1815. The power to make war and

88. The  
Federal Act,  
constituting  
the German  
Confederation

conclude treaties was reserved for the Federal Diet, but each state's boundaries and independence in affairs at home were rigidly guaranteed by the new constitution. The jealous, particularistic spirit which prompted the smaller states to insist upon this provision forced further concessions which bound the hands of the Confederation securely from the start. The votes in the Diet were so distributed that the smaller states, with one sixth of the total population, could out-vote by nearly two to one the seven larger states, with the remaining five sixths of the people. To clinch this and other absurd covenants, the proviso was added that no changes or innovations in the laws or in the organization of the union could be made without the unanimous consent of the Diet. Thus, in actual practice, the Confederation could adopt no positive constructive measures; it was susceptible of no evolution. Austria, the leading state, made no serious attempt to win and to consolidate the allegiance of other states; the Diet, which met at Frankfort-on-the-Main, never attained to any real significance; and the army of the Confederation was never properly organized. As in the United States from 1783 to 1789, the lack of central authority and power and the divergence of state interests made this German union a federation in name only. At best the German Confederation was a makeshift union which had arisen, not out of mutual inclination, but in order to afford the semblance of a union which would stay foreign intervention in German affairs. Nevertheless, for a whole generation after the establishment of the Confederation public peace was maintained within the borders of Germany. For thirty-three years there was not a battle nor a skirmish on German soil. Thrift and industry could again reap their rewards. After the years leading up to 1813 and 1815 the boon of peace was not to be despised.

The spirit of liberalism, created by the French Revolution and carried to every corner of Europe by the Napoleonic régime, saw its existence menaced soon after 1815 by an alliance of the most powerful monarchs of Europe. In September 1815 Russia, Austria, and Prussia, representatives of the Greek, the Roman Catholic, and the Protestant Churches, set a seal upon their labors at the Congress of Vienna by forming the "Holy Alliance." In the document proclaiming their act the three powers avowed their intention to observe Christian principles in their relations to their subjects and to each other. With the exception of the Pope and the Sultan all the reigning monarchs of Europe were invited to join the Alliance, and in the course of time all accepted the invitation except the prince-regent of England, who was deterred by constitutional considerations. The Holy Alliance was probably never intended for political purposes, but the three original signatories soon attempted to stamp out liberalism wherever they found it. The Alliance thus acquired the reputation of being a society for the promotion of absolute monarchies, and it was bitterly cursed by champions of constitutional government.

The Federal Act, which constituted the Confederation (June 8, 1815), declared that "a constitution based upon the system of estates," that is, representative, law-making bodies, "should be established in all the states of the union," and that "there should be assemblies of the estates in every state." A few enlightened rulers gladly fell into line with these promises. In Saxe-Weimar, which had been elevated into a grand-duchy at the Congress of Vienna, Carl August gave constitutional rights to his people as early as 1816. Other "middle" states, Baden, Bavaria, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Würtemberg, became constitutional monarchies

89. The Holy Alliance

90. The promises of constitutional government

by 1820. In fact, under the influence of France, numerous German states had long since broken with the feudalistic past and had legally recognized principles of the French Revolution, for example, proportionate taxation and equal rights before the law. Rulers of these states were consequently ready enough to grant constitutions. In the present situation of Germany, however, they feared the formation of a strongly centralized, national government which would rob them of sovereign privileges. They hastened therefore to grant constitutions in order to satisfy their people and to promote among them a local contentment. Common features of the constitutions which they granted were popular representation in legislative assemblies to be established in each state, equality of all men before the law, and freedom of religion. If all the ruling members of the German Confederation had followed the example set in these states and fulfilled the definite promises to which they had attached their signatures, Germany would have been spared much bloodshed and tribulation.

Austria and Prussia, champions of an ultra-conservative policy, were responsible for the bitterness of the struggle for constitutional government which arose in many states of the Confederation. Metternich saw that Austria could best preserve its empire of conglomerated states if it continued as an absolute monarchy. He therefore determined that in Austria a constitution should be withheld, and liberalism should be crushed wherever it raised its head. This was the policy of reaction which has given a name to this period of German history. Metternich saw only one enemy, Revolution, which was, as he said, "the disease which must be cured, the volcano which must be extinguished, the gangrene which must be burned out with the hot iron." His whole policy was "Preserve the existing." For a few years

91. The beginnings of reaction in Austria

it was easy to do this and to forget the irksome promises of the Federal Act, as no immediate popular demand for constitutional rights came forth. The campaign of 1809 ended so depressingly for Austria that the War of Liberation did not lay a strong hold on the life and imagination of the Austrians at large. Nor had Austria played a significant rôle in the literary and intellectual awakening that had been stirring other parts of Germany since 1750. It had produced no great poets and no great philosophers. As long as Austrian national spirit was at so low an ebb, Metternich could "preserve the existing."

In Prussia the dawn of a new constitutional era seemed at hand. Here lovers of liberty could enumerate material and intellectual achievements of Prussia in the eighteenth century, brilliant successes of recent years, the earnest desire of a people that had proved its worth, and the presence of able statesmen like Stein and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Frederick William, moreover, had not only taken part in the promises of the Federal Act; he had also issued a decree in May 1815, stating that a Prussian national assembly representative of the people should sit in Berlin. It was a golden opportunity for Prussia to take the lead in German affairs as it had done in the recent war; by granting a constitution at once, to set an example to all Germany; and to enter thus upon a path which might end in German national unity. Other urgent measures indeed were pressing in upon Frederick William. He was eager to make the acquisitions of 1815 an integral part of his kingdom, as he ultimately succeeded in doing. He transformed the laws and methods governing education with such efficiency that the proportion of illiterates in Prussia to-day is less than one half of one per cent; it is about seven per cent in the United States and fifty-eight

92. Condi-  
tions in  
Prussia

per cent in Spain. Frederick William also conducted an economical administration and reorganized the Prussian system of finances. But in regard to a constitution, the paramount idea of the age, Frederick William only showed once more that he was temperamentally incapable of rising to a great emergency. Unwilling to break his promises, he yet hesitated and considered and sought further advice. Irritated by the pressure of his advisers, he responded angrily that *he* would decide *when* the right moment had come. He was as far as usual from energetic decision and action when events happened which drew Austria and Prussia closer together and made the Prussian king a pliant follower of Metternich's policy.

The first symptoms of reaction in Austria and Prussia caused great disappointment all over Germany, especially in the universities where many gathered who had fought in the recent war and who had absorbed unconsciously many of the ideas of the French Revolution. An extreme radical element was not lacking, but righteous discontent over unfulfilled promises and glowing desire for constitutional liberty and German unity stirred university circles as they stirred no other assemblies of German men. In 1815 a student society, the *Burschenschaft*, had been founded at the University of Jena with Christian and patriotic purposes. In October 1817, when the three hundredth anniversary of the Reformation and the fourth anniversary of the Battle of Leipsic were being commemorated at Eisenach, a band of Jena students, members of the *Burschenschaft*, burned a heap of pasteboard which represented certain well-known reactionary books; copies of the books themselves were too expensive. In March 1819 Karl Sand, a Jena student of theology, stabbed the German author Kotzebue to death in Mannheim, because

93. Out-  
breaks in  
behalf of rep-  
resentative  
government



Kotzebue was publishing derisive attacks upon the liberals and was suspected of being a Russian spy. The forces of reaction, grossly exaggerating the significance of the Eisenach prank and strengthened by the accession of many liberals who abhorred Sand's fanatical deed, now combined and came out into the open with the determination to throttle liberalism once for all.

In September 1819 Metternich drew ministers of various states together in conference at Carlsbad and induced them to adopt "the Carlsbad Resolutions." This document abolished the Burschenschaft in Jena and similar societies in other institutions, placed all the universities under strict supervision, and took away the freedom of the press throughout the Confederation. A commission was appointed to watch and prosecute revolutionary acts and gatherings. Various states, notably Würtemberg and Bavaria, jealous of the state rights guaranteed by the Federal Act, were opposed to the Carlsbad Resolutions, but Prussia, like Austria, espoused them unreservedly, and they were pushed through the Federal Diet. The promulgation of the new measures was followed, at least on the surface of events, by a period of political stagnation. The rulers of Germany made no further recognition of popular rights; in some states, such as Baden, they proceeded to ignore the constitutions which they had granted. The people of Germany, enraged by the despotism of Carlsbad but cowed by persecutions, relapsed into a condition of ineffective fermentation; the soaring idealism of the War of Liberation sank into a bitter pessimism, which left an indelible stamp upon much of the German thought and German spirit of the nineteenth century. Men who had served their country conspicuously asked for a redemption of pledges and met with petty persecution. Even Baron Stein

94. The  
Carlsbad Res-  
olutions and  
their effect

1

2

3

4



did not escape surveillance ; Arndt was dismissed from his professorship at Bonn. The clouds which overhung Germany were relieved only by the spread of liberal ideas in England and by the Greek struggle for freedom from Turkey ; the Philhellenism expressed by Müller and other German poets in their praise of Greek courage was a convenient cloak for encouragement and exhortation to Germans.

95. The influence in Germany of the July Revolution in France

In 1830, when the July Revolution in France overthrew the Bourbon monarchy and put the Orleanist Louis Philippe on the throne as the head of a liberal government, hope arose in Germany that this breeze from the west might also clear the German atmosphere. The people of Brunswick and Saxony and Hesse-Cassel forced their rulers to establish constitutional governments ; at a gathering in Hambach (May 1832), a village in the Bavarian Rhine country, extreme revolutionists even advocated the establishment of a republican form of government ; but these and other less inflammatory radicals were soon checked. Some states, especially those, such as Würtemberg, which had already received tolerable constitutions, remained calm throughout. Nevertheless, after a series of ministerial conferences (July 1832 to January 1834), Metternich prevailed upon the Federal Diet to enlarge the scope of the Carlsbad Resolutions. The states of the Confederation were bound, at the call of any sovereign, to protect him against revolutionary acts of his people ; legislation in the different states was to be supervised ; political societies, public meetings, and revolutionary badges were forbidden. Fritz Reuter, the poet, was only one of those who suffered cruelly from an infraction of these laws. The only charge ever brought against Reuter was that as a student at Jena he had worn the black, red, and gold colors of the

abolished Burschenschaft. Yet he was sentenced to death for "treason" and was actually imprisoned for seven years. By such measures as these the spirit of reaction triumphed once more in Germany, and the spasm brought on by the July Revolution subsided.

Despite the varying political conditions within the different states and the divergent, particularistic relations between the states, a definite step toward the unification of Germany was taken even during the period of reaction. This was the establishment of the Zollverein, or "customs union," under the auspices of Prussia. Travel and, above all, commercial progress in Germany were impeded intolerably by the customs restrictions throughout the country, for the states had customs-houses not only on their main borders but also for all their scattered bits of territory; within Prussia alone thirteen states owned, or even consisted exclusively of, stretches of land, known as enclaves, which were entirely surrounded by Prussian territory. As early as 1818 Prussia abolished tolls on transit through the kingdom and, soon after, it forced the enclaves within its borders to join with it in a system of internal free trade. Other states gradually realized the advantages of such a union. In March 1833 Prussia was joined by Bavaria and Würtemberg, which had entered into a similar agreement with each other, and before the end of the same year a third union of states in central Germany, originally formed to offset the Prussian union in the immediate interest of the smaller central states, joined the Prussian Zollverein. With this accession all the members of the Confederation, except Austria, Hanover, and a few lesser states, were in the union; Austria held out through consideration for its possessions outside of Germany, and the other states declined to join, chiefly, through jealousy of Prussia.

96. The  
Zollverein :  
its formation

✓

97. Its  
influence

At midnight of the eve of the new year 1834 the toll-gates fell between the states of the Zollverein, and with the toll-gates the barriers of trade. From the Alps to the Baltic a market was opened to products of German skill. The prosperity of the working classes leaped forward; the beginnings of modern industrial Germany were made. After 1835 the introduction of railways between the states and of steamships in the merchant navy further accelerated the impetus which industries and trade had gained from the Zollverein. The cities grew with unprecedented rapidity. Conscious of the memorable fact that this new material prosperity was due to the leadership of Prussia, Germans began to look toward Berlin rather than Vienna as the capital of the nation. The possibility of a union of German states which would not include Austria now first dawned upon the German horizon. Above all, the Zollverein revealed the natural bonds of unity between Germans in a form so substantial that none could fail to mark its effect or note its significance. It nationalized German life. More than any other event or factor of the time it made for a sense of German unity that could survive the most disrupting influences of the nineteenth century.

98. A change  
of ruler in  
Austria

In the meantime Francis I of Austria had died (1835) after a reign of forty-three years. He had held the possessions of the Hapsburgs together, and he had won the affection of his people, who called him "our good Kaiser Franz," but Francis never saw, or he shut his eyes to, the light of the new era which had broken over Europe. To the end of his days he was determined to suffer no encroachment on the divine right of his rule. To that end he and Metternich built up a ponderous machine which was foredoomed to break down as soon as one of its main parts

failed. This contingency happened in the reign of Francis's son and successor, Ferdinand I (1835-1848). A victim of epilepsy in his youth and of intermittent insanity in his manhood, Ferdinand made no pretense at ruling. In his time Austria was ruled by a "conference of state" consisting of several archdukes and ministers; the chief of these was Metternich, whose theories of government were susceptible of no change.

In Prussia too a reign of forty-three years ended when Frederick William III died in 1840. The late king's son, Frederick William IV, was said to believe in representative government and to desire German national unity. He was therefore welcomed to the throne as a saviour. In the very year of his accession Frederick William had a chance to prove himself. German national feeling was running high at that time in resentment against the demand of various French writers that the whole of the west bank of the Rhine should be ceded to France. The universal popular appeal that rose for national unity and strength in order to keep out the foreigner stirred Frederick William deeply. He therefore insisted both at Vienna and at Petrograd on a reconstruction of the German Confederation, but he was opposed by Metternich and the Czar in 1840 and he was permanently discouraged by a second rebuff from the same quarters in 1845. Meanwhile he had changed his mind about representative government. In 1847 he summoned a united Diet of Prussia consisting of the members of the assemblies in the various provinces, but he at once marked his conception of the Diet's status by calling it an "adviser" to the crown, not a law-maker. He had, in fact, really summoned it far more out of his romantic fondness for the picturesque than out of conviction for liberal ideas. True to Hohenzollern belief in the divine right of kings, he

99. The accession of Frederick William IV in Prussia, 1840

said in his opening address that no "sheet of paper," in other words a constitution, should ever thrust itself between the Lord God and his country. The Diet soon refused to approve two royal propositions on the ground that no rights had been granted and guaranteed to its members. It broke up, therefore, after ten weeks without having accomplished any positive results.

100. Events  
and condi-  
tions in  
German  
"middle"  
states

The popular discontent and unrest which prevailed in Austria and Prussia was also rife in German "middle" and "little" states. Württemberg was less affected by political agitations than many other states, as its people remained fairly satisfied with the constitution of 1819. In Baden, French radicalism, which continued to find easy access, often roused the people to revolutionary outbreaks and demands. The grand-duke, a liberal-minded ruler, was disposed to satisfy many of these demands; but the Federal Diet bound his hands, and Baden made little progress toward a permanent reorganization of its affairs. The constitutional gain in Saxony was nullified in the early forties by the appointment of a reactionary ministry. Louis I (1825-1848) of Bavaria presided for years over a model constitutional monarchy; his patronage of arts and sciences transformed Munich into one of the most attractive cities of Europe. But revolutionary acts of the thirties and forties terrified him; he first yielded to the Jesuits and endorsed their repression of Protestants and liberals; and then he turned to the Protestants for support. A riot, which threatened the stability of the government, took place in 1847. In Hanover, when the English crown was inherited (1837) by a woman, Queen Victoria, the connection between England and Hanover was broken, and an extreme reactionary monarchist succeeded to the Hanoverian throne, Duke Ernest Augustus of Cumberland.

The new constitution of 1838, a revised and improved version of that of 1819, was at once overthrown, and a majority of the Federal Diet sanctioned and approved this shameless muzzling of the popular will. Thus, when 1848 arrived, Germany was standing on the edge of a volcano. Only a slight impulse was needed to plunge the whole country into a caldron of revolution.

However few political rights the German people gained before 1848, they strengthened in many ways their claim to citizenship in the world. During these years Goethe completed *Faust*, the profoundest imaginative work of modern times. Under the spell of Romanticism, Uhland and Eichendorff, Heine and others, produced a series of lyric poems which are unsurpassed in the literature of any other nation. By 1830, however, the literary tide had turned. Romantic indifference to modern life gave way to a new realism which culminated about 1850 in Hebbel's plays and Ludwig's stories. Also within these two decades men famous in German literature dealt directly with existing political conditions. A small group of young men who were soon classed together under the name of "Young Germany" — Heine, Börne, Gutzkow, and others — expressed in literary form the prevailing discontent with reactionary political measures. Their newspaper articles, poems, and other writings were intended to force the establishment of a liberal form of government in all the German states. But they succeeded only in having the ban put on their "immoral" writings and either in suffering imprisonment like Gutzkow or in being virtually exiled as were Heine and Börne in Paris. Similar punishment was meted out to Hoffmann von Fallersleben and Freiligrath, "political poets" of the forties, both of whom wrote bitter revolutionary lyrics. Becker's poem in answer to the

101. German literature in the period of reaction



French demands of 1840, *They shall not have the free and German Rhine*, resounded all over Germany; *The Watch on the Rhine* by Schneckengerber was inspired by the same excitement, but it did not become a national hymn until thirty years later.

102. German philosophy, fine arts, and music in the first half of the nineteenth century

Germany also produced a brilliant series of philosophers and scientists in the first half of the nineteenth century. Schleiermacher, the great synthesist of modern times, attempted to reconcile philosophy and science with religion and theology. Hegel founded a new German idealism, no longer, however, on the culture of the individual as preached by Kant and Fichte, but on the subordination of the individual to the whole and on collectivistic endeavor in the advancement of humanity. The history of science boasts such names as Niebuhr and Ranke and Savigny in history, Alexander von Humboldt in the natural sciences, and the Grimm brothers in philology. Architecture and sculpture progressed in their sense of proportion and in execution, but they displayed little originality. At the same time that the completion of the Gothic cathedral at Cologne and the restoration of Romanesque Spires were taken in hand, there arose the Classical edifices of Schinkel in Berlin and Klenze in Munich, and the hardly less Classical statues of Schadow and Rauch. The supreme German achievement of these years, perhaps the greatest contribution Germany has ever made to the world, was in the realm of music — in the lyric song of Schubert, in the romantic opera of Weber, and in the symphony of Beethoven, the profoundest of all musicians. Through the work of these and other composers Germany won its unquestioned preëminence in the world's most catholic art.





## CHAPTER IX

### THE POPULAR STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY AND NATIONAL UNITY

1848-1863

In February 1848 the people of Paris drove Louis Philippe from the throne because he would not grant universal suffrage, and proclaimed a new (Second) Republic. As the sparks from Paris fell, the states of Germany burst into flame. Liberals, radicals, and revolutionists of every degree joined as if by preconcerted signal in rebellions which shook the states of Germany to their foundations. Germany rang with familiar phrases : freedom of the press, trial by jury, and, above all, representative constitutional government and national unity. By the middle of March not a state remained unaffected by the clamor. Revolutionists captured cities and held them for weeks and even months ; Metternich fell as early as March 13, and Ferdinand I fled from Vienna ; Louis I of Bavaria was forced to abdicate in favor of his son Maximilian II. To appease the crowd, many rulers hurriedly granted constitutions embodying the reforms demanded, and selected " March " cabinets consisting of members of the liberal parties who were to institute the reforms ; every ruler was forced to make concessions.

103. The outbreak of the French Revolution of 1848 and its effect in Germany

Frederick William IV of Prussia responded to the cry of the time by summoning the Diet of the kingdom to assemble on April 2, thus tacitly pledging constitutional

104. Events in Prussia

government in Prussia. At the same time he promised to coöperate in so revising the constitution of the German Confederation that German national unity might be established. But the very day (March 18) these announcements were made, when soldiers were restraining the over-jubilant mob in Berlin, two accidental, fateful shots resounded. No one was wounded, but with the cry of "Treason! Vengeance!" the mob threw itself into a fight with the soldiers which cost many lives. To stop the fighting the king ordered the withdrawal of the troops from the city, and the mob ruled for a day and a half. The king's brother William, the heir to the throne and a man with a brilliant destiny before him, was suspected of having prompted the first shots; already hated by the people as the putative head of the reactionary party in Prussia, he was forced to flee in disguise to England. On March 21 the king rode in state through Berlin and halted in several places where he avowed his desire for Germany's freedom and unity; the evening of the same day he asked in a proclamation for the confidence of the people and declared that the interests of Prussia would thenceforth be merged in those of Germany. The Diet assembled two months later and began to discuss the preliminaries of a constitution, but after months of wrangling, in which the Diet thoroughly discredited itself, Frederick William took matters into his own hands. He dissolved the Diet (December 1848) and issued a constitution.

Early in March 1848 the Diet of the German Confederation, greatly excited by recent events and hastily unfurling the black, red, and gold of the abolished Burschenschaft, decreed the choice of a German Parliament by the direct vote of the people. On the eighteenth of May 1848 this Parliament assembled in Frankfort-on-the-Main. It came

from near and far, from northernmost Hanover and Austrian Tyrol, from the Bavarian Palatinate and easternmost Prussia, and proceeded to its first deliberations amid the pealing of bells and the thunder of cannon. Some of the wisest men in Germany took part in the debates, including Arndt, Jacob Grimm, Uhland, the historians Gervinus and Raumer, and the theologian Döllinger. Conscious of their prestige and with enthusiasm for their mission, these men set about the task of composing a constitution for all Germany and thus creating a new united nation. Many of the ideas evolved and expounded at Frankfort furnished the basis of later German law, but as the debates progressed, the fundamental weaknesses of the Parliament and the obstacles to its success became more and more apparent. The gulf between the north and south, between the aims and demands of conflicting parties, yawned ever wider. To bridge this gulf these men labored in vain. They were theoretical idealists in a situation that demanded practical politicians.

In spite of its inherent faults the Frankfort Parliament succeeded (March 1849), albeit by very scant majorities, in adopting a German national constitution and in electing Frederick William of Prussia "Emperor of the Germans." By these acts the Parliament declared that the salvation of Germany lay in the establishment of an empire with the king of Prussia at the head; this empire was to be composed of parts equal in area and power. It redounds to the everlasting credit of the Frankfort Parliament that it rose to this declaration. In its conception of an empire headed by the king of Prussia the Parliament anticipated by twenty years and more the historical solution of the problem of Germany; it fixed the goal of a large part of the German people from this time forth. But Frederick William

106. The results of the Parliament

declined the honor. He would not reduce Prussia to an equality with other states by yielding a jot of Prussia's territory or of Prussia's authority. He replied to the offer of the crown as a proud adherent of legitimist principles. The crown which the Parliament offered must be bestowed, he said, with the unanimous agreement of German rulers ; the new imperial constitution must also be ratified in the several states. As it was certain that loyalty to Austrian leadership would deter many German rulers from ratifying the Parliament's actions, Frederick William's reply checkmated the effort of that body to solve the problem of the age. Without the coöperation of the heads of the German states, the Parliament's work went for naught. When hot-headed radicals, dissatisfied at Frankfort, stirred up fresh insurrections in Saxony and Baden and elsewhere, the conservative and reactionary elements reassumed control. Within a month most of the representatives at Frankfort had been called home, and the Parliament died an ignominious death in May 1849.

107. The  
turmoil in  
Austria

During 1848 and 1849 the Austrian monarchy went through a crucial period in its history. Simultaneous revolts in the Italian possessions of the Hapsburgs, in Hungary, and in Austria proper threatened to rend the monarchy asunder into its constituent parts. The result hung in the balance through many months of bitter struggle. In Vienna a constitution was granted as early as April 1848, but it soon proved unsatisfactory. Students and day-laborers captured the capital and controlled it until October. Then the city was retaken and the uprising was cruelly crushed. In Italy a decisive victory of Austrian troops in July 1848 checked the struggle for liberty. When the Italians revolted again in the spring of 1849, they were subdued once more, and peace, which now

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seemed permanent, was made in August. The Hungarian struggle for independence, led by Louis Kossuth and aided by Italians from Austria's possessions in the peninsula, bore greater promise of triumph. In April 1849 the Austrians were entirely driven out of Hungary, and the young republic had 200,000 men in arms. But Russia came with a huge army to Austria's assistance and smothered the revolt. Meanwhile, in December 1848, Ferdinand had ended his hollow rule and abdicated in favor of his eighteen-year-old nephew, Francis Joseph, who still (1915) occupies the throne. In March 1849 Francis Joseph approved a new constitution which granted a few popular rights, but with the increasing triumphs over the revolutionists the forces of reaction secured the whip hand again. Constitutional rights were nullified one by one, and before the end of 1851 Austria was again the absolute monarchy of Metternich's time.

As in Austrian possessions, the turmoil continued in many states of Germany far down into 1849. The king of Saxony fled (May 1849) from the revolutionists in Dresden and regained his capital only with the aid of Prussian troops. The same means was used to pacify the Bavarian Palatinate and to prevent an uprising of the people of Würtemberg. The grand-duke of Baden was driven from his capital Karlsruhe by revolutionists who purposed to convert Baden into a republic. Here the fight was longer, but under Prince William of Prussia, who had returned from England, Prussian soldiers restored the old régime. With the restoration of order in Baden the defeat of the popular movement throughout Germany was complete. The spirit of reaction surged back over the states triumphant once more. The liberal March cabinets vanished and with them the March concessions. The

**108. The suppression of revolts in other states and the return of reaction**

dream of constitutional liberty took flight, it seemed, forever. Through persecutions which followed the return of reaction Germany lost some of its best blood. Able men, Carl Schurz and many others, left Germany, either to escape the penalty for rebellion or to seek liberty in other lands. In America, true to their German ideals of unity and liberty, many of these men were potent factors in preserving the Union and in emancipating the negro; they made themselves an integral element of a nation which owes in part to them its idealism and social stability.

109. The popular failures and successes of 1848 and 1849

The German people of 1850 thought they had labored in vain. Divided according to state lines into isolated rebellions, the popular movement was crushed here and there in turn. Not a state produced a leader who could bind together and direct effectively the discontented elements of the time; the struggles for state constitutions resulted, therefore, only in the transitory successes of mob violence. Nor did a popular national leader appear. The insurrections of 1848 and 1849 never assumed any semblance of a cumulative national uprising; they did not seem to advance German national unity at all. Burdened by a sense of this double failure, German people of 1850 to 1855 sank back farther than ever into hopeless, inactive pessimism. Nevertheless the popular gains of 1848 and 1849 appear to a later generation distinct and substantial. In the conflict of arms and ideas the German people arrived at an unprecedented understanding of the principles for which they were contending; they formulated precisely their political ambitions. The Frankfort Parliament revealed to them, moreover, a vision of national unity and the path by which unity might be attained. However dark were the years which followed, this vision never wholly faded. The German people never reverted, nor could they



revert, to the adolescent confusion of ideas and aims which characterizes the decades preceding 1848. Besides bestowing these spiritual gains, the struggles of the recent past exhibited one state, Prussia, which could withstand the terrific blows of the time at home and abroad. Prussia not only soon restored order within its own kingdom; it was also able to lend vital assistance to the rulers of other German states. It appeared in February 1850 as the leader of a new era in German political life when Frederick William yielded to the wishes of his people and granted a new and permanent constitution. This document, the most conspicuous tangible gain of 1848 and 1849, furnished in considerable measure the prototype of new constitutions granted later by other German rulers.

The Prussian constitution of 1850 contained in the main the provisions which govern Prussia to-day. It guarantees the equality of all men before the law, trial by jury, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of peaceable assembly. The king appoints and dismisses his ministers; they are responsible to him and not to the Diet, or, to use the American term, the Legislature. The king and the two houses of the Legislature have equal rights in the making of laws. But he may adjourn the Legislature for thirty days, and if he thinks a newly chosen body of law-makers will prove more amenable than the one in session, he may dissolve the existing Legislature. Besides all these rights the king also enjoys that of unconditional veto. It is possible, therefore, for him to avert all distasteful legislation. The upper house of the Legislature, the House of Lords, consists of hereditary nobles, peers selected by the king, and representatives of the universities and chief towns. The lower house, the House of Deputies, is made up of representatives of the people.

110. The  
Prussian con-  
stitution



Three-class  
suffrage

Every male Prussian, over twenty-four years old, may vote for the electors who choose the members of the House of Deputies. But the richest men who pay one third of the taxes of a given district form a group and choose one third of the district's electors; the taxpayers next in wealth likewise form a group and choose one third; while the remainder of the people choose the last third of the electors. Thus it is possible that one rich man, if he pay a third of the taxes, has as much power in electing a district's representatives as all the workingmen combined. As men of education normally belong to the second class of taxpayers, the Prussian constitution entrusts the welfare of the lower classes to the wisdom and good will of the rich and educated. Wide difference of opinion in regard to the discharge of this trust has led to many loud but ineffective demands for a reform of the suffrage laws. In the light of the twentieth century the Prussian constitution presents very distinct traces of Frederick William's medieval absolutism and a very imperfect realization of liberal ideals. Nevertheless the establishment of Prussian constitutional government marked the dawn of a new day in German political life. It overthrew in a leading German state the principle of absolutism in favor of that of constitutional monarchy; it established the principle of coöperative personal responsibility in public affairs.

111. The  
first clash  
between Aus-  
tria and  
Prussia for  
preëminence  
in Germany

The German leadership which Prussia had assumed in constitutional affairs and which had been ascribed to Prussia by the Frankfort Parliament was emphasized by Frederick William in his "league of three kings." In May 1849, less than a month after he had declined the crown offered by the deputation from Frankfort, Frederick William united the kings of Hanover and Saxony with himself in a league which was to serve as a magnet for all the other German

states except Austria; thus, through the agreement of rulers, Frederick William tried to establish the national unity which the Parliament had desired as the expression of the will of the people. Agreeing upon a roughly outlined constitution, the three original members of the league succeeded within a few months in securing the adherence of eighteen other states. A parliament was then summoned to meet in Erfurt in March 1850 and construct a permanent constitution. But before it assembled, defections had begun. The desire for national unity had been too much weakened by recent blows to overcome the particularistic demands of individual states, and Austria, as it regained strength at home, opposed more and more openly a scheme which would shatter its influence in Germany. The Erfurt Parliament adjourned in April never to meet again, though Prussia clung to its belief in the vitality of the union. As if nothing had happened, Austria invited all the members of the German Confederation to send delegates to a Diet to be held at Frankfort-on-the-Main in May. A large majority of the states followed this invitation. Thus the most momentous German problem of the nineteenth century, the dualism of Austria and Prussia or the struggle between these two powers for the hegemony of Germany, thrust itself into the foreground of national life and demanded solution. This was the outcome of the rivalry between Prussia and Austria which Frederick the Great had initiated, however unconsciously, a hundred years before. Since Frederick's time many historical events had sprung from this rivalry, but it was not until 1850 that rivalry became an open struggle for preëminence. After the events of 1850 the struggle between these two states formed the backbone of German history until the question was settled in 1866.

112. An Austrian defeat of Prussia in diplomacy

A crisis arose in the relations between Austria and Prussia while the restored Diet of the German Confederation was still in session (September 1850). The elector of Hesse-Cassel, who had thrown his land into turmoil by overriding its constitution, fled to Frankfort, where, in spite of the fact that his electorate was a member of the Prussian union, he called upon the Diet for aid against his subjects. True to its traditions, Austria backed the reactionary elector; Prussia opposed him because he had ignored his obligations to the union. In November the Prussian and Austrian armies stood face to face in Hesse; war was imminent; but the only life claimed by the few shots exchanged was that of one gray horse. Before the end of the month a meeting of the prime ministers of Prussia and Austria was held at Olmütz, and the Prussian yielded every point of disagreement. Prussia gave up its plan of forming a union; Prussian troops evacuated Hesse and Baden; and Hesse was handed over to its reactionary elector. Austrian influence was again supreme in Germany. Prussia was defeated as utterly as at Jena and without the consolation of having made an honorable stand.

113. Failures of Austria's foreign and domestic policies

Strengthened by its triumph at Olmütz, Austria attempted to force a place in the Zollverein for itself and all its heterogeneous provinces, but the determination of Prussia and other states to safeguard the German character of the customs-union frustrated Austria's plans. In April 1853 the Zollverein as already constituted was renewed for a term of twelve years. During the Crimean War (1853-1856) Prussia remained neutral and preserved its friendly relations with all the combatants. Austria never actively engaged in the conflict, but in 1856 it made a feint at joining England and France in their alliance with Turkey, and Russia was compelled to sue for peace. Austria won

no friends in western Europe, for its negotiations were always hesitating, and it incurred the enmity of Russia by refusing a return of Russia's decisive aid in the rebellion of Hungary in 1849. The friendship between Austria and Russia, dating from the formation of the Holy Alliance in 1815 and often reënfined in the conflicts between reaction and liberalism, was a closed chapter in European politics. Austria was isolated. Hardly more successful than its foreign policy was the method of government which Austria was employing at home. Much was said of reforms and popular benefits, but the vanity of these assertions was soon made manifest. In 1859 Austria fell into war with its Italian provinces and after only ten weeks lost all its possessions in the peninsula except Venice; Italy now established its kingdom and crowned Victor Emmanuel in March 1861. Austria rose from its defeat, however, potentially stronger than before, for it had learned much. It cast aside at once its long-cherished policy of reaction and prepared to establish a more liberal form of government. After a year of preliminaries a permanent constitutional era began in Austria proper in 1860, and seven years later in Hungary. Fleeting concessions of 1848 were embodied in these new constitutions. Austria thereby regained support in many German states.

Though blighted by events of 1849 and the early fifties, the popular desire for national German unity regained its vigor before a decade had passed. Idealists raised the cry as before and they were now aided by the swelling forces of industrial life, by merchants and manufacturers, who saw foreign markets closed to them through the impotence of the German Confederation. The desire for national unity was fostered and disseminated by many agencies, especially by gatherings of lawyers, scholars, and business

114. The renewal of the popular desire for national unity

men. Gymnastic contests, music festivals, and fairs assembled huge crowds, often from long distances, thus affording the people of different states an opportunity to understand each other better and promoting the desire for unity. Newspapers and periodicals increased with great rapidity; patriotic pamphlets were circulated broadcast. Freytag's prose essays, *Pictures of Germany in Past Times*, and the poetry of Scheffel, Reuter, and others bear lasting testimony to the wave of longing for national unity which swept over Germany in the fifties. In 1859, just as constitutional government was being permanently established in Austria and other German states, the centennial celebration of the birth of Schiller, Germany's great apostle of political freedom, caught up the whole country in a flood-tide of national enthusiasm. Thrilled by Schiller's idealism and by his lessons of peace and concord Germany, for a moment, was a unit.

The question of German unity was, however, not solved at this happy juncture, in part because numerous rulers, those of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, and other states, were still opposed on principle to any surrender of sovereign rights, in part because they differed irreconcilably in regard to the form and leadership of a united Germany. The whole country, including both rulers and people, was divided into two camps: that which desired a "little Germany" with Prussia at the head, and that which favored a "great Germany" with Austria as the leader. States which had desired to ally the German Confederation with Austria against Italy and had been held back by Prussia's persistent neutrality turned to Austria as the traditional leader of Germany, and with all the more warmth when they saw the dawn of Austria's constitutional era. Other states saw in the inclusion of Austria with its burden of

115. The discord between German states

varying nationalities the erection of an edifice foredoomed to fall of its own top-heaviness. The efforts for the new thus failed through the conflict of ideals. Nor were various attempts to utilize the old attended by more success. The German Confederation could not be rehabilitated because no scheme that was proposed enlisted general coöperation.

In October 1857 Frederick William IV fell ill and was succeeded by his brother, William I, who was first regent and afterwards (from January 1861) king. A son of Frederick William III and Queen Louise, William was almost sixty-four years old at his accession; he could recall events which preceded the triumph at Leipsic and even the disaster at Jena. He had won the order of the Iron Cross in 1814 and entered Paris with the allies of the Fifth Coalition. Permeated with Prussian and Hohenzollern traditions, he believed as fixedly as any of his ancestors in a strongly centralized government; he was also devoutly convinced that Prussia was destined to reunite Germany. Though slow of thought and unimaginative, he soon revealed a positiveness of action and a tenacity of purpose which set him at an opposite pole from Frederick William IV. Under William's guidance Prussia took and maintained its position of neutrality during Austria's war in Italy, despite the resentment of Austria and other German states. In 1863, contrary to the wishes of Austria and its friends, Prussia induced the Diet of the Confederation to intervene in Hesse-Cassel; the Diet compelled the elector to discard the constitution which he had forced upon his people in 1860 and to follow the more liberal Hessian constitution of 1831.

A soldier from his youth, William I considered the army the mainstay of the Government and the foundation of

116. The accession of William I in Prussia



117. The reorganization of the Prussian army

Prussia's hopes for the future. After the events of 1859 he believed more and more that a clash with Austria was inevitable. He therefore began a thorough reorganization of the Prussian army. The period of three years' active service remained the same, but the number of new recruits every year was raised on the basis of the increased population from 40,000 to 63,000, thus enlarging the army by half as many more, or establishing for time of peace, including both officers and troops, a host of 213,000 men. At the same time, the period of service in the first reserve was lengthened from two to four years, which increased enormously the number of troops at command as soon as war might be declared. The Landwehr, or second reserve, entailed a further liability to service for nine more years. Thus, for sixteen years, approximately from his twentieth to his thirty-sixth year, a Prussian was liable to service in the army. The intent and effect of this system was to put the burden of war upon young men, and to spare men of middle age and over for the conduct of business and the care of the families of the land. In actual practice the system proved so effective that it remained unchanged for over thirty years.

118. The constitutional conflict

The necessary appropriations for the army were granted at first, but in 1861 the House of Deputies refused to sanction the outlay again and thus entered upon a long struggle with the king. This struggle, known as "the constitutional conflict," revolved about the question of the king's right under the constitution to make outlays not sanctioned by the House of Deputies. Early in the conflict various factions in the House consolidated in two political parties, forbears of parties in the Reichstag of today: the Conservatives, chiefly members of the lesser nobility, who supported the Government, and the Progressives,



representatives of the middle and lower classes, who opposed the outlays. But the Progressives outnumbered the Conservatives by four to one, and there was never doubt of the position which the House would take on any phase of the constitutional conflict. The opposition of the House, which was bitter from the start, became intense in October 1861, when at his formal coronation William proclaimed the divine origin of his crown and told the Legislature that it had been called together as an adviser of the crown; this threat at the constitution alarmed many patriots at home and many friends of Prussia in other states.

In the critical situation which followed, William, instead of following his inclination to abdicate, made (September 1862) Otto von Bismarck his prime minister. Bismarck was thoroughly conversant with European politics through his experience as ambassador to Russia and to France; he believed as earnestly as William himself in a strongly centralized monarchy; and he clearly foresaw both the conflict with Austria and the necessity of eliminating Austria from Germany in order to achieve German unity. Bismarck therefore cordially approved the reorganization of the army. He proceeded to carry it on without appropriations, confident that the end would justify the means and that an indemnity would then be forthcoming. Bismarck could not reveal the basic reason for the new army measures; if he did, Austria would have all the rest of Europe on its side, and the idealists in the Prussian Legislature, who foresaw a unification of Germany through reason and persuasion, would oppose the army policy all the more bitterly. In 1863 Bismarck went so far as to suspend the freedom of the press in order to protect the Government from attacks. War between Austria and Prussia was imminent in 1863 when Bismarck openly advised the

119. The appointment of Bismarck as prime minister

Austrian minister to transfer the seat of Austrian power to Hungary, outside of Germany; and again when it was widely known that Austria was stirring up other German states against Prussia. These war clouds vanished, but the question of Austrian or Prussian supremacy in Germany was hastening to its solution.

## CHAPTER X

### THE FOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

1863-1871

The last act of the struggle between Austria and Prussia for the hegemony of Germany began in 1864, when long-standing trouble in the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein again became acute. Schleswig was a province of Denmark; Holstein was "personally" united with Denmark in so far as its reigning duke was also the Danish king, but it was independent of the Danish kingdom — just as Hanover was of England — and it was a member of the German Confederation. At the same time, Schleswig and Holstein were connected with each other by ancient law of the two duchies, which stated that Schleswig and Holstein were "indissolubly united." On the principle of this union Denmark, supported by the Danes who formed one third of the population of Schleswig, wished to make both duchies Danish provinces. On the same principle the remaining two thirds of the people of Schleswig, who were German, and all Holstein, which was inhabited by Germans exclusively, desired complete independence of Denmark and alliance with Germany. In the course of the nineteenth century, when the approaching extinction of the male line of the Danish royal family forecast the succession of a female branch, whereas Holstein by its law must go to the nearest male heir, the Germans of the two duchies saw a chance to realize their desire of union with the German Confederation.

120. The trouble in Schleswig and Holstein down to 1863

They fought for their independence with great pluck in 1848 and 1849 and 1850, but European powers intervened and decided in the London Protocol of 1852 that both the duchies should be united with Denmark and be handed down with the Danish crown. The people of the duchies were bitterly dissatisfied and so were the people of Germany.

121. Events  
of 1863

In 1863, when the new king of Denmark treated Schleswig as a Danish province and entirely disconnected from Hölstein, the Diet of the German Confederation fell into line with popular feeling. After declaring itself in favor of the male succession in Holstein and the "indissoluble union" of the two duchies, the Diet sent troops into Holstein "pending the settlement of the succession." England and Russia protested vigorously against this violation of the London Protocol, and Bismarck therefore feared the execution of the Protocol and the frustration of his own plans. Bismarck intended from the beginning to annex the two duchies to Prussia, and thus by a single stroke to enlarge Prussia and also to prevent the establishment of a state which might impair Prussia's influence in North Germany. He therefore at once joined with Austria in urging the German Confederation to demand that Denmark observe the united destiny of the duchies as provided in the London Protocol. When the Diet naturally refused to rescind its action, Bismarck considered himself free from any fealty to the acts of the Diet. Austria and Prussia now announced that they would proceed as independent European powers.

In January 1864 Austria and Prussia issued an ultimatum to Denmark to observe the London Protocol, and when the Danish Government gave an evasive reply, they started 45,000 Austrian and Prussian soldiers toward the frontier with the demand that Denmark evacuate Schleswig.

Denmark was powerless against this combined force. The allies secured one victory after another, on land and sea, and Denmark was obliged to sign a peace (October 1864) which relinquished the two duchies to the rulers of Austria and Prussia jointly. In the following year (August 1865) the two powers agreed at Gastein that Prussia should govern Schleswig, and Austria Holstein. The claims of the male heir of Holstein were thus ignored, to the disappointment of the greater part of the German Confederation and also contrary to the real wishes of Austria, since Austria realized now the difficulties of administering so remote a province and desired at heart to be relieved of Holstein altogether. While Austria was chafing under its burden, Bismarck negotiated a commercial treaty between Italy and the Zollverein, which involved the recognition of the Italian kingdom in direct opposition to Austria's bearing toward Italy. Austria replied by giving a free rein in Holstein to the movement which favored the male heir's accession to both duchies. Thus, backed by German popular sentiment, Austria put an end to the Gastein convention and to amicable relations with Prussia. The settlement of affairs in Schleswig and Holstein thus became a German national problem and merged into the Austro-Prussian struggle for preëminence. As Bismarck desired and intended, it precipitated the solution of this question ; it proved to be the first step toward the foundation of the German Empire. On June 14, 1866, at the proposal of Austria, the Diet of the Confederation voted in favor of mobilizing the troops of the allied states for a war against Prussia. Prussia withdrew from the Confederation at once. When it severed connection with its allies, Prussia proposed the formation of a German federation which would exclude Austria and accept Prussia as its head.

122. The trend of events in Schleswig and Holstein to war between Austria and Prussia

123. Conditions in Germany on the eve of war

Bismarck had already (April 1866) negotiated a secret agreement between Italy and Prussia, in which Italy, with a view to wresting Venice from Austria, promised to coöperate with Prussia in case of a war between Austria and Prussia. Napoleon III, who had succeeded in establishing (1852) an empire in France with himself at its head, also assured Bismarck that France would not intervene. Other European powers followed the example of French neutrality, either because they felt no decisive preferential friendship for Austria or for Prussia, or because they were sufficiently engaged with affairs at home. In the states of Germany the skies looked dark for Prussia. Bismarck had deeply offended public opinion by his dealings with Schleswig and Holstein, and the constitutional conflict in Prussia had undermined confidence in the wisdom and the stability of the Prussian Government. To be sure, the internal affairs of Austria as well as those of other states were no healthier than those of Prussia, but Austria had swept into line with popular sentiment toward the succession of the male heir in Holstein, and Austria continued to enjoy the advantage of traditional leadership. Prussia's proposal of a new federation excluding Austria awoke therefore but a feeble response. A few small North German states followed Prussia, but all the larger states stood by Austria. With the forces of the allies gathering about it Austria reckoned on a host of 800,000 men. Bismarck knew, however, that Prussia was not unprepared. Through the work of Roon, a man of extraordinary executive ability, the Prussian army had been vastly strengthened in efficiency as well as in numbers by the system established in recent years. The consolidating effect of universal service in the army could also be relied upon. This appeared indeed at once, even before the first clash of arms. When the country saw rich

and poë , high and low, called forth and lining up in the ranks of the army, all thought of the constitutional conflict vanished. To the chagrin of Austria and its allies, Prussia rose as one man and threw itself heart and soul into the war.

On June 15, 1866 Prussia ordered Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel to cease their preparations for war and accept Prussia's plan of reform or forfeit their independence. All three states refused to obey, and on June 16 Prussian troops entered each of the states, thus beginning the war. The masterly plans of Prussia's military strategist Moltke were now executed with scarcely a hitch. The army of Hanover surrendered June 28 after a rapid succession of defeats, and within the same time the armies of Saxony and Hesse had retreated to the south to join the Austrian troops and their South German allies. The main Prussian army of 300,000 men entered Bohemia the last of June far better armed and supplied than the 250,000 men of the enemy. Day by day the Prussians advanced still farther; day by day they won another and another victory. On July 3 their successes culminated in the Battle of Königgrätz, or Sadowa, where the crown prince of Prussia, as Blücher at Waterloo, brought up his reënforcements and gave the enemy the death-blow. After a campaign of only three weeks the war was virtually at an end, though the Prussians marched on to the outskirts of Vienna. The Prussian army in central Germany was almost as uniformly successful. It gradually pushed the Bavarians, Würtembergers, Hessians, and other allies farther and farther toward the south, and on July 16 William of Prussia was informed that the country north of the Main lay at his Majesty's feet. The Italians failed in their assaults on Austria's possessions in Italy, but

124. The war between Austria and Prussia, 1866



Austria was ready for the armistice of July 26, which was converted a month later into the definitive Peace of Prague.

125. The terms of the Peace of Prague and the establishment of the North German Federation

By the terms of the Peace of Prague (August 23, 1866) Austria withdrew from all political union with Germany, yielded Venice to Italy, and paid Prussia a war indemnity of \$15,000,000. These were the terms which Bismarck with shrewd foresight induced his king to make; by foregoing a greater humiliation of Austria, Bismarck was paving the way to an early reconciliation, and he was avoiding the resentment of German friends of Austria. Like Austria, the South German states, Baden, Bavaria, and Württemberg, were also required to pay only a small war indemnity; the surrender of a few square miles of Bavarian territory was the only loss of land which any of them suffered. All three states retained their independence and continued their membership in the Zollverein. Prussia took possession of six more or less recalcitrant states — Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Homburg, Nassau, and Frankfort — and incorporated them in Prussian territory. Together with the twenty-one other states north of the Main, Prussia formed the North German Federation. The constitution of this new union, proclaimed April 17, 1867, was largely that of the German Empire, which was established four years later; this constitution will presently be outlined. Jealous of their liberties as independent states, Baden, Bavaria, and Württemberg remained aloof from the Federation, but Prussia's treatment of these states at the close of the war had weakened their hostility, and the advantages of an alliance had been patent. As early as August 1866, therefore, all three states entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia by which all territories were guaranteed; in case of war

against a non-German country the South German states were to place their troops under Prussian command.

The joy in Prussia over the outcome of the war was unbounded. The reorganization of the army was overwhelmingly justified; a large majority of the Progressives in the House of Deputies eagerly joined hands with a large majority of the Conservatives in voting all the army appropriations which the House had denied; the king granted a blanket amnesty for all political offenses; and Bismarck was the idol of the hour. All Germany rejoiced in certain definite results of the recent conflict. The war of 1866 solved the most vital German problem of the age, the dualism of Austria and Prussia. The war proved the superiority of Prussia in state organization and administration, in diplomacy, and in might. Prussia's right to supremacy was established; the exclusion of Austria from Germany by the terms of peace left Prussia the undisputed leader of German states. The formation of the North German Federation was an outward expression of this most significant result of the war. The Federation, however, went a step farther. It realized the German popular dream of the century, unity. After decades of agitation, hope, and failure, unity among German states was a fact. On the ruins of the makeshift German Confederation stood a union which was virtually the German Empire of 1871. Germany, as it has been constituted in recent decades, was made by the events of 1866—though it was not yet complete.

The swift success of Bismarck's diplomacy and Prussia's army startled the nations of Europe. Anxiety and fear soon arose in various quarters, lest the great military power which had suddenly appeared in the heart of Europe might enter upon an era of conquest and aggrandizement.

126. The supremacy of Prussia and the realization of German unity

127. Anxiety and dissatisfaction in France

Apprehension was felt especially by Switzerland and the Netherlands, but in France other more fateful elements entered into the situation. France was no longer dominating European politics as during the Crimean War and in the Italian revolt of 1859. It had been forced by a threat of the United States to withdraw from Mexico. It had also been rebuffed as a mediator of peace in the conflict of 1866. France had not gained a foot of territory in the Peace of Prague as it hoped, and it was chagrined by the growing prestige of a people who had been held in eclipse for a century. Besides anxiety concerning Prussia, irritation arose in France against the weakness of the home Government. Napoleon and his ministers were bitterly denounced; it was thought that the stability of the Empire was threatened. In these trying circumstances friends of the Government desired a martial victory more and more as the readiest means of preserving the Empire, and Napoleon threw in his lot with this party of war.

128. Bismarck's attitude toward a war with France

These conditions in France were known by Bismarck in all detail. Bismarck also saw that conditions in Germany were favorable for war, if indeed they did not even demand it. In the Diet of the North German Federation numerous members of the Conservative party, who favored the new federal system more than their former comrades, had established a new party, the Free Conservatives (later called the German Imperial Party), and more moderate, more practical Progressives had likewise broken away from old associates and formed the National Liberal party; but Bismarck knew that in case of war with France these party differences would vanish and the Diet would give him undivided support. Bismarck did, however, greatly fear the leanings of South German states, especially of Bavaria, toward France, and he was determined that these states

should be bound to the North German Federation and Germany thus be made complete. Within very few years he became convinced that this could be done only by the blood of a war in which the South German states would have to fight with Germany against France. Bismarck believed that a war with France was inevitable. He was therefore ready to make capital out of the first chance that France offered.

In 1870 Spain offered its crown to a distant Hohenzollern relative of the king of Prussia. At the advice of Bismarck, William as the head of the Hohenzollern family approved a favorable consideration of the offer. The crown was accepted, but when strong French opposition declared that Prussia was using this means to acquire influence in Spain, the acceptance was withdrawn. In France the possible accession of a Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne concerned only the members of the party in power, who feared their downfall if they betrayed any sign of weakness; they therefore became much agitated over the Spanish offer and used the incident as a means to strengthen their position. In Prussia the matter concerned only the ruling family and that indirectly, and the state not at all. The incident was thus in no sense national, and it therefore seemed closed by the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidacy. The French war party, however, was carried away by excitement and declared itself not satisfied. In the name of France it demanded (July 1870) that King William should promise for all time to refuse his support to the Hohenzollern candidacy for the crown of Spain. This demand was refused. Before wiser counsels could prevail in France, Bismarck deliberately set fire to German popular sentiment by publishing a telegram from King William in a form so abbreviated that France appeared as the aggressor and

129. The immediate cause of the Franco-German War

Germany as the object of French insults. France was thus forced to maintain the position it had taken and the deadlock led to France's declaration of war (July 19).

130. Prepara-  
tions for  
war

France hoped and thought that many of the German states, especially those which had once formed the Confederation of the Rhine, might join the French or at least remain neutral, but the national resentment which Bismarck had aroused united all the states of Germany as they had never been united before. On the day that France declared war the Diet of the North German Federation placed all the troops of the Federation at Prussia's disposal. Within a week the South German states voted by large majorities to stand by their alliance of 1866. Germany was a unit. The war was thus not merely between France and Prussia; it was Franco-German. Besides the Prussian force of 350,000 men King William and Moltke could count on 200,000 more. France had hardly 350,000 men in arms. Through the foresight of Moltke and Roon, Germany enjoyed the further immense advantage of an equipment down to the last buckle, of a staff of generals who had proved their ability very recently, and of a plan of action which promised to move like clock-work. On the second of August, 450,000 Germans were beyond the Rhine, extending in three main divisions from Coblenz to the region opposite Karlsruhe; thus they planned to meet any French invasion of central or southern Germany. One hundred thousand more were on their way to the same region, and provision had been made for the protection of German ports on the North and Baltic Seas.

131. The  
Franco-  
German War  
to the fall of  
Sedan

France sent two armies toward Germany, but neither of them ever saw the Rhine. The southern army was routed north of Strassburg by the southern division of the Germans; the northern army was defeated by the German central division. The two French armies began a retreat,

the southern army moving rapidly toward Châlons-sur-Marne, the northern after some hesitation going by way of Metz toward Verdun. While portions of the southern German division were beginning the siege of Strassburg and pursuing the enemy toward Châlons, the German central and northern divisions proceeded to converge at a point not far from Metz. The northern German division overtook a portion of the northern French army on August 14 and delayed their retreat. The next day, while the French were gathering to continue their march, a part of the central German division seized one of the three roads connecting Metz and Verdun. This led to the Battle of Vionville (August 16), the most brilliant of the German victories in this neighborhood. Against odds of two to one and, for a time, of nearly four to one, the Germans held their own and stopped the retreat of the French. As the French took up a new position west of Metz on the following day, instead of pushing on rapidly along the other two roads to Verdun, the Germans gained time to seize both these roads and to unite their forces for a final conflict. This, the Battle of Gravelotte (August 18), lasted all day and cost the Germans 19,000 men. But the 200,000 French were driven from their position, and in the gathering twilight they swarmed back into the fortress of Metz. Here they were held during the following weeks by a besieging army equal in number to those within the fortress. The remainder of the German forces started at once against the French army, which was said to be at Châlons. But it had been decided at Paris to send the Châlons army to the relief of Metz. Indeed, the southern German force, sent in pursuit of the French, had found Châlons empty, and it had turned to the northeast, still in pursuit. On August 31 the French army of relief found itself between Germans coming from



Metz and Germans coming from Châlons. The Battle of Sedan followed on the next day. With the fortress of Sedan at their backs the French fought heroically from four in the morning until three in the afternoon, but they were surpassed in numbers and in generalship here as at Metz. The Germans completed their circle around Sedan and forced the French to seek refuge in the fortress, where at six o'clock they hoisted the white flag. Napoleon, who was with this army, surrendered with 100,000 men on September 2. It seemed that with the surrender of the ruler of France the war was ended, but the French overthrew their Empire and established on September 4 the (Third) French Republic. After defeating the Empire, the Germans had now to reckon with a new French Government.

132. The  
siege of Paris  
and the con-  
clusion of  
peace


While detached corps continued to lay siege to Strassburg and Metz, the main German army pressed on toward Paris. On September 19 the girdle of Germans around the French capital, though thin, was complete. A long siege followed. For weeks the Germans had no effective means of bombardment, nor could they hope to take the city by assault, as they were outnumbered by the army of defense within Paris by more than two to one. Early in October a member of the new French Government escaped from Paris in a balloon and began to assemble armies in the south, east, and north of France to relieve Paris and to threaten the western border of Germany. But on September 27 the Germans entered Strassburg, singing *The Watch on the Rhine*, and Metz capitulated October 27. A large force was thus freed, 200,000 from Metz alone, to assist in preventing the relief of Paris. Nevertheless, all through the autumn and down into January the fighting continued in a great semicircle, with Paris as the focal point. Again and again attempts were made from within Paris to break



through the line of besiegers. In the south and east and at Paris the French achieved temporary successes; they were ultimately defeated, in part by the enemy's excess of numbers, in part by the superiority of German veterans over the untrained forces in whom France had to place its trust. By January the situation in Paris grew desperate. A terrible famine was added to incessant bombardment and lack of fuel. An unavoidable armistice was signed January 28, 1871. A few months later (May 10, 1871) this armistice was converted into a peace at Frankfort-on-the-Main. France ceded Alsace and a part of Lorraine including Metz—about 5500 square miles and a million and a half inhabitants. France also agreed to pay within three years a war indemnity of \$1,000,000,000.

The German Empire, a government which did not exist when the war began, concluded the treaty of peace with France. Bismarck's vision of a new Germany born of a consummate union of Germans against a foreign foe had been realized. During the first months of the war one South German state after another had taken steps toward a formal alliance with the North German Federation. All signed the articles of union by November 25, 1870. The rulers of all the German states, headed by the king of Bavaria, then requested the king of Prussia to assume with the title of "German Emperor" the hereditary presidency of the whole union. Thus, as the war approached its triumphant conclusion, the German states celebrated the final triumph of national unity. On January 18, 1871, to the booming of the cannon in the siege of Paris, in the palace at Versailles—amid the most gorgeous memorials of the former French Empire—the new German Empire was formally proclaimed and William I was hailed as German Emperor.

133. The  
establish-  
ment of the  
German  
Empire



134. The constitution of the Empire. The Bundesrat

As the constitution of the North German Federation was constructed with a view to the ultimate admission of the southern states, few changes were necessary to make it serve the new Germany. It went into effect for the Empire May 4, 1871. The head of the Empire is called "German Emperor," not "President" or "Emperor of Germany," as theoretically not he, the King of Prussia, but the whole body of German rulers is the imperial sovereign. This body is personified in the *Bundesrat*, or "Federal Council," which consists of representatives of the twenty-two rulers of the different states, delegates of the three free cities, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, and, since 1911, representatives of the imperial viceroy of Alsace-Lorraine, sixty-one members in all. Every state has at least one vote in the Bundesrat, but Prussia has seventeen by the federal agreement, owing to its preponderating size, about one hundred and thirty-five thousand square miles and nearly forty million inhabitants, or almost two thirds of the whole Empire both in area and population; by private agreement Prussia also controls the one vote of the principality of Waldeck. The members of the Bundesrat vote by states in strict accordance with instructions received from the Governments of the states. It is a non-debating body, and only the results, not the proceedings, of its sessions are published; for this reason discussions of German legislation generally do not mention the Bundesrat at all. The Bundesrat enjoys legislative, executive, and judicial prerogatives. It must sanction bills before they can become law; it regulates the conduct of the imperial administration and appoints many officials; it is a court of last resort in cases where a state court is accused of a denial of justice.

The *Reichstag*, or "Imperial Parliament," is made up of three hundred and ninety-seven members, elected at

first for a term of three, now for a term of five, years. One representative for every 100,000 of the population as it was in 1867 is elected by men over twenty-five years of age; in the elections to the Reichstag all members are chosen throughout the Empire on the one basis of population, so that Prussia, for example, uses one system of election to its Legislature and another to the Reichstag. The Reichstag has neither executive nor judicial functions; it is designed preëminently as a forum for the expression of representative public opinion on current legislation. The head of the Empire, the emperor as such, has limited authority. He is commander-in-chief of the army and navy; he has charge of foreign diplomatic affairs; he appoints and dismisses the chancellor and other imperial officials not appointed by the Bundesrat. He may not veto, and as far as he is qualified he must execute, any law passed by the Reichstag and Bundesrat; he may not conclude treaties nor declare war nor dissolve the Reichstag without the consent of the Bundesrat. But the emperor's imperial functions are supplemented by his power and prerogatives as King of Prussia. As king, with seventeen votes, he can veto absolutely any constitutional amendment, since only fourteen votes in the Bundesrat can prevent any change in the imperial constitution. As king he introduces bills into the Bundesrat through his prime minister, who is also both the presiding officer of the Bundesrat and the imperial chancellor, and as king he controls outright nearly a third of the Bundesrat's votes; in actual practice he nearly always controls a sufficient addendum of votes from lesser states to hold a majority. In view of the wide latitude of the functions which the Bundesrat enjoys, the range of the power of the King of Prussia-German Emperor is incalculable.

135. The Reichstag and the emperor

136. Bismarck the founder of the German Empire

The ultimate realization of German unity seems an inevitable product of an age which brought to flower the ideas of nationality and racial unity; between 1860 and 1865 alone, Italy founded its united kingdom, and union ideals triumphed in the American Civil War. That German national unity was realized as early as 1871, however, was due to Bismarck, "the Iron Chancellor." Bismarck forced the first step toward the Empire, the war with Denmark, against universal popular opposition; Bismarck forced the second step, though Prussia, in taking it, faced the armed resistance of Austria and almost all the other German states; Bismarck was largely responsible for the Franco-German War. German popular imagination conceives Bismarck truly as a smith who, with three great blows upon his anvil, welded the modern Empire. In sharp contrast with preceding German leaders who theorized to their destruction, Bismarck was a realist and dealt with concrete facts. He formulated his policies and purposes one by one on the basis of things as they were, and he exercised an amazing dexterity in bringing about facts which would favor his purpose. Imaginative in foresight, resourceful and not meticulous in his diplomacy, Bismarck created again and again the international political situation he desired, and he was extraordinarily able in extracting advantage from each new situation. He was a master of realistic, concrete diplomacy.

137. The significance of the founding of the German Empire

The establishment of the German Empire relaid the foundations of German life and of the relations between the powers of western Europe. A long and painful epoch of German national prostration, of bitter internal conflicts, and of exposure to foreign encroachment, was ended with the establishment of a compact constitutional empire. An unprecedented opportunity was thereby given to the German

people to develop their capacities and to fulfil the promise which the brilliant rise of the Empire had conveyed. The Empire had arisen, however, not as the idealists had dreamed. The free will of the people, the feeling of racial unity among Germans, the reasonable advantages of national unity to the preservation of German boundaries and to the economic development of German states—these cardinal principles of idealism played a very small part in the founding of the Empire. The Empire was the product of cold, hard realism, of sheer force, or, as Bismarck foretold, of "blood and iron." The German people realized this very soon, and they were therefore affected by the manner in which the Empire was founded no less than by the event. The German people conceived thereby a faith in force, a veneration of power and might, that has directed in large part the subsequent course of German life and history. They lost in turn, however, the sublimest inspiration of German life and German thought, faith in the power of ideals, faith in ideals not supported by might; therein lies for the world and not for Germany alone the tragedy of the events leading up to 1871. For Europe the establishment of the German Empire signified, first, the removal of temptation afforded by the presence of a disorganized nation; it restored to health the weakest organ in the body of western Europe. The ensuing adjustment of the relations of Germany to the rest of Europe entailed a general readjustment of the powers to each other; it entailed a proportionate redistribution of prestige and authority. On the basis of the mutual understanding and agreement thus tacitly achieved, a balance of power arose which maintained the peace of Europe for forty-three years, the longest period of peace ever known among the nations of western Europe.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE GERMAN EMPIRE TO THE FALL OF BISMARCK

1871-1890

The first years of the new Empire were beset with problems at home and abroad. At home Germany had to consolidate its different parts; to unify its financial and economic affairs; to establish common codes of law for all the states; in short, to transform the political fact of a new empire into the living organism of a united growing nation. Abroad Germany had to secure a place of equality among the nations of Europe. Here the task was difficult and delicate. In the first place, Germany faced the scorn which other nations had felt for generations toward the disunited "Germans" of a former time and toward Germany's long incompetence to assimilate modern ideas of nationality and representative government. In the second place, other nations doubted the stability of the new Empire, and they also feared that the goal of German territorial ambition within Europe was not yet reached. The German Empire therefore in the first decades of its existence had to allay the suspicion and secure the respect of other nations. In the presentation of the new Empire's history at home and abroad it will be well, for the sake of clarity, to discuss in turn the relations of Germany with other countries; those events within Germany which concerned the nation as a whole; and, finally, problems which affected chiefly individual German states.

138. Problems of the new Empire



After the Franco-German War Germany's foreign policy was animated and directed by a sincere desire for peace. Germany needed peace in order to develop its national life. Bismarck therefore indicated Germany's pacific intentions, first, by taking steps toward a cordial understanding with Russia, Austria, and lesser monarchies. In September 1872 the emperors of Russia and Austria met in Berlin and agreed with Emperor William to an informal alliance "without written obligations." A year later Italy manifested a desire for closer relations with the members of the union, and the distrust and suspicion of Germany which had been current in other nations — the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland — began to ebb. By drawing Russia and other powers to Germany Bismarck, as usual, accomplished more than one purpose. He strengthened Germany's position in Europe; he forestalled any possible coalition between France and any other nation which might be jealous of Germany's sudden elevation; and he made it impossible for France to venture a war of revenge. After the recent conflict the relations between Germany and France were none too pleasant at best, and further strain was put upon them by various incidents; for example, by the intermeddling of a German ambassador in French affairs, by the loud-voiced sympathy of French Catholic bishops for German Catholics who were under the ban of Bismarck, and by the foolish war talk of German army officials. However, nothing of lasting significance in German foreign affairs happened until the end of the seventies.

At a congress of the powers in Berlin in 1878 Russia and Austria clashed on account of their conflicting interests in the Balkan states. Forced to choose between the two powers, Germany sided with Austria and enabled it to

139. International affairs. From 1871 to 1878

140. The Congress of Berlin, 1878



secure the right to administer affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia bitterly resented this action of Germany. It therefore broke the friendship which had existed ever since the War of Liberation and assumed an attitude of half-concealed hostility. While Russia was entering its first complaints of Germany's "faithlessness," both officially and in the public press, Bismarck proceeded to the most important act of his later career. In October 1879 he concluded a secret written alliance between Germany and Austria whereby the two countries bound themselves to a common defense of each other against possible attacks by Russia. Three years later Germany and Austria were joined by Italy for the similar purpose of common defense against France. Thus arose the Triple Alliance, a defensive league based primarily upon a desire for peace and the first step toward the alignment of the powers of Europe as they have stood in recent times. The existence of the Alliance was not formally announced for several years, but rumors of it were received by Europe in general with approval. Europe saw that by trebling the risks of a war against one of its members the Alliance might be a bulwark of peace. In the eyes of Germany the Alliance guaranteed peace. And it ensured for Germany a rôle in the concert of Europe.

**The Triple Alliance**

141. From  
1879 to 1890

Germany's relations with England were troubled in Bismarck's time only by a dispute (1884-1885) concerning England's and Germany's claims to territory in Africa. Agreement was soon reached, however; boundary lines were fixed; and England bore testimony to its respect for Bismarck by asking repeatedly for his advice in its affairs in Egypt. Meanwhile, with a view of restoring Germany's friendship with Russia, Bismarck concluded a secret treaty (1884) in which Germany and Russia in turn promised

neutrality in case the one or the other were attacked by a third power; thus Germany was "reinsured" against war. Nevertheless Russia did not forget the events of 1878. Indeed, in spite of the treaty, which continued in effect until 1890, and in spite of Bismarck's friendly attitude, Russia seemed to draw nearer and nearer to another, more cordial alliance with France. In 1884 and 1885 Germany and France were united against England in their colonial designs in Africa, but a new French ministry, which was openly hostile to Germany, instituted (1886-1887) reforms in the French army which were interpreted as a direct threat at Germany. The fever of this situation was soon heightened by increasing rumors of a Franco-Russian alliance. For a time, Europe quivered with excitement. But all the agitation resulted chiefly in the renewal of the Triple Alliance (1887) and in the formal publication of its existence (February 1888). During the two remaining years of his chancellorship Bismarck continued his efforts to restore the old friendship with Russia; as he thought, not without effect. At any rate, when Bismarck fell in March 1890, Germany had only one certain enemy in Europe, France. With all the other European nations Germany was on friendly terms; with two it enjoyed the benefits of an alliance which had no counterpart. Germany had secured a peerage among the leading powers of Europe.

The first national problem which arose in the new Empire was the *Kulturkampf*, or "struggle in behalf of civilization." When the Vatican proclaimed the doctrine of papal infallibility in 1870, various German teachers of Roman Catholic theology refused to accept the decree and yet continued in their offices as before. The German bishops who were faithful to the Pope demanded that the

142. National affairs. The *Kulturkampf*

Government remove the rebel teachers because the Church desired their removal. As this was the same as saying that the secular government should recognize the supremacy of the Pope, it precipitated a conflict between faithful Catholics and the rulers of German states on the question of the preëminence of the civil government. In this crisis the Prussian, Bavarian, and other Legislatures passed stringent measures against the Catholics, the "May laws," so called from the month in which many of them were adopted. Protestants as well as Catholics considered many provisions of these laws too extreme; for example, examinations by the Government of candidates for the priesthood, and the establishment of a lay court of justice for church affairs. The chief effect of these and other measures was to arouse powerful opposition and to consolidate the Catholics in a growing political party. (The struggle ended in favor of the Catholics.) In 1879 the votes of the Catholics were indispensable to the passage of new measures before the Reichstag, and in order to win the party's support Bismarck caused the repeal of virtually all the May laws. This change of front won the votes Bismarck desired, but it did not break up the Catholic party, or the "Centre" as it is called from the location of its seats in the Reichstag chamber. On the contrary, the party of the Centre was permanently solidified and organized — through the Kulturkampf — as no other party in the Empire.

143. The beginnings of modern German industrial life

The development of modern German industrial life began in the first half of the century. (Fostered after 1830 by the Zollverein,) German industries entered upon a period of rapid growth and expansion early in the fifties. Between 1850 and 1870 many credit banks were founded which financed the origin and establishment of industries; over two hundred joint-stock companies were established; the

exports of wheat, barley, and oats exceeded the imports more and more, while the revenues of the Zollverein doubled; mines quadrupled their output; railways increased their mileage sixfold. From 1830 to 1870 the territory which has made up the German Empire advanced in the value of its annual foreign commerce from \$185,000,000 to \$1,060,000,000. In the early seventies the rapid payments on the French war indemnity promised at first still greater prosperity; they poured a vast sum of money into Germany, which found its way into the hands of the people at large, partly through the redemption of government securities, partly through outlays of the Government on fortifications and other public works. In possession of capital people now clamored for more opportunities of investment and thereby called hundreds of new joint-stock companies into existence. But money was too plentiful. The desire to invest became a fever of speculation, and the stock of many of the new companies was worthless. The crash came in 1873. Banks, railways, manufactories failed by the score; thousands of people lost every penny. Germany recovered very slowly from the panic. The Imperial Bank, which replaced (1876) the Bank of Prussia, gradually reestablished the former value of the depreciated currency and founded new systems of credit, but German industrialism did not fully regain its confidence and its impetus until the eighties. Then it began the phenomenal rise of recent decades. By 1890 the Empire's foreign commerce had regained the ground lost in the seventies and advanced in value for the fiscal year to nearly \$1,900,000,000.

The centralization of power in the hands of the Imperial Government, a dominating factor in Bismarck's home policy, was furthered and emphasized by the establishment of the Imperial Bank, by the adoption of a single standard

144. The centralization of government

of coinage, and by the introduction (1877) of the same system of law courts and civil and criminal procedure in all the states. But in accordance with the constitution of the Empire the expenses of the Imperial Government were borne at first by proportionate annual contributions, so-called "matricula," from the several states; the Imperial Government was thus a beneficiary of the various states, not the source of all blessings as Bismarck desired. As a means of rescue from this galling financial dependence Bismarck first proposed imperial ownership of railways, but he could not win the favor of the Bundesrat for this proposition, nor was he more successful when he suggested an imperial tobacco monopoly. At last, when the pressure of general hard times pushed Bismarck to a reduction of direct taxes and his imperial policy at the same time continued to urge an increase of public revenues, he renounced the principle of free trade and came out in favor of indirect taxation by means of a protective tariff. With the aid of the Centre Bismarck put a protective tariff bill through the Reichstag in 1879 and succeeded in the following years in amplifying it. The new duties thus imposed on foreign manufactures restored confidence and prosperity to German industrial life. Agriculture was protected by duties on farm products. At the same time excise taxes and a high duty on tobacco, sugar, and other imports were established for the support of the Imperial Government. The states continued to pay matricula, but it was agreed that the annual expenses of the Government should be limited to \$32,500,000 and that any excess of this sum obtained through the new measures should be divided among the states. On several occasions during the following twenty years this excess surpassed the matricula by several million dollars. Thus the introduction of a protective tariff, an emergency measure,

The introduction of a protective tariff

steadied German industrial life, and legislation connected with the new tariff made the Imperial Government, at least for a number of years, financially independent of the individual states. The central Government was invested with new strength and the Empire was further unified.

The rise of the modern German workingman dates back to the liberation of labor through the abolishment of serfdom, but the workingman did not begin to assert himself until the third quarter of the nineteenth century, when growing capitalistic enterprise began to exert more and more power over labor. Then came the panic of 1873. The poverty and suffering which it induced made workingmen hopeless of the existing order of things and drove them by thousands into a new political organization, the Social-Democratic party. In 1876 the Social-Democrats formulated and published their first detailed party program, demanding the immediate fulfilment of some articles of their faith and setting up others as ideal goals of the future. After attributing their suffering to the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, the Social-Democrats proposed the ultimate abolition of private ownership of the sources and agents of production — for example, lands, mines, canals, and railways — and urged the establishment, with the aid of the state, of coöperative productive associations controlled by the workers themselves in the interest of society as a whole. The more specific articles of the Social-Democratic program comprised the obligatory secret ballot for all members of both sexes over twenty years of age, direct legislation and trial as well as the declaration of war and peace by the people themselves, a system of militia instead of a paid standing army, absolute freedom of the press, of assembly, and of religion, unlimited liberty in forming unions, a graduated income tax, the

145. The  
rise of the  
Social-  
Democrats



introduction of a normal working-day with the reservation of Sunday as a day of rest, the protection of female labor, and the prohibition of child labor. Many of these demands were just, but others sounded like red revolution to the Imperial Government. When the Social-Democratic representatives in the Reichstag increased in 1877 from nine to twelve and shots were fired at the emperor (May 1878) by a man under the influence of Social-Democratic ideas, the Government resolved to take rigorous action against the party. At first it seemed that the Government would be defeated, as the Reichstag then in session rejected the bill proposed. But the Government reaffirmed its purpose by dissolving the Reichstag at once. Ten days later another attempt was made on the emperor's life, also by a man of Social-Democratic leanings. The Reichstag which was now (July 1878) elected adopted the Government's original proposal.

146. Bismarck's attitude toward the Social-Democrats and its effect

In October 1878 Bismarck put the so-called Law of Exceptions through the Reichstag, thus prohibiting meetings and publications which purposed "the subversion of the social order" or the advancement of socialistic tendencies which might endanger the public peace. Scores of agitators were expelled from the country; over two hundred unions were disbanded; hundreds of publications were suppressed. The Law of Exceptions remained in force until 1890, but the very pressure of the law made a compact body of the Social-Democrats; in the elections of 1884 they returned twenty-four representatives to the Reichstag, or just twice the number of 1877. Meanwhile the justness of many Social-Democratic demands had forced the Government to enter upon an era of legislation aimed at beneficent social reform. In 1883 the Reichstag passed a bill insuring workingmen against sickness, in



1884 one against accident. In 1887 laws were adopted limiting child and female labor, establishing the maximum number of working hours, and setting Sunday apart as a day of rest. In 1889 a law went into effect which insured workingmen against permanent disablement and old age. The Social-Democrats in the Reichstag voted against all these laws on the ground that they were only a drop in the bucket. This negative attitude of the party and the initial promise of the new legislation reduced the Social-Democratic representatives to eleven in the elections of 1887. (But the insurance laws forced the workingman to pay an appreciable portion of his wages against contingencies — sickness and accident — which in many cases never arose, and they robbed him of his independence and freedom of choice in disposing of his wages.) These features of the new laws the Social-Democrats seized upon at once and used in reuniting and augmenting the party's forces. In 1890 the party elected thirty-five representatives to the Reichstag.

In order to understand the course of events in the Reichstag and the part which the German people play in political life, it is necessary to remember various provisions of the constitution of the Empire. In the first place, the constitution gives the Bundesrat, the instructed representatives of the rulers of the respective states, the final decision on all pending legislation. The Bundesrat may veto any bill passed by the Reichstag, the assembly which represents the will of the people. In the second place, the people, that is, the members of the Reichstag, have no control over those who direct the policy of the Government. The emperor reigns by right of heredity, subject to none, and ministers of state are responsible to the emperor alone as he appoints and dismisses them at his own volition.

147. The limitations of parliamentary life in Germany

Thus the parliamentary form of government, in which the representative popular assembly determines the character of the ministry and hence the policy of the Government, does not exist in Germany. The only weapon which the Reichstag can use to enforce its will upon the Government is the rejection of bills which the Government proposes. But in such a case the emperor, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may dissolve the Reichstag on the chance of securing a more amenable assembly through new elections. History has proved the efficacy of this provision. Each of the four dissolutions of the Reichstag has been followed by the election of an assembly which passed the bill on which its predecessor was wrecked. Thus the political will of the German people is directed and driven by a few, who compose the Government, along the way which the Government prescribes. As before the founding of the Empire, the accepted theory of government in Germany is still that of one which is imposed from above; only to a very limited degree is it a government of and by the people. Furthermore the people themselves have yielded much of their potential power in controlling legislation by dividing and subdividing into many political parties; they have long since forsaken the former cleavage along state lines and divided anew along the lines of party programs. The Reichstag has always consisted of representatives of at least ten political parties: the Centre, the Social-Democrats, and, as in the Diet of the North German Federation, Conservatives, German Imperialists, National Liberals, and representatives of other parties too weak numerically to require specification. As a result of this manifold division of the Reichstag no party has ever gained nearly a majority of the votes—"the party in power" is an unknown quantity in German parliamentary life—and legislation

has always been dependent upon a combination of parties, in some cases, of as many as five or six.

During the first years of the Empire, the years of increasing centralization, Bismarck was constantly opposed in the Reichstag by several parties: by the Conservatives who feared that centralization would obliterate the privileges of individual monarchs; by the Centre on account of the Kulturkampf; and by lesser parties of discontent, such as the Social-Democrats. The Progressives were sometimes with Bismarck, sometimes against him; the German Imperialists were generally with him. Bismarck's stronghold lay in the camp of the National Liberals. Here were one hundred and fifty of the three hundred and ninety-seven votes in the Reichstag; here were men of conspicuous ability; here was hearty intelligent coöperation in centralizing and strengthening the Imperial Government. The union of these two forces, Bismarck and the National Liberals, brought on the golden age of parliamentary activity in Germany; the Reichstag has never known another period in which debates were maintained on so high a level, nor one in which so much sound, enduring legislation was accomplished. But the National Liberals differed fundamentally from Bismarck in their political ideals. They had indeed voted for the adoption of the constitution, but only in order that some form of national unity might be achieved. They believed in a parliamentary form of government. And they hoped that parliamentary government might come through a gradual transformation from within by means of legislation. But Bismarck was centralizing the government in order to increase the power of his king and emperor; he never dreamed of submitting the Government to the control of the Reichstag. The support of the National Liberals therefore became more and more irksome

148. The chief events in the Reichstag from 1871 to 1879

to Bismarck. At length an opportunity came to break their fetters in the abandonment of free trade, a principle of the liberal program, in favor of a protective tariff. When the introduction of the new tariff became a certainty, a large number of National Liberals immediately broke their former ties and set up a new free-trade party; this wing afterwards united with the Progressives and formed the German Free-thinking Party. In the next elections (1881) the National Liberal representation shrunk to forty-seven. Bismarck was free. The one party which might seriously menace the power of the Government, which might have forced the evolution of a parliamentary form of government, was permanently shattered. The King of Prussia-German Emperor was supreme as Bismarck intended that he should be.

The Government secured its independence of every party at the cost of the stable effective support of any party. After 1879 the Government was forced to gather a majority for its measures before the Reichstag by dickering with several parties, by effecting compromises between several divergent groups. The Conservatives gave Bismarck the most constant support which he enjoyed; they had been won over by the protective tariff, because it favored the agrarian Conservatives, a considerable portion of the party. The German Imperialists and the remaining National Liberals also were generally loyal to the Government. The Catholic Centre, on the other hand, was neither a faithful friend nor an unrelenting enemy of the Government, and it was always a powerful factor. No other party rivaled the Centre in drawing adherents from all the strata of society and from every part of Germany. Being, in the language of economists, both a vertical and a horizontal party, the Centre remained a unit because it represented all classes and united opposing interests. It

149. The  
Reichstag  
from 1879 to  
1890

voted for the protective tariff out of consideration for the industrial and agrarian classes which it represented, also for the social reform laws in order to hold the allegiance of Catholic workingmen, but it opposed any increase of taxes for the army or for colonial expansion. From 1878 to 1887 the Centre held the balance of power, because its votes added to those of the Government's parties or to those of the opposition — the Free-thinking Party, the Social-Democrats, and lesser parties — could nearly always pass or defeat a measure. In this way the Centre forced an amendment of an army bill of 1887 before the measure could be passed. But Bismarck was now thoroughly aroused. He refused to accept the amendment, and the Reichstag was at once dissolved. In the elections which followed, Bismarck used a war scare of the time with such effectiveness that the parties favorable to the Government and the original army bill — the Conservatives, German Imperialists, and National Liberals — secured an ample majority of the members of the Reichstag. The so-called "Cartel" which these three parties formed gave Bismarck the most docile Reichstag of his career. But the Cartel was foreordained to a brief existence. Extreme liberals and extreme conservatives could not agree long. The Cartel was blasted in the elections of 1890 when the German Imperialists and the National Liberals lost over half their representatives. The old days of pulling and hauling among the parties, with the Centre as the deciding factor, were come again. This was the situation in the Reichstag when the Iron Chancellor resigned his office.

The expansion of the imperial army began almost at once after the close of the Franco-German War. Incentives to this expansion were readily found. The army was the backbone of Prussia, the model and guaranty of orderly

150. The expansion of the army

life in the state which had made modern Germany; the army had carved out the new Empire; a great imperial army seemed an indispensable measure of self-protection against French revengefulness on the west and possible Russian encroachment on the east. The first move toward the development of the imperial army was to extend the Prussian military system throughout the Empire: three years' active service, four years in the first reserve, and nine years in the Landwehr, or second reserve. In 1874 the Government proposed that one per cent of the population be adopted as the permanent ratio of men in the standing army, but the Reichstag refused its consent because it desired to have at least an occasional voice in determining the size of the army. A compromise, the "Septennate," was finally effected whereby the Government secured for seven years the ratio and the number of men, 401,659, which it desired. The same basis of compromise was employed in 1880, when it was again agreed that for seven years the army include one per cent of the population, or 427,370 men. Several parties in the Reichstag proposed to reduce the term of active service from three to two years in accordance with a growing popular demand, but a proposal to this effect was defeated. The next army bill which the Government submitted (1887) provided for such a large force that the Reichstag voted to grant it for only three years, but the original bill was ultimately passed (1888) — 468,409 men, including under-officers, for seven years. It was further agreed (1888) that enrollment in the second reserve continue until a man's thirty-ninth year; also that a last reserve, the Landsturm, be established including men between thirty-nine and forty-five years of age. Thus Germany followed Bismarck's advice to "keep its powder dry and its sword sharp."



Many Germans took part in the explorations of the nineteenth century, especially in those in Africa, but for many years no one thought of taking possession of any of these remote districts in the name of Germany. In 1879 a German Mercantile Marine Company acquired property in the Samoan Islands and asked the Reichstag to guarantee its dividends. The Reichstag refused (April 1880). Public opinion, however, had seized upon the idea of imperial colonial possessions and soon found an organ in the German Colonial Union, which was formed in 1882. To this new pressure the Reichstag yielded. In 1884 large territories were taken under German protection; in Africa: German South-West Africa, Togoland, and Cameroon; and in the South Seas: a part of New Guinea and a group of islands in the New Britain Archipelago; these protectorates in the South Seas were later rechristened as Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago. In 1885 a similar protectorate was established over the Marshall Islands, which also lie in the South Seas, and over German East Africa. A year later the home Government emphasized its close relation to all these distant regions by subsidizing steamers which plied regularly between them and Germany. In less than two years the Empire had practically extended its dominion over a total area four times as large as European Germany. At first, however, it did not incorporate them in the Empire but held them as protectorates. Two companies were formed to govern them, the German East Africa Company and the New Guinea Company. An attempt was thus made to reach Bismarck's goal for the colonies, "the ruling merchant, not the ruling soldier and Prussian official." But the East Africa Company was driven out by the natives in 1888 and the control of this and the other

151. The acquisition of new territories in Africa and the South Seas



territories was taken over within the next decade by Government officials assisted by Government troops. The acquisition of all these territories was a momentous step in German history, as the Empire thereby broke the bounds which limited it to Europe. The time was at hand when Germany might enter upon its career as a world power.

152. German literature, art, and music from 1850 to 1888

For nearly a generation after the middle of the nineteenth century German literature presents hardly a name of international reputation. Of the poets only Mörike can be compared with the Romantic lyrists of the first decades of the century. After Hebbel the German stage waited until the end of the eighties for the appearance of dramatists with a serious purpose and with notable power in dramatic expression. In short, between 1850 and 1888 only the story-teller commands the attention of the modern reader. Keller and Reuter, Heyse and Storm, reveal in their novels and, to a greater degree, in their short stories, genuine humor and pathos, reality and romance, combined with artistic form; they have enjoyed wide recognition at home and deserve a larger fame abroad than has been accorded to them. Painting and sculpture reflect the realism of the time, but the Classical predilections of the early nineteenth century predominate in the works of the greatest painters, Feuerbach and Lenbach, and in the sculptures of Rietschel and Hildebrandt. The great traditions of German music, in song and symphony, were continued by Brahms and Bruch and Franz. Opera, which hitherto had been a jewel box of unconnected musical gems, not serious drama, was transformed by Wagner into music-drama, into an absolute union of continuous music and drama. At the same time, disillusioned by the political failures of 1848, Wagner gave immortal expression to mid-century pessimism; in *Tristan and Isolde* the pain





Longitude 80 West from Greenwich 20



**TERRITORIES OF**

**GREAT BRITAIN**  **UNITED STATES**   
**GERMANY**

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000  
 Scale of Miles along the Equator

**ANTARCTIC OCEAN**

20 Longitude 40 East 60 from 80 Greenwich 100 120 140 160 180



of living finds peace only in death, in *Parsifal* pity and renunciation alone bring salvation.

The eminent position which Germany holds in the fields of historical writing and natural science dates largely from the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Ranke was then still in his prime, and beside him rose a brilliant group of ancient and modern historians, Mommsen, Sybel, Waitz, Curtius, Treitschke, and others. In natural science the work of Alexander von Humboldt and the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution combined to inspire German investigation to a series of famous achievements, to Liebig's organic chemistry, Bunsen's spectral analysis, Helmholtz's application of the law of the conservation of energy, and the studies by Virchow and Koch in pathology and anatomy. The study of psychology was directly affected by the results in natural science; the metaphysical observations of early psychologists were established on a basis of physiology by Fechner and elaborated by Wundt and Lotze. When the hope of a larger national life was wrecked in the turmoil of 1848 and 1849, Schopenhauer's pessimistic philosophy struck deep into German life. That life had no meaning or object, that living was calamity, expressed the feeling of the age. Nietzsche, however, soon shook off the influence of Schopenhauer and fought pessimism with all his tremendous energy; he saw the joy of conflict in life. Learning from Darwin the evolutionary ascent of man to infinite strength and power, Nietzsche proposed the conscious evolution of a higher type, the superman, by casting aside the Christian and socialistic principles of helping the needy and by concentrating on the development of the strong.

153. German historians, natural scientists, and philosophers

As compared with the national affairs discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the affairs of individual German

154. State  
affairs. Gen-  
eral condi-  
tions within  
the states

states are of slight importance. It is often said that in actual practice Germany is a group of provinces under one authority rather than a federation of states. At any rate each new imperial law has deprived the states of part of their authority, and almost all the especial concessions which were made to different states at the founding of the Empire have been relinquished; Bavaria's independent control of its post-office is a survival of initial concessions. But the states have continued to control their own educational and religious affairs, questions concerning land tenure, local government, the raising of direct taxes, and, in Bavaria and other large states, the management of railways.

155. The  
chief events  
in Prussia

Prussia began a series of internal reforms with a redivision of the kingdom into provinces, districts, and circles, whose officials are in part appointed by the king, in part elected by the people; a form of local government was thus established (1872-1889) which was first suggested by Stein in 1808. During the eighties Prussia bought up nearly all the railways in the kingdom and made them state property. At the same time canals were constructed which connected the Rhine and the Ems, the Weser and the Elbe, and southern Silesia and Berlin. Great discontent prevailed in several Prussian provinces where people had never reconciled themselves to their enforced Prussian citizenship. The Poles in the provinces of West Prussia and Posen desired the establishment of a new Poland; in the province of Hanover the "Guelphs," so called from the family name of the former reigning house, urged the restoration of the kingdom of Hanover; the "Danes" of northern Schleswig demanded the fulfilment of a promise of the Peace of Prague (1866), whereby a plebiscite should determine their continued incorporation in Prussia or their reversion to the kingdom of Denmark. Each of



these bodies of people formed a political party and sent representatives to the Prussian Legislature and to the Reichstag, where they swelled the opposition to the Government; the Poles returned as many as eighteen representatives to the Reichstag in the elections of 1884. The most repressive measures which Prussia took against these parties of disintegration were those which Bismarck inspired against the Poles. Many Polish agitators were expelled from West Prussia and Posen; a large sum of money was appropriated for the purchase of Polish estates and their colonization with German peasants; the use of the Polish language was forbidden in all public schools. These measures not only failed; they made bad matters worse. The Poles remained a people apart and cherished their grudges against Prussia with increased bitterness.

Alsace-Lorraine, the new imperial province, was ruled at first by a governor-general who had the powers of a dictator. In 1874, however, the imperial constitution went into effect in the province providing for the election of popular representatives to the Reichstag. In 1879 the governor-general was displaced by the establishment of a provincial constitution which provided for a viceroy appointed by the emperor. Many reforms were introduced; taxation and banking, schools and railways, were greatly improved. But the paramount desire of the people of the province was not granted — an autonomous form of government with representation in the Bundesrat, such as other states of the Empire enjoyed and more or less analogous to the political freedom which Alsace-Lorraine had enjoyed under French domination. The friction produced by constitutional restrictions was aggravated by the first viceroy's attempt to curry favor with the provincial aristocracy and by his reckless persecutions of newspapers

156. In lesser states.  
Alsace-Lorraine

and societies. Even in the wiser régime of Prince Hohenlohe, the second viceroy (1885–1894), leading men in Berlin discussed the advisability of returning to a dictatorship in Alsace-Lorraine. The course of events in Bavaria, Saxony, and other states of the Empire offers nothing of great importance and little of interest. Internal reforms of significance did not begin until a later time. In Bavaria Louis II, the son and successor of Maximilian II (died 1864), was declared insane in 1886, and his uncle, Prince Leopold, was appointed regent (1886–1912). Three days after the appointment of Leopold, Louis drowned himself, but the regency was continued as Louis's brother, Otto, was also insane. After the death of its childless duke (1884), Brunswick would naturally have passed to Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland and son of the deposed king of Hanover, George V (died 1878), but as Ernest Augustus would not renounce his claims to Hanover — that is, desired to impair the integrity of Prussia, a state of the Empire — Brunswick was placed by a decision of the Bundesrat under a regency elected by the Legislature of the duchy.

Bavaria

Brunswick

157. A summary of the character of William I

The first head of the modern German Empire, William I, died in March 1888. Though nearly ninety-one years old at the time of his death, William remained to the last in close touch with the course of events. But the real power of his reign as king and emperor was long since in other hands. If William had ruled in his own strength alone, the course of Prussian and German history would have been very different. He alone could never have risen to the opportunity of his time, for he lacked both the divining power of great statesmanship and bold, quick initiative, the two indispensable qualities for the complications of the sixties. William's greatest virtue lay in his

subordination of his own will and judgment to those of men in whom he had placed his trust. A man of strong character and deep convictions, he could be reconvinced and he could yield. His greatest wisdom appeared in his selection of his aides and in his support of them.

William I was succeeded by his son, Frederick III (born 1831), but Frederick was fatally ill at the time of his accession and died after a reign of ninety-nine days. Frederick was followed in June 1888 by his son, the present emperor, William II (born 1859). Bismarck remained chancellor for nearly two years longer, but he soon observed that William wanted to be his own chancellor and Bismarck was accustomed to handling the reins himself. Their differences reached a climax in March 1890, when Bismarck refused to sanction a cabinet order whereby the chancellor would no longer be the intermediary between the emperor and the ministers of state. William at once demanded Bismarck's resignation, and the Iron Chancellor retired to private life. Thus ended the public career of the man who made modern Germany. With tragic irony the power which he had made supreme in Germany turned and destroyed him. Bismarck had, however, reached his zenith in 1871. He afterwards unified the Empire internally by legislation as he had unified it externally by war, but he failed signally in many domestic measures ; he failed primarily because in many cases sheer force, his favorite means to the end he desired, no longer availed. His iron policy against the Catholics, the Social-Democrats, and the Poles effected the opposite of that which he intended. Bismarck's forte was his command of international affairs. In this regard his career, as long as he remained in active life, is unrivaled in German history.

158. The succession of Frederick III and William II, and the fall of Bismarck

## CHAPTER XII

### GERMANY UNDER WILLIAM II

1890-1914

159. The evolution of Germany since 1890

The history of Germany from 1890 to the outbreak of war in 1914 is the story of the evolution of a European nation into a world power. In 1890 Germany's interests were often not at all involved in questions arising outside of Europe; in the spring of 1914 a conference of "the powers" without the participation of Germany was hardly imaginable. In other words, under William II and his imperial chancellors — Caprivi (1890-1894), Hohenlohe (1894-1900), Bülow (1900-1909), and Bethmann-Hollweg (1909- ) — the German Empire continued to fortify its national strength and unity; it expanded its industrial life, seeking and finding markets all over the world for the products of its industries; it acquired new colonial possessions. In virtue of this national growth and strength, Germany exercised profound influence in the decision of questions arising far beyond the borders of Europe. This evolution of Germany, or its progression from state and national strength to international power, marks the lines which may be followed fittingly in an account of the chief events in German history since 1890.

160. National affairs. The development of agriculture

In the early nineties, when many thousands of Germans were deserting the farms for the cities in order to take part in the new industrial progress and prosperity, it was freely prophesied in Germany that the Empire would soon

become wholly industrial; it was said that agriculture must soon limit itself to cattle raising and to the cultivation of a few select varieties of grain. But German agrarians resolved to make agriculture more productive and profitable than ever. In the first place, therefore, they formed (1893) the Agrarian League and, through their Conservative and other representatives in the Reichstag, forced the imposition of high import duties on agricultural products; they formed societies — there were over twenty-six thousand of these in 1912 — which aid small farmers in various ways, as purchasers of raw materials and selling agencies, and as savings and credit banks; they established schools of instruction in scientific farming, listing two hundred and twelve schools and nearly ten thousand pupils in 1911. Above all, German farmers employed every bit of technical science that could be applied to agriculture; it is said that no other country farms so scientifically or produces so much per acre. Between 1890 and 1912 the amount of rye produced in Germany within a year rose from 6.8 to 11 million tons, potatoes from 29.7 to 44.2 million tons; in the same period cattle increased from about 17 to 20.1 million head, pigs from 12 to 21.8 millions. On the other hand, more land was drawn into cultivation; indeed the cultivation of crops on land which was formerly used for grazing entailed a reduction in head of sheep from about 14 to 5.7 millions. At the same time the imports of wheat, oats, barley, and meat for immediate consumption exceeded the exports of the same articles in 1890 by 1.6 million tons and in 1912 by 5.2 million tons.

Germany's industrial and commercial progress from 1890 to 1914 forms the proudest chapter in recent German history. German sense of order and system produced enormous organizations of capital and employees; the

161. The growth of industries and wealth

Krupp steel-casting company had in 1913 a capital of \$60,000,000 and employed nearly fifty thousand men. German adjustability to foreign conditions led to the production of articles carefully suited to the needs and tastes of buyers all over the world; in 1912 the German salesman found in Argentina, for example, a market for products valued at \$170,000,000, in Australia for \$90,000,000 worth. The Germans were also extraordinarily alert in utilizing new industrial opportunities; they exported in 1912 electrical machinery and appliances valued at nearly \$60,000,000, products that were unknown a generation ago. The progress of German industrial and commercial life was halted at two or three stages—notably in the winter of 1901–1902 and in that of 1907–1908—when chiefly overproduction brought on a stagnation of business and the failure of many firms; but with these exceptions the rise of industry and commerce was constant and amazing. To specify the progress of only a few of the most important industries: Germany produced in 1910 seven times as much coal as in 1870, nine times as much pig iron, twenty-four times as much steel; potash-salt mining, which did not become a conspicuous industry until the eighties, advanced within twenty years (1886–1906) from a yearly output of less than one million to over fifty million tons. Statistics such as these might be given of other industries. Not long ago (1912) the gross value of Germany's industrial productions within a year was reckoned at \$2,900,000,000; in this respect Germany yielded precedence only to England (\$4,100,000,000) and to the United States (\$7,000,000,000). An interesting corollary of this activity is found in the records of banks. At the end of the seventies German savings banks listed deposit accounts amounting to \$500,000,000, in 1911 \$4,000,000,000.



The annual increase of wealth of the nation was estimated in 1913 at between \$1,000,000,000 and \$1,500,000,000, the wealth itself at well over \$300,000,000,000.

In order to transport at least a part of the vast cargoes which went to and fro, Germany trebled its commercial fleet between 1893 and 1913; in 1900 it constructed only about two thirds as much tonnage in sea-going vessels as the United States, but in 1911 it constructed nearly twice as much. Germany's commercial fleet was then second only to England's. The same ranking obtained in the most significant, the most comprehensive item of all, in foreign commerce. Between 1890 and 1914 the annual value of Germany's foreign commerce, consisting chiefly of imports of raw materials and unfinished products and exports of finished manufactures, rose from \$1,900,000,000 to \$5,000,000,000, or 250 per cent; Germany exported more goods to England in 1912 (about \$290,000,000 worth) than to any other country; it imported most from the United States (nearly \$400,000,000 worth). Between 1890 and 1914 Germany displaced both France and the United States in the comparative value of its foreign commerce and thus rose from fourth to second place among the nations. England still had a considerable advantage — its foreign commerce was valued in 1911 at \$6,250,000,000 — but England's rate of increase, about 50 per cent for the decade from 1901 to 1911, was lower than that of Germany.

The surpassing growth and success of German industrialism have raised up one of the leading problems of modern Germany, the conflict between agriculture and industrialism. Attracted by the larger opportunities and returns of industrial employment, the balance of population has shifted from the country to the city. In 1830

162. Ship-  
ping and  
foreign  
commerce

163. The  
conflict be-  
tween agri-  
culture and  
industrialism



eighty per cent of the German people lived in towns of five thousand inhabitants or less ; in 1907 only 32.7 per cent. But in spite of the great preponderance of urban over rural population, agriculture has been much more encouraged and favored by legislation than industrialism. This appears especially in the high import duties which have been imposed on foreign foodstuffs and which have enabled agriculturists to sell their products at a high figure. These duties have been secured and maintained by appeals to German patriotism ; agriculture must be furthered, it has been said, so that Germany, in case of war, may be able to feed itself. Industrialists have opposed these duties bitterly, because foreign nations have retaliated with high import duties on German manufactures, and because the majority of the people has been forced to pay higher prices for food in order to benefit a diminishing minority. Many economists inside and outside of Germany believe that the victory in this struggle lies with the industrialists, if for no other reason, on account of the limited area of Germany. Only 9.3 per cent of the soil is now unproductive — as compared with 14.3 per cent of French soil and 18.2 per cent of that in Great Britain and Ireland — and a large increase of the population must force the Empire into dependence on other countries for a sufficiency of food. In that case the high import duties on foodstuffs will naturally fall, and Germany will become industrial according to prophecy.

German industrialism, besides transforming a rural people into residents of cities, has wrought other impressive changes in German life and character. It has increased very largely and generally the wealth and contentment of the Empire. All classes have shared directly or indirectly, to a greater or less extent, in the material gain of the time. Immense

fortunes have been amassed, but the poor have not become actually or relatively poorer. Many have enjoyed the means to travel as never before. And emigration from Germany has virtually stopped. The rate of 221,000 emigrants per year in the early eighties dropped by 1900 to 22,000. The number in recent years is perhaps still lower ; but, in any case, emigration at present is probably balanced by the immigration of various peoples, chiefly of Poles and other Slavs who come into the eastern provinces of Prussia to work on the farms. Industrial prosperity has, however, not stopped with the establishment of a justifiable contentment. It has imparted a sinister, materialistic aspect to German life. It has not overthrown idealism in Germany altogether. Idealism is apparent in science and literature ; it is conspicuous in the religious and philosophical thought of a cultured minority. But material prosperity has led to less and less observance of the difference of functions which men perform in human society and to more and more regard for materialistic differences. The old aristocracy of culture has given way in considerable part to an aristocracy of immense industrial wealth. The workingman, desirous of sharing the affluence of his time but despairing of his own ability to acquire a share, dreams of the evolution of a state which will make wealth common to all men. Finally, industrial prosperity has brought economic power and with this a further veneration of power from a new point of view. Germany, with its idolization of Bismarck, the man of might, has developed, in considerable part through a proud consciousness of its economic, industrial strength, a worship of power and a "will to power" which tend to overshadow every other element of German character.

Four years before the expiration of the Septennate of 1887, that is, in 1890, the army was increased by

## 165. The growth of the army and navy

nearly 20,000 men, to 486,983, including under-officers. Caprivi, the imperial chancellor at that time, was not satisfied, however, so in 1893 he proposed general compulsory service, excluding only the absolutely unfit; by this scheme the numbers in the army were to increase automatically with the growth of the population and not be set periodically by the Reichstag. To ensure the passage of this proposal, Caprivi offered to reduce the period of service from three to two years. Eventually, however, the number was fixed at 479,229, excluding under-officers, for five and a half years — the quinquennate principle thus replaced the septennate — and the two-year provision was granted. As before and after, the Reichstag set the numbers in the army. The German army has therefore never been based strictly on universal service; many able-bodied Germans have been excused because the allotted number could be made up of men of greater military fitness. In 1899, in view of the growth of population, the army was further enlarged to include 495,500. By a bill passed in 1905 the increase was so arranged that by 1910 the army should number 505,839. In 1911 it was agreed that by 1916 the army should number 515,321, but in the very next year it was decided that this number should be enrolled by October 1, 1912. There followed in 1913 the largest increase of all. By the bill then passed, the army, after October 1, 1913, was to include 661,478 privates; these together with the officers and under-officers were to form a standing army in time of peace of over 800,000 men. On August 1, 1914 Germany could muster about 7,000,000 men, of whom 3,000,000 were untrained and 4,000,000 were the most thoroughly drilled soldiers in the world. In 1912 the army cost the nation \$212,000,000. By the bill passed in 1913 the annual expenditure for the army was increased

by \$45,000,000, and a "contribution for national defense," a tax to be levied only once on incomes and property, was to be collected, netting \$225,000,000. Compared with the army and its origins, which may be traced back to the seventeenth century, the German navy is a growth of yesterday. The first important step toward its creation was taken in 1889 when the army office surrendered its control of naval affairs and an imperial admiralty was established. Even then nine years elapsed before the first navy bill was passed (1898) by the Reichstag. This bill provided for a fleet of 19 battleships and 42 cruisers. Only two years later, however, this program seemed inadequate. It was therefore enlarged to 38 battleships, 14 first-class cruisers, 38 smaller cruisers, and 96 torpedo boats and destroyers. In 1908 a submarine flotilla was added, and the torpedo fleet was increased to 144. When war was declared in 1914, Germany was said to have 37 battleships, 48 cruisers, and a torpedo flotilla of 189 destroyers and torpedo boats and 27 submarines; this display of naval strength was second only to that of England. The Empire expended \$118,000,000 on the navy in 1912.

The increase of German armaments has been facilitated by Prussian-German tradition, which favors a large armed force, and by reiteration in German books and public speeches that many events which German history cherishes would never have come to pass without military might. It is true that for a decade and more after 1871 many parties in the Reichstag favored a reduction in the numbers of the army; but in 1913 only the representatives of the Social-Democrats, the Poles, and Alsace-Lorraine voted against the hugest army bill ever known. A majority of the German people, as they are represented in the Reichstag, supports therefore the increase of armaments.

166. Reasons  
for Ger-  
many's  
armaments

Germany has justified its armaments chiefly by the argument that they are a defensive necessity, for it has felt its territorial integrity threatened constantly, on the west by France with its desire of retribution for 1870 and 1871, on the east by Russia. Germany has also believed its commercial progress to be menaced by the jealousy of France and especially of England. At least in part for these reasons the Empire has prepared, in case of war, to protect its borders and industries at home and its colonies and commerce in far-away lands and on the seas. It is not unreasonable, however, that Germany should have multiplied its armaments with offensive as well as defensive intent. It has been very sensitive to the restrictions of its limited area in Europe and to the imperfections of its colonies for purposes of settlement. A nation growing with extraordinary speed and vigor, it has desired naturally and most earnestly a larger area. It has been jealous of those nations, France and England particularly, which secured enormous colonial possessions in favorable climates before Germany had been unified and could claim a share of the new worlds opened by the explorations of the nineteenth century. Germany's desire for as much territory as other European powers possess has never been concealed. Its ambition to even up the difference has been declared in the last decade more and more frankly. Territorial as well as commercial equality is what Germany has meant when it has reiterated its desire and ambition to enjoy "a place in the sun." A great armament seemed to be the logical instrument whereby to ensure participation in any territorial profit-sharing which might arise from new international situations. Outside of the Empire the growth of German armaments has been viewed with rising odium and fear. It has meant to other nations

the growth of militarism, which, subject to no laws except its own, does not observe the rights of others, and advocates sheer physical force as the means to every end. To other nations German armaments have seemed a constant menace to the peace of Europe. Well aware of the numerical and inherent strength of the Empire's forces, other nations have looked upon these forces as an outward expression of the German will to power. They have feared for years that in some moment of international disturbance this will to power would seize and use an instrument so ready and so potent.

The general tendency and effect of the most important legislation since 1890 has been toward further consolidation of the Empire. The completion and adoption of a new Civil Code, which went into effect January 1, 1900, added more strength to German national unity than any other measure adopted since 1871. This new code put an end to the bewildering diversity of laws in the different states and established a body of law which regulates nearly all legal matters; for example, indebtedness, movable property, and family and inheritance rights. Financial legislation has presented a much more difficult problem. Until the turn of the century the revenues of Bismarck's protective tariff more than covered the expenses of the Imperial Government. But in the meantime commercial treaties with other countries, entailing reductions in German import duties, had diminished imperial revenues, and the expansion of the army and the creation of the navy had caused huge outlays, for which provision had not been made. The Government was again financially dependent upon the matricular contributions from the states of the Empire just as it had been in the seventies. It was therefore agreed (1904 and 1906) that the states should pay

167. Legislation of importance for the development of the Empire at home



fixed matricula, which, it was thought, would make up the deficits. But the matricula and other revenues were still insufficient, and meanwhile the national debt was increasing enormously; between 1900 and 1907 it rose from \$600,000,000 to \$1,000,000,000. The financial legislation of 1909 was far more effective than that which preceded it. By the law of 1909 the matricula were doubled; a higher tax was laid on tobacco, liquor, coffee, and tea; and new taxes were put, chiefly, on checks, bills of exchange, dividends and interest, matches and means of illumination. The annual imperial revenues thus increased by \$125,000,000. The addition in 1911 of a tax on unearned increment enlarged the revenues still further. But the army bills passed in recent years have alone swallowed up a very large part of the increase. The national debt in 1912 was \$1,200,000,000, involving the payment of interest to the amount of \$45,000,000. The railways of the Empire were brought into closer coöperation in 1909, but the union of all the railways in an imperial system is still incomplete.

168. Social-  
istic legis-  
lation

The socialistic legislation which began in the eighties has been much expanded, chiefly, however, in making the laws already passed more comprehensive. The Empire has spent many millions on workingmen's dwellings, public baths, and other institutions for the public good. A movement is now on foot to insure workingmen against lack of work. The German Government deserves great credit for its solicitude toward the working classes; no other modern Government has fathered so much legislation in their behalf. But it is a question, as leading German economists agree, if Germany has not already gone too far in providing for the working classes. Many fraudulent cases of disablement and sickness have been



discovered, and theorists contend that the responsibility and initiative of workingmen are being stunted. German socialistic legislation has, moreover, appeared in every case as a benefaction from above, not as a gain of a brotherhood of men. For this reason the political representatives of workingmen, the Social-Democrats in the Reichstag, have not furthered imperial legislation intended solely for the benefit of their own constituencies.

Many features of imperial legislation have added greatly to the unification of the Empire in form and in spirit. This effect has been heightened by many other less tangible, but powerful, factors in every-day life. National pride has been deeply stirred by Germany's brilliant industrial progress and by its material prosperity. It has been aroused by the creation of the imperial navy. Service in the army unites through common experience, as well as through pride in an historic institution, a large proportion of the men in every state in the Empire. Impetus to national pride has been given deliberately by the erection of countless memorials of German achievements, especially of monuments to the Franco-German War, and by innumerable celebrations of historical events. As the German people thus became more unified in the contemplation of their past glories and their present progress, so too they were drawn together in fear of danger from their geographical situation and from the jealous commercial rivalry of other nations. All these centripetal forces have made the German Empire an organic whole which would have seemed visionary fifty years ago. The advantages of such a union have been patent to all. Germans often wished in the years just past that some features of life in the Empire might be altered, but they never wished that the Empire did not exist. For years it has

169. Unifying factors in German life

seemed very improbable that Germany would ever again break up into the "Germanies" of a former time.

170. The Reichstag from 1890 to 1900

From 1890 to 1907 the Reichstag was dominated by the Catholic Centre to the extent that a bill could rarely be passed without the coöperation of the Centre. In 1893 the Centre caused a dissolution of the Reichstag by its opposition to an army bill, though the rejected bill was passed by the succeeding Reichstag when the Catholic Poles, usually allies of the Centre, cast their decisive votes in favor of the measure. As a rule, neither the parties of the Right — the Conservatives, the German Imperialists, and the National Liberals — nor those of the Left — the German Free-thinking Party, the Social-Democrats, and lesser parties — could form a majority, and the gulf between the Right and the Left could seldom be bridged. As the Centre turned and joined with the one or the other, legislation was effected or defeated. The tendency in German life toward the formation of small independent groups emphasized the divergence of the older parties and indeed created new parties. The German Free-thinking Party divided in 1893 into the Free-thinking Union and the Free-thinking People's Party. The German Social Reform Party, which usually voted with the Conservatives, arose on the basis of anti-Semitism; agrarian rather than industrial in its sympathies, it feared and hated the Jewish financiers in the German money markets. With the rise of this and other parties, the groups in the Reichstag represented more and more the interests of special classes rather than principles; they were determined to protect the especial interests of their adherents, and thus they proved to be a sequel of Bismarck's policy of protection. The Centre alone represented interests of all classes. Caprivi, when Imperial Chancellor, alienated every party in

Caprivi

turn, either by army bills or by discouragement of colonial expansion or by commercial treaties with other countries. He fell (1894) because he could not hope to find effective support anywhere in the Reichstag. His successor, Hohenlohe, won the Centre's coöperation with the Government by making various concessions to the Roman Catholics, such as permitting the Jesuit Redemptorists to settle in Germany. With the aid of the Centre, Hohenlohe secured the adoption of the new Civil Code and the first increases in the navy. The Conservatives, whom Caprivi antagonized by the commercial treaties of his time, returned to their normal allegiance to the Government in response to the greater protection of agriculture. Hohenlohe retired in October 1900 on account of his advanced age.

Hohenlohe

Bülow, the next chancellor, continued the policy of his predecessor ; he further conciliated the Centre by a measure of 1904 repealing a clause of the anti-Jesuit law which forbade the settlement of individual Jesuits in Germany. The Centre responded by securing a reform of imperial finances, the adoption of new commercial treaties, and a further enlargement of the navy. But Bülow wearied of the Centre's domination and the concessions to the Catholics which it forced from him. In December 1906, when the Centre blocked the passage of a bill involving increased colonial subsidies, the Reichstag was immediately dissolved with the hope that the power of the Centre might be destroyed. But the Centre emerged from the elections of January 1907 as strong as ever. The Social-Democrats, on the other hand, although they had increased their total poll of votes by nearly a quarter of a million, had lost many seats, returning only forty-three representatives to the Reichstag instead of eighty-one. The seats thus lost were divided among various parties, so that none gained

171. From  
1900 to 1909.  
Bülow

much power ; indeed several new parties — the Economic Union, the Farmers' League, the German Peasants' League, and the Bavarian Peasants' League — which represented varied interests obtained a foothold in the Reichstag. The chief result of the elections and the agitation which preceded them lay in the new allegiance which the Free-thinking parties now owed to the measures of the Government. Bülow could oppose the Centre and the Social-Democrats and secure the passage of measures by a combination of parties from the Right and Left, the so-called *bloc*. Through various and numerous compromises the *bloc* remained intact until 1909, but in that year the Conservatives voted against an inheritance tax, and with the aid of the Centre they passed a financial reform bill which was very different from the one which Bülow had proposed. The *bloc* was blasted by this defection of the Conservatives ; the Centre again became all-powerful ; and Bülow, rather than henceforth seek the support of the Centre for his majorities, resigned his chancellorship (July 1909).

172. Since  
1909.  
Bethmann-  
Hollweg

The predominance of the Centre has remained stable under the next and present chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. On close votes the Government has obtained its majorities usually by a combination of the Conservatives and the Centre. The National Liberals, the builders of the Empire, have no power inside or outside the Reichstag ; they vote usually with the Conservatives out of fear of the Social-Democrats. The amalgamation in 1910 of the two Free-thinking parties and the German People's Party in a group known as the Progressive People's Party has not disturbed the balance of power in the Reichstag. Nor did the elections of 1912 alter conditions materially. The Social-Democrats gained enormously — 110 seats instead of 43 — at the greater or less expense of every other party, but

the Social-Democrats are powerless against the combination of the Centre and the parties of the Right. As far as power is vested in the Reichstag, the Centre, a party based on church confession, remains the arbiter of German political life. A few years ago an attempt to widen the party by admitting members of other confessions was defeated impressively. The Centre favors now many measures, military, naval, and colonial, which it once opposed; it also advances further consolidation and nationalization of the Empire; but in crises the final dictator of its actions is the Pope in Rome. In this power of church over state lies one of the anachronisms of German parliamentary conditions in the twentieth century.

The Law of Exceptions, which was passed against the Social-Democrats in 1878 and renewed in 1884, lapsed permanently in 1890. In the autumn of the same year the Social-Democrats held with great enthusiasm the first of their annual general meetings of delegates. Disruptive influences have appeared in all these meetings; but the party has lost only individuals, it has never broken into groups. No other party, except the Centre, holds so closely together; its public gatherings, its unions of small inner groups, and its popular entertainments appeal to varied interests and consolidate them. Since 1881 the party has lost seats in the Reichstag in two elections, those of 1887 and 1907, but the number of votes it has polled has increased without a break, from 311,961 in 1881 to about 4,250,000 in 1912. The 110 seats which it secured in 1912 made it the largest party in the Reichstag. The conciliatory policy which the Government adopted by allowing the Law of Exceptions to expire had no visible effect on the temper and solidarity of the party. The Government therefore soon returned to repressive measures,

**173. The Social-Democrats. Their increasing numbers and solidarity**

particularly in keeping a close watch on Social-Democratic gatherings and in haling speakers before the courts on the charge of seditious utterances. The emperor has declared repeatedly that he considers a Social-Democrat a personal enemy of himself and of the Empire. But the use of force and threats has effected, as in the days of Bismarck, only the opposite of the Government's intent; the party to-day is stronger than ever.

174. The evolution of Social-Democracy in recent times

The Government and the parties of the Right oppose the Social-Democrats so vigorously because they fear the complete overthrow of existing institutions if the Social-Democrats win control. The reasonableness of this fear is largely a matter of personal opinion, but it can be met with weighty arguments. The German workingman, as everybody else in Germany, has profited by the prosperity of the last decades; he alone has enjoyed the gain of the socialistic legislation. The Social-Democrat is therefore less sweeping in his condemnation of the existing order than he formerly was; the party tends more and more to take an active part in the making of laws, less and less to be merely a party of obstruction, as under Bismarck and later. The Social-Democratic party still upholds many of the tenets of its original faith — for example, a system of militia instead of a paid standing army, and the declaration of war and peace by the people themselves — but the party can hardly be said to have threatened the complete overthrow of the existing order, because it has had no rounded theory of government to offer as a substitute. It has, moreover, not appeared in recent years as a party of revolution. It has proved itself in parliamentary as in every-day life to be rather a party of evolutionary reform. What the Social-Democrats most desire for the immediate future is more, if not complete, coöperation in government on the part of every adult German.



The Social-Democrats are not alone in desiring real coöperation in government ; the other parties of the Left unite with the Social-Democrats in this desire, as well as many adherents of the Centre and the parties of the Right. In other words, the tide of democracy and democratic government, which has already risen and swept over many countries, has also been rising in the German Empire. German exponents of this movement, realizing the limitations of the present Reichstag, see the first step toward a more democratic government in a redivision of the Empire into electoral districts, a leading question of the present time. A law of 1867 divided the country roughly into electoral districts of 100,000 inhabitants each, apportioning one member of the Reichstag to each district. This law has never been changed. Since its adoption, however, the population has increased from 40,000,000 to 65,000,000 ; many thousands have removed from the country to the city. Former constituencies of 100,000, rural for the most part, have dwindled ; others, mostly urban, have increased three- and four-fold. The resulting inequalities may be emphasized by the fact that to-day one district of 59,000 inhabitants elects one representative, and one Berlin district of 697,000 also elects one. On the basis of the present population there should be over 600 representatives in the Reichstag instead of 397. According to the present distribution of the people such an increase in representation would go almost exclusively to the towns and their industrial elements. It would go to the parties of the Left. These parties might then be able to obtain such alterations in the form of government as would ensure a redivision of political power. Another means to democratic coöperation in governmental affairs is parliamentary government and ministerial responsibility to the

175. The democratic movement in Germany and the obstacles to it



representatives of the people, the dream of the National Liberals in the first years of the Empire. Neither ministerial responsibility nor parliamentary government is possible, however, as long as the Reichstag is made up of so many parties, each a small minority in itself. Parliamentary government is based on the two-party principle, the party in and the party out of power, or the party which elects and directs the ministers of the Government — to which they are responsible — and the party of the Opposition. Ministerial responsibility to a minority party of the Reichstag would promote class legislation and incur the overwhelming opposition of all the other parties.

176. The  
opposition of  
the Govern-  
ment

The present German Government is opposed both to a redivision of electoral districts and to the institution of parliamentary government. It fears the alterations which a combination of parties of the Left might bring about. It naturally prefers a Reichstag divided against itself and the independence of individual parties which the Government thereby enjoys. It prefers that the ministers composing the Government and directing its policy should be responsible to one man, the emperor, and subject to no control whatever on the part of the people. These preferences the present Government will maintain as long as it can. As recently as January 1914 the chancellor declared in the Reichstag that he would oppose any attempt to encroach upon the emperor's constitutional rights "with all his power." Bethmann-Hollweg meant by this no recognition of the democratic movement of the age. To the world at large it seems incredible that a people, to whom the world owes so much of its intellectual freedom, should have so little coöperative political freedom and responsibility, so little part in governing themselves, as the German people.

German colonial ambition stood still in the early nineties. Caprivi was much more interested in fortifying European Germany than he was in developing opportunities of colonial expansion. He accordingly yielded German claims to valuable districts in Africa to England, receiving in turn the island of Heligoland in the North Sea, a tiny but important base for defensive and offensive naval strategy. The next chancellor, Hohenlohe, favored colonial expansion; since his time colonial problems have engaged lively interest in Germany. In 1898 Germany secured a foothold in the Far East. Two German missionaries had been murdered in China in 1897, and in the following year China granted Germany, as a measure of redress, a ninety-nine year lease on the harbor of Kiao-Chau. Germany also strengthened its position in the South Seas (1898) by buying the Caroline and Marianne Islands from Spain (for less than \$4,000,000), and by securing in an agreement with England and the United States the two largest islands of the Samoan group. These various tracts form with Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago a fairly closely connected whole. In 1911 Cameroon was much enlarged by an agreement with France. In 1914 Germany ruled over colonies in every quarter of the globe, a total colonial area five times as large as European Germany.

Germany's toil and trouble with its colonies resemble those described in the colonial histories of other nations. Officials have been appointed and dismissed in rapid succession; numerous "colonial scandals" have been published, in which officials were charged with bribery, inhuman cruelty to natives, and other crimes; many insurrections have arisen among the subject peoples. Those of German East Africa were in rebellion from July 1905 to October 1906; tribes

177. Colonial acquisitions since 1890

178. The course of affairs in the colonies

in German South-West Africa fought against German troops nearly three hundred times between October 1903 and March 1907. Under the stress of these experiences, the Imperial Government proceeded to reorganize its colonial affairs and to establish and maintain order. It elevated the "colonial office" into the "imperial colonial office," an independent department of state; it appointed an able secretary, laid a direct cable between Germany and Africa, constructed railways and telegraph lines, and quartered thousands of soldiers and officials in the colonies. By these means the Government gave uniformity and force to its colonial policy, and it has drawn great encouragement from the fact that several of its colonies have become self-supporting; some have even yielded revenues to the Empire. On the other hand, the Government has apparently sought to make little Germanies out of these alien lands, with but slight regard for climatic and racial differences and with scarcely any respect for the desires of the natives. The wisdom and the ultimate success of this method of procedure may at least be questioned.

179. State  
affairs.  
The most  
conspicuous  
public events  
in Prussia

The internal affairs of Prussia still surpass those of other German states in relative interest, as Prussian influence continues to predominate in the Empire. The most important law adopted by the Prussian Legislature since 1890 revised (1895) the finances of the kingdom fundamentally; it did away with double taxation and many indirect taxes, substituting, chiefly, a tax on incomes and one on industries. The enlargement of the canal system was vigorously opposed by the agrarians, because it meant the cheaper transportation of foreign foodstuffs through the country and a fall in the price of native farm products; the agrarians finally agreed, however, to various measures, most notably (1905) to the completion of a waterway from the

Rhine to Hanover. A law of 1906 established a variety of public schools in line with differences of religious confession and under the supervision of the clergy concerned. This law seems a fateful recognition of church in state affairs and a perpetuation of the religious differences from which Germany has suffered ever since the Reformation; but it was announced as a merely provisional measure. In this as in all its other legislation of recent years Prussia has remained true to its traditions. It has continued to keep its house in order. Order is the chief pillar of strength in Prussian life. No other country is administered so efficiently or has such honest, devoted officials. But Prussia has frequently converted a virtue into a fault. Its zeal for order has at times assumed the appearance of reaction and of militaristic use of power. Thus, in 1894, the Prussian Legislature passed a bill controlling university instruction in economics, because the doctrines of various lecturers threatened to disturb existing economic regulations; a law of 1850 was used for a time in dissolving Social-Democratic organizations; a Berlin professor was summoned before a disciplinary court for criticizing Prussia's policy toward the Danes in northern Schleswig.

The Prussian Government adopted a conciliatory policy toward the Danes and toward the Poles in the early nineties, winning the support of the Poles in the Reichstag at a critical time, but the Government soon reverted to repressive measures because the Danes continued to demand the promised plebiscite and the Poles their national independence. In 1901 the use of the Polish language was further limited by requiring that religious instruction be given thenceforth only in German. In 1906, when many thousand Polish school children struck, their parents were fined and imprisoned; newspapers were confiscated; no

180. In the  
Danish and  
Polish prov-  
inces of  
Prussia

public meetings were permitted in which Polish was to be spoken; peasants were not allowed to build houses on their own land. The Expropriation Law of 1907 gave the Colonization Commission the power to compel the sale of many landholdings, thus rendering it possible to unsettle a large number of Polish inhabitants and practically to drive them out of the country; the Commission has, however, not attempted to apply in any large measure the great power thus placed in its hands. The Poles in eastern Prussia and the Danes in Schleswig have remained as discontented as they ever were. Instead of winning their loyalty, Prussia has consolidated them against itself by its policy of repression.

181. The need of suffrage reform in Prussia and the opposition to it

The most extreme phase of reaction in Prussian government at the present time lies in the attitude of the ruling powers toward the question of suffrage reform, the leading problem in the kingdom's political life. The three-class system of suffrage, established in 1850, has never been essentially altered. The subsequent depopulation of rural districts and the congestion in the cities have therefore produced a lamentable situation. There is actually a district in Berlin in which one man constitutes the first class and thus has as much electoral power as all the workingmen of the district combined. In May 1913 the total number of men voting in the first class throughout Prussia amounted to about 300,000, that in the second class to about 1,100,000; the number in the third class was 6,500,000. Amendment of this situation has been demanded over and over again, so that in 1910 the Government proposed a new law, but many changes were made in the bill, and the Government withdrew it. In May 1914, in response to a query concerning the prospect of suffrage reform, the Prussian Minister of the Interior declared in the Legislature

that the Government would submit another bill when it saw fit. In spite of the inequalities of the present suffrage, it would be exceedingly difficult to secure a reform. The forces favored by three-class suffrage, chiefly the agrarian Conservatives, are so strong both at court and in the Legislature that the constitution could hardly be altered without their consent. It is very doubtful if they would give their consent short of a revolutionary outbreak of the widespread discontent with the suffrage as it is. The dominance of the agrarian, or Junker ("country squire"), element has gravely affected the unity of life in Prussia by giving much nourishment to class distinctions and class hatred. This dominance of an ultraconservative minority also tends to weaken the respect of other states for Prussia and their loyalty to Prussian leadership; it thus tends to affect the unity of life in the German Empire.

With the exception of Prussia all the important German states have recently remodeled their suffrage and their constitutions in general along more democratic lines. In the case of suffrage Prussia is the most backward state in all Germany except the two grand-duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz. Here, in spite of numerous attempts to reform political life, people are still living in an absolute monarchy which employs a modified (1755) feudal system of 1523. The kingdom of Saxony tried three-class suffrage unsuccessfully; after thirteen years it substituted (1909) a plural system of voting, by which as many as four votes may be acquired, through greater wealth, advancing age, and higher education. The states of South Germany are far more democratic than those in the north; for example, Social-Democrats have often been welcomed at southern courts as cordially as members of any other party. The grand-duchy of Baden,

182. Suffrage reform and other events in lesser states

Saxony



- Baden** the most democratic of all the German states, "the model duchy," has had since 1904 a suffrage that is direct, secret, and universal, and gives one man one vote; Baden even reserves the control of the budget to the lower of the two houses of the Legislature.
- Württemberg** introduced universal, secret suffrage in 1906; in 1910 the kingdom passed from the Protestant to the Roman Catholic branch of the reigning family.
- Bavaria** Bavaria's universal secret suffrage dates from 1905. The prince regent of Bavaria, Leopold, died in 1912 and was succeeded by his son Louis, also as regent, but in November 1913, when the insanity of the king, Otto, was declared incurable, Louis ascended the throne as king. Ernest Augustus, eldest son of the duke of Cumberland and grandson of the last king of Hanover, promised in 1913 to seek in no way to impair the integrity of Prussian territory. The Bundesrat received this promise as a renunciation of claims to the kingdom of Hanover, and therefore consented to the formal entry (November 1913) of Ernest Augustus into Brunswick as reigning duke.
- Brunswick** The imperial province Alsace-Lorraine received in 1911 a constitution together with three votes in the Bundesrat, thus, in the words of the imperial chancellor, "raising its people from the status of second-class Germans." The province obtained a much more liberal suffrage — equal, direct, and secret — than that in Prussia, but much objection has arisen to various provisions of the new constitution, among others, to the power of the emperor in the province through his appointment and control of the viceroy. Conditions in Alsace-Lorraine have remained far from satisfactory, even to the most optimistic observers. The population is German, rather than French, by a huge majority — almost exactly (1910) eight to one — but pro-French agitation has always been lively and obstreperous.
- 183. Alsace-Lorraine**



To counteract this influence the policy of forcible repression has been used almost exclusively. Journals have been suppressed; societies dissolved; the army has often assumed civil authority without convincing warrant. Nine of the fifteen representatives whom Alsace-Lorraine elected to the Reichstag in 1912 formed a group whose bond of union was discontent with the existing order in the province. The possession of a local constitution has furthered the consciousness of state life in Alsace-Lorraine just as the progress of other states has bound the individual peoples more closely together in state loyalty and state pride. It has been said that this loyalty and pride overshadow national consciousness, that they constitute a centrifugal force which menaces the permanence of the Empire as a unit; but German states, both rulers and people, ascribe the possibility of their great development of recent decades to the protection and encouragement afforded by national unity. Certainly no nation ever went to war with more conspicuous unanimity than Germany in August of 1914.

State unity  
and national  
unity

The consciousness of national unity has given a notable impulse to intellectual life along many lines. The unity and prosperity of the Empire have presented an opportunity unknown in Germany hitherto for the genesis of new intellectual ambitions and for the attempt to realize them. Since the eighties, German thinkers, whether engaged in philosophy or science or literature, in music or the fine arts, have pursued both the ideal and the material; they have experimented with many new forms and have recharged the old with new vitality; they have sought, in the spirit of Goethe, synthetic assimilation and development and the beauty of harmony. Philosophers, such as Bergmann and Eucken, returning to Kant, have faced materialistic tendencies of the time with a new idealism.

184. The  
chief phases  
and leaders  
of German  
intellectual  
life

Religious and scientific, permeated with love of the Hellenic ideal of beauty, modern idealism seeks to unite these elements in a new harmonious whole. Science has been, as always, idealistic in its search for pure truth; in its calculations of the applicability of science to modern life, it has also frequently been materialistic, serving as an accomplice to will to power. German literature is just emerging from a period of transition and conflict. In the eighties the influence of Ibsen and Zola and Dostoievsky brought forth many examples of appalling naturalism. Beside these there soon arose expressions of the opposite extreme, mystic, often riddling symbolism. For a decade or more men have been seeking the mean between these extremes, a realism inspired by a broader, serener, more Goethean outlook and clad in a more restrained and beautiful form. The drama commands the most attention in Germany, as evidenced by the fame and success of Hauptmann, the greatest German man of letters of the present; but the novels and short stories of Sudermann, Frenssen, and others are more indigenous and illustrative of German life and character, and the lyrics of Dehmel, George, and other poets are far richer in new moods and new ideas. In music Humperdinck has revived German romanticism and given it the new accepted forms of modern polyphony; Strauss has offended deeply by the gross naturalism of his operas, but many of his songs maintain by their nobility of conception and expression the highest traditions of German lyrical music. The fine arts and architecture display less idealism and more striving after effect, particularly the effect of mass, than any other expression of intellectual endeavor. Statues and monuments of crudely colossal proportions, such as the Bismarck statue in Hamburg and the Leipsic "Monument to the Battle of the Nations," the

impression of strain after effect in Klinger's statues and Stuck's paintings, are apt to eclipse in memory the Classical beauty of Tuillon's "Mounted Amazon," the poetic symbolism of Uhde's paintings, and the refined native romanticism of the town halls in Leipsic and Munich.

German life since 1890 may be surveyed from many points of view, and from almost every one the dominant figure is that of the emperor, William II. The presence and the influence of the emperor's vigorous personality has been felt immediately and constantly throughout the Empire. William II has thus fulfilled in ample measure the conception of a reigning prince as one who touches the life of his people at every point, and who strives with all his capacity to further every phase of their welfare. The depth of William II's insight and the breadth of his vision are disputable. From his public speeches and acts the outlines of his theory and policy of government are, however, fairly clear. William II believes in monarchy and the mission of the Hohenzollerns as devoutly as did William I; he believes in the political capability of the common people as little as did Frederick the Great. He apparently sees the hope of Germany in the development of an empire in which the people will follow with enthusiasm the leadership of the Hohenzollerns. He has therefore exalted the memory of his ancestors repeatedly, and equally often he has admonished his people to follow dutifully and confidently their appointed ruler. The emperor has not seen, or he will not acknowledge, the world-wide democratic movement of the age; he has seemed not to know that his people are determining to control their own political life, that a democratic era has already dawned within the borders of his own Empire. He has therefore been trying in vain to graft an outlived theory of government on

an age of other ideals. Bismarck recovered his later failures at home by his diplomacy and statesmanship abroad. In the field of foreign affairs, where the constitution of the Empire gives practically unlimited authority and responsibility to the emperor, William II has made his most fatal mistakes.

186. Inter-  
national  
affairs.  
From 1890 to  
1900; Ger-  
many's ap-  
pearance as a  
world power

Before and after his retirement Bismarck urged the renewal of the "reinsurance" compact with Russia, which was due to expire in 1890. But the emperor and Caprivi, Bismarck's successor (1890-1894), preferred cordial relations with England, Russia's enemy for many years, to an agreement with Russia. The treaty with England (1890), in which Germany renounced its claims to African territory for the island of Heligoland, was therefore readily agreed upon, the "reinsurance" compact was dropped, and the restoration of friendship with Russia was halted. A subsequent tariff war with Russia, lasting until 1894, destroyed the remnants of cordiality between Russia and Germany. In the meantime, probably in 1891 and 1892, Russia and France agreed in secret to conventions which secured Russia's support to France in case of a Franco-German war provided that France was not the aggressor; in 1897 the union of the two nations in the "Dual Alliance" was formally announced. Thus Russia and France made answer in logical sequence to the Triple Alliance and the announcement of its renewal (1892). Germany first came forward as a world power in 1895, soon after the beginning of Hohenlohe's chancellorship (1894-1900). China and Japan were discussing terms of peace at the close of their war, and Germany, backed by other powers, prevailed upon the victor, Japan, to modify its demands on China. Germany displayed armed force outside of Europe for the first time in 1897, when it seized Kiao-Chau and established itself in the Far East. In the same year, in the

settlement of the war between Turkey and Greece, Germany sided with Turkey, thereby acquiring influence in Constantinople and securing important concessions to German capital; the chief of these gave a German company permission to construct the so-called "Bagdad Railway," about 1500 miles long, through Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf. The range of German influence was thus vastly extended, but, excepting those with Austria and Italy, Germany's relations with other world powers were far from satisfactory. France and Russia were alienated definitively, and estrangement from England was beginning. Cordiality was manifested by both Germany and England in the distribution (1898) of the Samoan islands. But England's dealings with the Transvaal (Boer) Republic aroused much criticism in Germany, which led to counter-irritation in England; and the beginnings of commercial and naval rivalry were felt, if they were not already apparent. Nor were Germany's relations with the United States cordial in spite of the large number of German-born American citizens. A tariff war between the two countries and Germany's strictures on the importation of American meat and fruit aroused ill feeling in the United States, and during the Spanish-American War Germany intensified this feeling when it attempted to interfere with operations of American battleships in Manila Bay.

The ill feeling toward Germany which was current in many nations was due in part to jealousy of Germany's surpassing advance in prosperity and power. It was also due in part to Germany's new imperialistic attitude toward other countries and to rising distrust of the German Government's intentions. The origins of German imperialism were manifold and, mainly, quite defensible: the example of every other first-class nation, the limited area of European

187. The growth of German imperialism and Pan-Germanism

Germany, German ambition to equal in territory other nations of its class, the consciousness of German national strength and worth, the emigration of millions of Germans to other quarters of the globe and the desire to hold these former citizens to their native allegiance. But Germany seemed at times not merely to be protecting its people and interests abroad, but also to be forcing opportunities to seize a foothold in many regions, in South America, in the Philippines, in Africa, and in Asia. Each of these moves fell short for one reason or another, but each added to the distrust of Germany. This distrust was further increased by the appearance and activity of a new element in German life, Pan-Germanism. This movement, an outgrowth of German imperialism, set in shortly before the end of the nineteenth century and grew very rapidly. It is not an organized union, however ; it is an idea, which, roughly stated, conceives all Germanic peoples as forming in spirit one great nationality. All Pan-Germanists start out from this idea, but their declared aims vary widely. Some Pan-Germanists deny any political or territorial ambitions and assert that they wish merely to spread the knowledge and influence of German culture throughout the world. Others daringly proclaim as an ultimate mission the German occupation not only of territory where German is spoken but of the whole globe ; they favor, if need be, the forcible Germanization of the world. Men of high official standing in Germany have disclaimed repeatedly that the Government has ever taken part in the Pan-German movement ; they have also asserted that the Pan-Germanists form a very small percentage of the German people. But Pan-Germanists carried on their propaganda with great vigor ; they enlisted the aid of many influential German newspapers ; they increased their following at home by large



numbers every year ; and they instigated the formation of societies all over the earth to advance exclusively German ideas of culture and civilization. These ideas were threatening, for they promoted the most sinister elements of German life : increase of armaments, militarism in the conduct of state and national affairs, magnification of German achievements, and disparagement of non-German institutions and customs. In its advocacy of such principles as these and in its tacit repudiation of the equal rights of other nationalities, Pan-Germanism in its extreme form was hurling boomerangs ; it was making itself the most insidious of all the hostile forces rising up against Germany. Largely on account of those things for which extreme Pan-Germanism stands, Germany became the most disliked nation in Europe.

When Bülow became Imperial Chancellor (1900-1909), a new, more conciliatory spirit seemed to enter into German diplomacy. The German Government seemed earnestly to desire friendship with other nations. It worked harmoniously with other powers to suppress the Boxer uprising (1900) in China, and it readily agreed (1901) with England concerning the integrity of China. It began also to draw closer to the United States through an exchange of gifts, through the visit (1902) of Prince Henry to the United States, and through the establishment of exchange professorships. But Germany made no progress with France or with Russia, and soon a contrary tide began to rise in England. England resented the lively sympathy of the German people for the Boers in the English-Boer War (1899-1902) ; commercial rivalry became very real ; and England saw in the rapid growth of the German navy a direct menace to its mastery of the sea. In 1902 England entered into an alliance with Japan. In 1904 it established

188. From  
1900 to 1904

Estrangement from  
England and  
the rise of  
the Triple  
Entente



the "Entente Cordiale" with France. This was a prologue to the "Triple Entente," which soon after united England, France, and Russia, and served as a reënforcement of the Dual Alliance between Russia and France. The Triple Entente bound the contracting parties to act together in diplomatic sympathy; it did not, however, bind England on the one hand or France and Russia on the other to help in case of war.

189. From 1904 to 1909; the first stage in the Franco-German dispute over Morocco

The Triple Alliance was renewed in 1902, but in 1904 a growing friendliness between France and Italy threatened its integrity. Germany, with only Austria as a certain friend, found itself becoming more and more isolated. This feeling of isolation was emphasized by the proclamation of the Triple Entente and by events concerning northern Africa. In 1904 England and France agreed that England should have a free hand in Egypt, and France in Morocco. Germany was ignored in the consultations leading to this agreement in spite of the fact that Germany had important commercial interests in Morocco, based in part on a convention of the powers in 1880, in part on a special treaty with Morocco made in 1890. Highly indignant at the slight, and not improperly, Germany insisted (1905), with the support of Austria, on the territorial integrity and independence of Morocco and on the "open door" to the commerce of all nations. In 1906 the powers approved this demand at Algeciras, Spain. Germany took this position, probably, with a twofold purpose, to defeat the parties to the Entente Cordiale and thereby weaken their union, and to exert an influence which would force the recognition of Germany thenceforth as a nation to be reckoned with and consulted. On the other hand, Germany apparently stood on the ground of a lofty morality, and it maintained this ground triumphantly. German diplomacy seemed to

be regenerated and to be informed by German idealism. A few years later it celebrated another triumph, though a more dubious one. The Berlin Congress of 1878 had turned over the administration of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria; thirty years later (1908) Austria annexed both states as Austrian provinces. Russia, which was looking to the establishment of a Balkan federation of Slavic states under its protection, entered a vigorous protest against Austria's seizure of the two states, but Russia was still too weak from its war with Japan (1904-1905) to venture upon a conflict of arms. When Germany, in return for Austria's aid at Algeciras, threw all its influence on the side of Austria, even to the threat of war, Russia acquiesced. In 1909 the powers confirmed the Austrian annexation. Germany was now proclaimed as the arbiter of Europe. Germany had prevented war when war seemed inevitable, but whereas at Algeciras it had won with a display of noble morality, it triumphed in 1909 with a display of its sword. This was not forgotten in the chancelleries of Europe.

Germany assists Austria in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bethmann-Hollweg, the imperial chancellor of the present time, succeeded Bülow in 1909. For a while it seemed that Germany, from the vantage ground of 1909, might regenerate its relations with at least two arch-enemies, Russia and England. In 1910 Germany and Russia promised in turn not to enter upon any policy which might aim aggressively at the other. In 1911 Germany removed a possible source of conflict with England and English interests in Asia by conceding the completion of the Bagdad Railway to an international company. Then came the downfall of German diplomacy of 1911. In the summer of that year, when French troops were occupying the capital of Morocco in order to preserve peace, a German cruiser cast

190. From 1909 to 1911

The last  
encounter  
over Morocco,  
the defeat  
of Germany

anchor off the town of Agadir, in southern Morocco, in order to protect German merchants and to safeguard the observance of the conventions of Algenciras. In the negotiations which followed, Germany beat a lamentable retreat. It granted that in view of France's activity for the welfare of Morocco France should be politically preëminent in the sultanate and might establish a protectorate over it; both France and Germany endorsed the principle of equal commercial liberty in Morocco to all nations; and — the most significant feature of these negotiations from the moral standpoint — France ceded to Germany 106,000 square miles of African territory contiguous to Germany's province of Cameroon. Thus Germany maintained the principle of the "open door," but it yielded the independence of Morocco, and it forced the cession to itself of territory more than half as large as European Germany. At Algenciras it had appeared inspired by idealistic motives and wholly disinterested in regard to territorial acquisitions; in 1911 it laid itself open to the charge of having nourished territorial ambitions from the start. To foreign observers the Franco-German agreement of 1911 afforded convincing evidence of a highly dangerous spirit of aggression in Germany. This evidence was augmented by that of the reception which a large portion of the German people gave to the news of the agreement. Many Germans, Pan-Germanists and others, were bitterly disappointed that Germany did not force France to divide its protectorate over Morocco; they have never ceased to censure this "weakness" on the part of their Government. Thus German diplomacy lost heavily at home and abroad. Other nations were more convinced than ever that militaristic aggressiveness was the dominant note in German diplomacy and German life.

During 1912 and 1913 the relations between the powers remained essentially unchanged. The reality of the alignments of the great nations and of their vast, increasing armaments became, however, more oppressive constantly. On the one hand stood the Triple Entente of England, France, and Russia, reënforced for England by its alliance with Japan and for France and Russia by the more binding terms of their Dual Alliance. On the other hand stood the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, which was renewed in 1912. The advantage of a comparison lay with the Entente. The wealth and the resources of the parties to it, not including the English and French colonies, aggregated nearly \$4,000,000,000 of annual revenues and nearly 8,500,000 trained soldiers, whereas the annual revenues of the Triple Alliance slightly exceeded \$2,500,000,000 and its trained soldiers 7,000,000. The more important comparison of the cohesive power of the two groups of nations likewise favored the Entente. Nothing occurred in recent years to mar at all seriously the cordiality of the relations between its members, and no conflict of interests anywhere threatened for the immediate future. The stability of the Triple Alliance was menaced by a rising conflict of interests between Austria and Italy, each of whom was eager to acquire territory along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea. No friction developed between Germany and Italy, but it became increasingly evident after 1904 that the ties between Germany and Austria were drawn much closer than those between Germany and Italy. The close coöperation of Germany and Austria at Algeciras and again in 1909 proved this to the satisfaction of Italy as of every other nation. Thus have the great powers of Europe stood in the most recent years. These were the fruits of German

191. The relations of the powers within the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance in 1912 and 1913

diplomacy since the time of Bismarck. When Bismarck retired, Germany had only one certain enemy, France. In the spring of 1914 Germany had only one certain friend, Austria. That friend was destined to draw Germany into the most calamitous war in history.

192. The immediate causes of the war

Russia yielded to Austria's seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it neither forgave nor forgot. On the contrary, it used Serbia in stirring up all the Slavic elements in both the provinces against the rule of Austria. This agitation culminated on June 28, 1914, when the Austrian heir-presumptive was murdered in the capital of Bosnia. On July 23, in a formal ultimatum, Austria laid all the blame for the assassination at the door of Serbia and demanded immediate investigation and retribution. The following day Austria rejected the joint request of Serbia and Russia for an extension of time to Serbia in preparing a reply. On July 25 Serbia granted all the terms of Austria's ultimatum except the participation of Austrian officers in the investigation of conditions in Serbia. But even with this Austria was not satisfied. It therefore declared war on Serbia July 28. Russia, Germany, and France began at once to prepare for war, and as Russia refused to cease its mobilization, Germany declared war on Russia August 1. Within twenty-four hours German troops invaded France without waiting for a formal declaration of war, and Belgium appealed to England for protection against the threatened invasion of its territory by Germany. As Germany did invade Belgium, in violation of the neutrality guaranteed to Belgium by all the powers, England declared war on Germany August 4; on August 12 England declared war on Austria. In the meantime (August 8) Montenegro, as an enemy of Austria, and Portugal, as an ally of England, had ranged themselves on the side of the Triple

Entente; on August 23 Japan, as an ally of England and still smarting from the wound inflicted by Germany in 1895, declared war on Germany. Thus the Triple Entente held fast and attracted new allies; all the eight nations together—England, France, Russia, Belgium, Portugal, Servia, Montenegro, and Japan—could muster at the outbreak of the war nearly 11,000,000 trained soldiers. The Triple Alliance did not go to war. Italy declared its neutrality and reaffirmed (August 8) this position, on the ground that the terms of the Triple Alliance bound its members to mutual support only in case one of them were attacked by France or Russia, whereas Germany committed the first act of war. Germany and Austria thus entered upon the conflict alone, opposing with slightly more than 6,000,000 trained soldiers the unparalleled hosts of their enemies.

The haste with which Germany plunged into war, absolving Italy from participation as a member of the Triple Alliance, was only one of the mistakes of German diplomacy in the critical weeks and days before the war. If, as other nations believe, Germany was behind Austria throughout the negotiations with Servia, German diplomacy made in this its gravest, most fundamental mistake; it precipitated the war. For, in view of the part which Russia had taken through Servia in the anti-Austrian agitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was certain that Russia, having recovered command of its normal strength and resources, would unite with Servia in a defensive war against Austria; Russia would not, as in 1909, be stayed by a display of Germany's sword. France was drawn into war by Germany's invasion of French territory, but even now, when Germany and Austria were arrayed against Russia, France, and Servia, Germany might anticipate a victory in the

193. Mistakes of German diplomacy



struggle. Germany then repudiated Prussia's written guarantee of Belgian neutrality as an immaterial "scrap of paper," when advantages of war were in the balance, and proceeded to throw many thousand troops into Belgium on the way to France. Germany thereby destroyed the good will of many neutral nations; it raised up new and powerful enemies, England, Belgium, and Japan. More undiscerning diplomacy can hardly be imagined than that of Germany in the summer of 1914.

194. The ultimate causes of the war and the blame

Nevertheless, however blundering German diplomacy may have been, and however clear the immediate causes of the war may seem to be, the ultimate blame does not lie with Germany alone. Only those whose vision is limited to things of to-day can charge all the guilt to any one or all the evil forces at work in Germany. From the German point of view it is a war of national defense against the inroads of the Slavs and the jealousy of England and France. Germany's enemies are fighting German militarism and overweening ambition. It is the shame of Europe that Germany and its enemies can cite in turn historical proof of charges which they bring against each other. Greed and jealousy, therefore, alliances and ententes, armaments and militarism, each and all are responsible for the collapse of civilization on the noblest continent of the globe.



## STATES COMPOSING THE GERMAN EMPIRE

THE STATES	AREA IN SQUARE MILES (IN ROUND NUMBERS)	POPULATION DECEMBER 1, 1910 (IN ROUND NUMBERS)	NUMBER OF MEM- BERS IN THE BUNDES-RAT	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE REICHSTAG
<b>Kingdoms :</b>				
Prussia . . . . .	134,000	40,000,000	17	236
Bavaria . . . . .	29,200	7,000,000	6	48
Saxony . . . . .	5,700	5,000,000	4	23
Württemberg . . . . .	7,500	2,500,000	4	17
<b>Grand-duchies :</b>				
Baden . . . . .	5,800	2,000,000	3	14
Hesse . . . . .	2,900	1,000,000	3	9
Mecklenburg-Schwerin . . . . .	5,000	600,000	2	6
Mecklenburg-Strelitz . . . . .	1,100	100,000	1	1
Oldenburg . . . . .	2,400	500,000	1	3
Saxe-Weimar . . . . .	1,300	400,000	1	3
<b>Duchies :</b>				
Anhalt . . . . .	800	300,000	1	2
Brunswick . . . . .	1,400	500,000	2	3
Saxe-Altenburg . . . . .	500	200,000	1	1
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha . . . . .	700	250,000	1	2
Saxe-Meiningen . . . . .	900	300,000	1	2
<b>Principalities :</b>				
Lippe . . . . .	400	150,000	1	1
Reuss, younger branch . . . . .	100	75,000	1	1
Reuss, older branch . . . . .	300	150,000	1	1
Schaumburg-Lippe . . . . .	100	50,000	1	1
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt . . . . .	300	100,000	1	1
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen . . . . .	300	90,000	1	1
Waldeck . . . . .	400	60,000	1	1
<b>Free Cities :</b>				
Bremen . . . . .	99	300,000	1	1
Hamburg . . . . .	150	1,000,000	1	3
Lübeck . . . . .	100	100,000	1	1
<b>Imperial Territory :</b>				
Alsace-Lorraine . . . . .	5,600	2,000,000	3*	15
	208,000	65,000,000	61	397

\* Not counted if Prussia, by means of them, should secure a majority for the measure on which the Bundesrat is voting.

## GENEALOGIES OF LEADING GERMAN RULERS

### *A.* Hohenzollern Rulers since 1640.

Frederick William, "the Great Elector" of Brandenburg, 1640-1688.

Frederick III, son of the Great Elector; Elector of Brandenburg, 1688-1713; as Frederick I, King in Prussia, 1701-1713.

Frederick William I, son of Frederick I; King in Prussia, 1713-1740.

Frederick II, "the Great," son of Frederick William I; King of Prussia, 1740-1786.

Frederick William II, nephew of Frederick the Great; King of Prussia, 1786-1797.

Frederick William III, son of Frederick William II; King of Prussia, 1797-1840.

Frederick William IV, son of Frederick William III; King of Prussia, 1840-1861.

William I, son of Frederick William III; regent, 1857-1861; King of Prussia, 1861-1888; German Emperor, 1871-1888.

Frederick III, son of William I; King of Prussia and German Emperor, March-June, 1888.

William II, son of Frederick III; King of Prussia and German Emperor, 1888-

### *B.* Hapsburg Rulers since 1740.

Maria Theresa, daughter of Charles VI; Archduchess of Austria, 1740-1780; wife of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Francis I, 1745-1765.

Joseph II, son of Maria Theresa and Francis I; Archduke of Austria and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 1765-1790.

Leopold II, son of Maria Theresa and Francis I; Archduke of Austria and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 1790-1792.

Francis II, son of Leopold II; Archduke of Austria, 1792-1804; Emperor of Austria as Francis I, 1804-1835; Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 1792-1806.

Ferdinand I, son of Francis I; Emperor of Austria, 1835-1848.

Francis Joseph, nephew of Ferdinand I; Emperor of Austria, 1848-

C. Wittelsbach Rulers of Bavaria since 1726.

Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria, 1726-1745; Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire as Charles VII, 1742-1745.

Maximilian III, son of Charles Albert; Elector of Bavaria, 1745-1777.

Charles Theodore, a distant relative and heir of Maximilian III; Elector of Bavaria, 1777-1799.

Maximilian IV, a distant relative and heir of Charles Theodore; Elector of Bavaria, 1799-1806; King of Bavaria as Maximilian I, 1806-1825.

Louis I, son of Maximilian I; King of Bavaria, 1825-1848.

Maximilian II, son of Louis I; King of Bavaria, 1848-1864.

Louis II, son of Maximilian II; King of Bavaria, 1864-June 13, 1886.

Leopold, brother of Maximilian II; regent, June 10, 1886-1912.

Otto, son of Maximilian II; King of Bavaria, June 13, 1886-1913.

Louis, son of Leopold; regent, 1912-1913; King of Bavaria as Louis III, 1913-

D. House of Hanover since 1692.

Ernest Augustus I, Elector of Hanover, 1692-1698.

George I, son of Ernest Augustus; Elector of Hanover, 1698-1727; King of England, 1714-1727.

George II, son of George I; Elector of Hanover and King of England, 1727-1760.

George III, nephew of George II; Elector of Hanover, 1760-1815; King of Hanover, 1815-1820; King of England, 1760-1820.

George IV, son of George III; King of Hanover and King of England, 1820-1830.

William, son of George III; King of Hanover, 1830-1837; King of England as William IV, 1830-1837.

Ernest Augustus, son of George III; Duke of Cumberland; as Ernest Augustus I, King of Hanover, 1837-1851.

George V, son of Ernest Augustus I; Duke of Cumberland; King of Hanover, 1851-1866; died 1878.

Ernest Augustus, son of George V; Duke of Cumberland; heir of William, Duke of Brunswick (died 1884).

Ernest Augustus, son of Ernest Augustus; Duke of Brunswick, 1913-

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